In re Brandon S.

169 A.D.3d 1047

92 N.Y.S.3d 903 (Mem)

In the MATTER OF BRANDON S. (Anonymous), Appellant.

2018–02264

Docket No. D–6948–17

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—January 3, 2019

February 27, 2019

W. David Eddy, Jr., White Plains, NY, for appellant.

John M. Nonna, County Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Linda Trentacoste and Justin R. Adin of counsel), for respondent.

JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Brandon S. appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Westchester County (Mary Anne Scattarretico–Naber, J.), entered January 22, 2018. The order of fact-finding and disposition, after a hearing, found that Brandon S. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree, adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation for a period of two years.

ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient is unpreserved for appellate review (see Matter of Jonathan F., 72 A.D.3d 963, 963–964, 898 N.Y.S.2d 516 ; Matter of John M.P., 54 A.D.3d 1041, 1042, 864 N.Y.S.2d 550 ; cf. People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ). In any event, viewing the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621 ; Matter of Kemar G., 72 A.D.3d 965, 898 N.Y.S.2d 518 ; Matter of Summer D., 67 A.D.3d 1008, 1009, 890 N.Y.S.2d 562 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree (see Penal Law § 130.65[1] ; People v. Jessup, 90 A.D.3d 782, 783–784, 934 N.Y.S.2d 225 ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ; cf. CPL 470.15[5] ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Clarissa S., 83 A.D.3d 1083, 1084, 921 N.Y.S.2d 540 ; cf. People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determinations were not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 342.2[2] ; Matter of Charles S., 41 A.D.3d 484, 486, 838 N.Y.S.2d 136 ).

The Family Court has broad discretion in entering dispositional orders (see Matter of Antoine H., 81 A.D.3d 646, 915 N.Y.S.2d 869 ; Matter of Gustav D., 79 A.D.3d 868, 869, 912 N.Y.S.2d 424 ; Matter of Abel R., 77 A.D.3d 758, 908 N.Y.S.2d 601 ). "That discretion includes the authority to impose conditions of probation that are reasonably related to rehabilitation" ( Matter of Ashley D., 55 A.D.3d 605, 606, 866 N.Y.S.2d 222 ; see Family Ct Act § 353.2[2][h] ; cf. Penal Law § 65.10[2], [5] ; People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259, 263–264, 631 N.Y.S.2d 105, 655 N.E.2d 146 ). Here, contrary to the appellant's contentions, the disposition was appropriate in light of, inter alia, the seriousness of the incident that led to the appellant's adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, as well as the recommendations made in the probation report and the forensic evaluation report (see Matter of Gustav D., 79 A.D.3d at 869, 912 N.Y.S.2d 424 ; Matter of Eunique B., 73 A.D.3d 764, 899 N.Y.S.2d 852 ; Matter of Jonathan F., 72 A.D.3d 963, 964, 898 N.Y.S.2d 516 ; Matter of Javed K., 57 A.D.3d 899, 900, 870 N.Y.S.2d 412 ; Matter of Julissa R., 30 A.D.3d 526, 528, 817 N.Y.S.2d 116 ).

The appellant failed to preserve for appellate review his argument with respect to the timeliness of the fact-finding hearing because he did not move to dismiss the petition in the Family Court (see Matter of Yarras F., 5 A.D.3d 481, 481, 772 N.Y.S.2d 563 ; Matter of Kovan Clearance D., 288 A.D.2d 219, 220, 732 N.Y.S.2d 575 ; Matter of Naiquan T., 265 A.D.2d 331, 332, 696 N.Y.S.2d 79 ). In any event, the appellant's contention that the fact-finding hearing was not timely commenced is without...