In re C.N.R.

379 N.C. 409

866 S.E.2d 666

In the MATTER OF: C.N.R.

No. 102A21

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed December 17, 2021

James N. Freeman, Jr., Elkin, for petitioner-appellee Yadkin County Human Services Agency.

Paul W. Freeman, Jr., Wilkesboro, for appellee guardian ad litem.

Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, for respondent-appellant mother.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock, Asheville, for respondent-appellant father.

ERVIN, Justice ¶ 1 Respondent-mother Joyce R. and respondent-father Joshua R. appeal from an order entered by the trial court terminating their parental rights in their daughter C.N.R.¹ After careful consideration of the parents' challenges to the trial court's termination order, we conclude that the challenged order should be affirmed.

¶ 2 In 2016, respondent-mother was charged with misdemeanor child abuse as a result of unsanitary conditions that existed in the family home at the time that the Yadkin County Human Services Agency completed a family assessment. The charge against respondent-mother was dismissed in light of respondent-mother's agreement to maintain the home in an appropriate condition and to take proper care of her children.

¶ 3 On 13 October 2018, HSA received a child protective services report concerning Corinne, who had been born in June 2017, and her two half-siblings. According to this report, law enforcement officers had performed an animal welfare check at the parents' residence, during which they found the three children in respondent-father's care. Upon arriving at the home, a social worker

found multiple dogs in cages that were soiled with large amounts of animal feces. Furthermore, large quantities of animal feces covered the floors in the home, to the point that it was impossible to traverse a certain room in the home without stepping in animal feces. The entire home had a strong smell of animal urine.

In addition, the social worker observed the presence of dirty dishes throughout the home and "pill bottles on a table in the living room within reach of the children."

¶ 4 Upon making these observations, the social worker contacted respondent-mother and the fathers of the other children and asked them to meet her at the HSA office. After initially denying that she had any responsibility for the conditions that the social worker had observed in the family home in light of the fact that "she had been at work that day[,]" respondent-mother subsequently acknowledged that the home had been in the same state in which the social worker had found it when respondent-mother left for work that morning.

¶ 5 Corinne's paternal grandmother, who is disabled, told the social worker that she lived in the residence with respondent-mother, respondent-father, and the children and that she had spent the preceding week "unsuccessfully urging [the parents] to either clean the home or move out." In addition, the paternal grandmother reported that respondent-mother "frequently" left the children in her care even though she is "largely unable to care for [them,]" while Corinne's half-sister told the social worker that she had, "on occasion," witnessed the parents "arguing and fighting in the home to the point that it made her cry."

¶ 6 On 15 October 2018, HSA obtained the entry of an order taking Corinne and her half-siblings into nonsecure custody and filed juvenile petitions alleging that the children were neglected juveniles. On 28 November 2018, the parents signed an Out-of-Home Family Services Agreement in which they agreed to (1) complete a parenting education program, provide certificates of completion, and demonstrate appropriate parenting skills during their visits with the children; (2) obtain stable and appropriate housing and employment and demonstrate the ability to provide for the children's basic needs; and (3) obtain a psychological assessment and complete any recommended treatment.²

¶ 7 After a hearing held on 29 November 2018, Judge Jeanie R. Houston entered an order on 10 January 2019 in which she found the children to be neglected juveniles in light of the injurious environment in which they lived. Although Judge Houston awarded legal and physical custody of Corinne's half-sister to the child's father, Corinne and her half-brother remained in HSA custody, with the parents having been granted one hour of biweekly supervised visitation with Corinne, subject to the requirement that they avoid incarceration.

¶ 8 In a ninety-day review order entered on 10 April 2019 following a review hearing held on 7 March 2019, Judge Houston found that, while the parents had been attending visitation sessions with Corinne, they had only engaged in "minimal" interactions with their daughter and had, instead, been "observed to spend much of their visitation time on their cell phones." In addition, Judge Houston ordered the parents to participate in a Marschak Interaction Method assessment at Jodi Province Counseling for the purpose of "clinically evaluat[ing] their approach to parenting[.]"

¶ 9 Judge William F. Brooks held a permanency planning hearing in this matter on 19 September 2019. In a permanency planning order entered on 6 November 2019, Judge Brooks found that the parents had completed the required parenting classes and had provided the necessary confirmatory information to HSA and that the parents had also obtained the required psychological and Marschak Interaction Method assessments. In addition, Judge Brooks determined that respondent-mother continued to be employed in the same position that she had occupied at the time of the initial review hearing. On the other hand, Judge Brooks found that the parents had yet to procure housing, that they were "living with friends a[t] an unknown address," and that they had not "demonstrated improved parenting skills during" visits, obtained the counseling recommended at the conclusion of their psychological assessments, or complied with the recommendation set out in their Marschak Interaction Method assessment that they "participate in ‘theraplay’ treatment to learn how to establish structure, firm limits, and clear expectations" for Corinne. Finally, Judge Brooks determined that respondent-father continued to be unemployed. In light of these findings, Judge Brooks established concurrent permanent plans of adoption and reunification for Corinne while concluding that further efforts to reunify Corinne with respondent-mother or respondent-father "would clearly be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the minor [child's] health, safety, and the need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time." See N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) (2019). As a result, Judge Brooks directed HSA to "initiate an action to terminate the [parents'] parental rights within sixty days from the filing of [its o]rder."

¶ 10 On 2 July 2020, HSA filed a motion seeking to have the parents' parental rights in Corinne terminated on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019) ; failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that had led to Corinne's removal from the family home, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) ; and failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of Corinne's care, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). On 24 November 2020, a hearing was held before the trial court for the purpose of addressing the issues raised by the termination motion. On 10 December 2020, the trial court entered an order in which it concluded that both parents' parental rights in Corinne were subject to termination on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), and failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that had led to Corinne's removal from the family home, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), and that respondent-father's parental rights in Corinne were also subject to termination for failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the care that Corinne had received following her removal from the home, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3).

In addition, the trial court concluded that the termination of the parents' parental rights would be in Corinne's best interests. The parents noted appeals from the trial court's termination order to this Court.³

¶ 11 In seeking relief from the trial court's termination order before this Court, both parents have argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the challenged termination order on the grounds that the director of HSA, who had verified the termination motion, and the notary public before whom the director had appeared had failed to date the verification attached to the termination motion. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 (2019) (providing that a petition or motion for termination of parental rights "shall be verified by the petitioner or movant"). More specifically, the parents pointed out that, while the verification form associated with the motion contained an indication that it had been "[s]worn to and subscribed before me this ___ day of May, 2020," the blank into which the date was to be inserted had not been filled in. In addition, the parents stated that the termination motion had been signed by counsel for HSA on 30 June 2020 and had been filed with the Clerk of Superior Court of Yadkin County on 2 July 2020.

¶ 12 After noting that this Court had opined in In re T.R.P. that "[a] trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over all stages of a juvenile case is established when the action is initiated with the filing of a properly verified petition," 360 N.C. 588, 593, 636 S.E.2d 787 (2006), and that the Court of Appeals had held that "[a] violation of the verification requirement of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 [constituted] a jurisdictional defect per se ," In re T.M.H. , 186 N.C. App. 451, 454, 652 S.E.2d 1 (2007) (citing In re Triscari Children , 109 N.C. App. 285, 287–88, 426 S.E.2d 435 (1993) ); accord In re C.M.H. , 187 N.C. App. 807, 809, 653 S.E.2d 929 (2007) (stating that "[p]etitioner's failure to verify the petition to terminate parental rights left the trial court without subject matter jurisdiction"), the parents...