In re Buckingham

197 Conn.App. 373

231 A.3d 1261

IN RE Probate Appeal of Sheryl BUCKINGHAM et al.

AC 42548

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 23, 2020

Officially released May 26, 2020

Michael A. D'Onofrio, with whom, on the brief, was Dante R. Gallucci, Fairfield, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

John A. Farnsworth, Greenwich, with whom was Anthony E. Monelli, for the appellee (defendant).

DiPentima, C. J., and Elgo and Devlin, Js.

DEVLIN, J.

An unusual feature of Connecticut law involves the role of the Superior Court in probate appeals. In such appeals, the Superior Court sheds its status as a constitutional court of general jurisdiction and assumes the status of a statutory Probate Court of limited jurisdiction. See In re Probate Appeal of Knott , 190 Conn. App. 56, 61, 209 A.3d 690 (2019) ; State v. Gordon , 45 Conn. App. 490, 494–95, 696 A.2d 1034, cert. granted on other grounds, 243 Conn. 911, 701 A.2d 336 (1997) (appeal dismissed October 27, 1998). In the present case, we are asked to decide whether, while adjudicating a probate appeal, a Superior Court may entertain a direct challenge to a probate decree admitting a will to probate based on a claim of fraud. Because, in the context of the present case, such claim of fraud may be raised only by way of a separate equitable action and not a probate appeal, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the probate appeal filed by the plaintiffs, Sheryl Buckingham and Darlene Dunn, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On October 21, 2011, the decedent, Steve T. Liscinsky, executed a will naming as beneficiaries his children, which include the plaintiffs and the defendant, Wayne S. Liscinsky. The will also named the defendant as executor of the decedent's estate. The decedent died on May 1, 2016. Following the decedent's death, the defendant filed a petition with the Probate Court for the district of Housatonic to admit the will to probate. On August 9, 2016, the Probate Court issued a notice of the defendant's petition, which listed the plaintiffs as recipients of the notice and explained that the will would be admitted on August 24, 2016, with a deadline to object to its admission of August 22, 2016. The plaintiffs never filed an objection to the will, nor did any other interested party. Subsequently, on August 24, 2016, the Probate Court issued a decree admitting the will to probate, and it served notice to the interested parties on August 25, 2016. The plaintiffs never appealed from this decree. See General Statutes § 45a-186 (b).

Nearly three months later, on November 10, 2016, the plaintiffs’ counsel filed his appearance with the Probate Court. On January 9, 2017, 137 days after the Probate Court had issued its decree, the plaintiffs filed a motion titled "Notice of Intention to Contest Will" with the Probate Court. On January 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a related motion titled "Request for Court Order for Disclosure of Medical Information." In effect, these two motions sought the decedent's medical records in order to contest the will under the alternative theories that either the decedent lacked the capacity to knowingly and voluntarily execute his will or the will was the product of undue influence. On January 17, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the will contest, arguing that the Probate Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ contest was untimely, the court lacked statutory authority to consider their claims, and their claims were barred by res judicata. The Probate Court agreed and, on June 28, 2018, dismissed the action.

From that decree, the plaintiffs timely appealed to the Superior Court. In their complaint to the Superior Court, the plaintiffs included additional allegations that they had not received proper notice of the defendant's petition to admit the will to probate and that the defendant had "fraudulently concealed" and "fraudulently presented" the will. The plaintiffs did not offer further factual allegations to support their new claims of fraud. In response, the defendant moved to dismiss the probate appeal on three grounds: (1) the Superior Court, in exercising the same authority as the Probate Court, lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the appeal; (2) the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata; and (3) the plaintiffs’ claims of fraud were legally insufficient. The Superior Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs lacked statutory authority to raise their claims outside of a timely appeal from the original probate decree admitting the will and those claims were barred by res judicata. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the Superior Court improperly dismissed their appeal from the Probate Court. Specifically, they contend that they sufficiently pleaded their claims of fraud, and, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-24,¹ the Superior Court has jurisdiction to set aside prior probate decrees without any applicable statutory time limitation "when the claim involves fraud, including concealment of lack of capacity, and undue influence."² We conclude that, in the circumstances of the present case, the Superior Court in this probate appeal had no jurisdiction to set aside prior decrees of the Probate Court—even on a ground of fraud. Thus, the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claims.³

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review. "Our Supreme Court has long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. ... Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. ... Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. ... The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Probate Appeal of Knott , supra, 190 Conn. App. at 61, 209 A.3d 690.

Moreover, "[a]n appeal from a Probate Court to the Superior Court is not an ordinary civil action. ... When entertaining an appeal from an order or decree of a Probate Court, the Superior Court takes the place of and sits as the court of probate. ... In ruling on a probate appeal, the Superior Court exercises the powers, not of a constitutional court of general or common law jurisdiction, but of a Probate Court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gordon , supra, 45 Conn. App. at 494–95, 696 A.2d 1034. "When ... no record was made of the Probate Court proceedings, the absence of a record requires a trial de novo." Silverstein v. Laschever , 113 Conn. App. 404, 409, 970 A.2d 123 (2009).

The ultimate question in this appeal, therefore, is whether the Probate Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction to set aside a prior probate decree. If so, then the plaintiffs would have had a cognizable cause of action, and the Superior Court, in exercising the same authority as the Probate Court, would have possessed subject matter jurisdiction as well. Accordingly, we now analyze the jurisdictional bounds of our courts of probate.

"The Probate Court is a court of limited jurisdiction prescribed by statute, and it may exercise only such powers as are necessary to the performance of its duties. ... As a court of limited jurisdiction, it may act only when the facts and circumstances exist upon which the legislature has conditioned its exercise of power. ... Such a court is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Probate Appeal of Cadle Co. , 129 Conn. App. 814, 820, 21 A.3d 572, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 914, 27 A.3d 373 (2011).

In 1904, our Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether the Probate Court possesses the authority to reverse or to set aside its prior decrees. Delehanty v. Pitkin , 76 Conn. 412, 416, 56 A. 881 (1904), appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 602, 26 S. Ct. 748, 50 L. Ed. 328 (1905). In Delehanty , the Probate Court issued a decree admitting a will to probate, which the plaintiff did not appeal, and then, four years later, the plaintiff petitioned the Probate Court to admit a different will for the same decedent. Id., at 413–15, 56 A. 881. The Probate Court denied the plaintiff's petition, and the Superior Court subsequently dismissed his appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id., at 413, 56 A. 881. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that his proposed will was the true will of the decedent and that one of the executors had fraudulently destroyed the original copy of this will. Id., at 414, 56 A. 881. Upon reviewing the contemporaneous statutes governing the authority of the Probate Court, our Supreme Court concluded that "the power to set aside a decree of this kind, after the estate is settled, is not in express terms anywhere given to our courts of probate ...." Id., at 416–17, 56 A. 881. Further, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the Probate Court possessed that authority by implication, holding that the courts of probate "have no such unregulated and unlimited power to modify, reverse, or set aside ... their own final decrees ...." Id., at 417–18, 56 A. 881. Instead, the legislature vested the right to overturn probate decrees with the Superior Court on appeal and, "save in the cases excepted by statute, a final probate decree can be set aside or reversed only upon appeal." Id., at 420, 56 A. 881.

Our Supreme Court further concluded that there was no statutory exception permitting the Probate Co...