In re C.H.

606 S.W.3d 570

IN RE COMMITMENT OF C.H.

NO. 14-19-00040-CV

NO. 14-19-00041-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinions filed July 30, 2020

Frances Bourliot, Justice

This case involves an involuntary civil commitment for mental health services. C.H.'s son applied for temporary mental health services for his mother. The trial court ordered C.H. to be committed for inpatient treatment and to receive psychoactive medication. The trial court denied C.H.'s request to be present at the commitment hearing over her objection that denying this request would violate her federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation of the witnesses against her. At the hearing on the forced administration of medication, the trial court denied C.H.'s request to testify based on her right to be heard under article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution.

C.H. now challenges the trial court's denial of these requests. She contends that the trial court violated her federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation and her right to be heard under the state constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. These constitutional grounds are the sole basis for her complaints. Because these constitutional rights apply only to criminal prosecutions and this case involves a civil proceeding, we find no merit in C.H.'s issues and affirm. The dissent would address whether the trial court violated C.H.'s procedural due process rights. While we agree that C.H. was entitled to procedural due process, unfortunately we cannot address this constitutional ground for reversal because C.H. did not raise a due process complaint in the trial court or on appeal.

Background

In his application for temporary mental health services for C.H., C.H.'s son alleged, among other things, that C.H. was (1) "suffering severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress"; (2) "experiencing substantial mental or physical deterioration of [her] ability to function independently, except for reasons of indigence, to provide for [her] basic needs[,] including food, clothing, health, or safety"; and (3) "not able to make a rational and informed decision as to whether to submit to treatment." A "Certificate of Medical Examination" signed by a physician was filed along with the application. The physician stated that C.H. "has been physically aggressive and is at risk of harming others," "bit a constable on his hand and broke his skin," "displays florid psychosis including delusions that impair ability to function safely," "[b]elieves people are trying to kill her, threatening people," and "[n]eeds inpatient stabilization." Six days later, the physician filed a petition for a court order to administer psychoactive medication.

The trial court ordered C.H. into protective custody, set a hearing to determine whether probable cause existed for C.H.'s immediate restraint, and set a hearing on the application for mental health services and petition to administer medication. At the probable cause hearing, the trial court found there was probable cause to believe that C.H. "present[ed] a substantial risk of serious harm to [herself] or others" and that she should remain in the hospital pending the final hearing.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the application for mental health services and a hearing on the petition to administer medication on the same day, addressing mental health services first. C.H.'s attorney requested that C.H. be present. The court constable told the trial court that C.H. "was very aggressive" and had bitten one of the constables and broken his skin, and as a result, the constable was off duty to recover from his injury. The psychiatrist who was there to testify at the hearing stated, "They will not give her a roommate because of the violence." The trial court stated that it would not be in C.H.'s best interest or the best interest of other people in the courtroom for C.H. to be present. C.H.'s attorney objected as follows: "specifically for purposes of the appeal, [C.H.] is entitled to confrontation of the witnesses against her. That is a constitutional right under both State and Federal [C]onstitutions."

At the end of the commitment hearing, the trial court signed a judgment committing C.H. for court ordered mental health services. The court then began the hearing on the petition to administer medication. The State of Texas presented its case-in-chief and rested. At that point, C.H.'s attorney asked for C.H. to be allowed to testify under " Article I, Section 10 [of the Texas Constitution], the right to be heard." The trial court asked if C.H. could appear by telephone and asked if she would "get violent" if "she gets frustrated or I cut her off because she's talking for 20 minutes on the same point, how will she take it? Will she throw the phone at somebody?" The psychiatrist told the trial court that C.H. did not respond to his redirection that morning or to staff redirection, which was part of the reason C.H. was not allowed to have a roommate. The trial court denied the request, stating, "I'm not too sure that giving her a hard, plastic telephone receiver, which would be in her control obviously, or putting her near a phone which is on a speaker, ... would be consonant with safety of the people on the unit who are also there who also have rights."

Discussion

In two issues, C.H. contends the trial court erred in (1) denying her request to be present in the courtroom so that she could confront the witnesses against her based on her rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution, and (2) refusing to allow her to testify telephonically on the basis that she has a right to be heard under article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution.

We review questions raising constitutional concerns de novo. State v. Hodges , 92 S.W.3d 489, 494 (Tex. 2002) ; In re K.C. , 563 S.W.3d 391, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). When the trial court may grant or deny relief based on its factual determinations, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. In re Doe , 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000) ; In re K.C. , 563 S.W.3d at 396. In this connection, we typically apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to procedural rulings or "other trial management determinations." In re Doe , 19 S.W.3d at 253 ; In re J.B. , No. 01-19-00037-CV, 605 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 12, 2020, no pet.).

We turn to C.H.'s constitutional challenges.

I. Right to Confrontation

In her first issue, C.H. asserts that the trial court erred in waiving C.H.'s appearance "over her objection." The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "In all criminal prosecutions , the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added). Similarly, article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution provides, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused ... shall be confronted by the witnesses against him." Tex. Const. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). The right to confrontation includes the right to "face-to-face confrontation." Coronado v. State , 351 S.W.3d 315, 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ; see also California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) ("[I]t is this literal right to ‘confront’ [a] witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause[.]").

C.H. acknowledges that commitment proceedings are civil, but she contends that these proceedings implicate a loss of liberty and so she should be entitled to the right to confrontation. But the express language of the federal and state constitutions compels us to conclude otherwise. The right to confrontation under both the United States and Texas Constitutions is expressly limited to criminal prosecutions. In re J.B. , 605 S.W.3d 650, 654 (citing Austin v. United States , 509 U.S. 602, 608, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993) ("The protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are explicitly confined to criminal prosecutions.")). Texas courts have repeatedly held that there is no constitutional right to confrontation in civil proceedings, including civil commitment proceedings. Id. (citing In re K.C. , 563 S.W.3d at 397, In re S.A.G. , 403 S.W.3d 907, 912 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (holding confrontation clause did not apply in suit affecting parent-child relationship), and Cheng v. Wang , 315 S.W.3d 668, 669-72 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (holding confrontation clause did not apply in partnership dispute)); In re Polk , 187 S.W.3d 550, 555–56 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, no pet.) (holding confrontation clause did not apply in civil proceeding to commit sexually violent predator).

Involuntary mental health commitment proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. Campbell v. State , 85 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. 2002) ; State v. Addington , 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979). We cannot ignore the plain text of each constitutional provision stating that each provision applies to "criminal prosecutions." See U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. Thus, C.H.'s constitutional confrontation rights under the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution do not apply in this civil commitment proceeding. See In re J.B. , 605 S.W.3d 650, 653–55 ; In re K.C. , 563 S.W.3d at 397 ; In re Polk , 187 S.W.3d at 555–56. We overrule C.H.'s first issue.

II. Right to Be Heard

In her second issue, C.H. contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow her to testify telephonically at the hearing on the petition to administer psychoactive medications on the basis that this refusal violated her right to be heard under article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution. Article I, section 10 provides, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused ... shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both." Tex. Const. art. I, § 10 (...