In re Chennisi

272 A.3d 67

ESTATE OF: Richard A. CHENNISI, Deceased

Appeal of: Lauren E. Newman

No. 362 EDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued November 16, 2021

Filed February 18, 2022

Reargument Denied April 25, 2022

Richard L. Holzworth, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Shari J. Odenheimer, King of Prussia, for appellant.

Jeffrey I. Pasek, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Jennifer D. Gayle, King of Prussia, for appellee.

John F. Higgins, King of Prussia, for appellee.

Adam T. Gusdorff, West Conshohocken, for appellee.

Jake A. Chennisi, East Greenwich, RI, participant, pro se.

Michelle A. Chennisi, Conventry, RI, participant, pro se.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Lauren E. Newman ("Ms. Newman") appeals from the order that overruled her objection to the inclusion of an award from the September 11th Victim's Compensation Fund ("VCF") as an asset of the estate ("the Estate") of her deceased husband, Richard A. Chennisi ("Decedent").¹ We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The following salient facts of the case are not in dispute. Decedent lived in New York City near the World Trade Center at the time of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In 2016, he developed leukemia, "thought to be caused by his exposure to pollutants and carcinogens released in the immediate aftermath" of the attacks. Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/21, at 1.

In 2012, prior to the onset of his illness, Decedent executed a will. The instrument named as executor Decedent's brother, Michael S. Chennisi ("Executor"), and bequeathed Decedent's property to beneficiaries including Executor, Decedent's mother, Elaine Wenda Chennisi, and Ms. Newman, with whom Decedent was in a long-term relationship and had been cohabiting. Decedent and Ms. Newman married on November 1, 2016, but Decedent did not revise his will before he died four days later.

On November 10, 2016, Executor filed a petition for probate and grant of letters testamentary. In the following proceedings, it was determined that Ms. Newman, as a pretermitted spouse, was entitled to take from the Estate as if Decedent had died intestate pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 2507(3) ("If the testator marries after making a will, the surviving spouse shall receive the share of the estate to which he would have been entitled had the testator died intestate, unless the will shall give him a greater share or unless it appears from the will that the will was made in contemplation of marriage to the surviving spouse."). Consequently, Ms. Newman was entitled to a share of the Estate calculated as follows:

If there is no surviving issue of the decedent but he is survived by a parent or parents, the first $30,000 plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the case of a decedent who died as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a surviving spouse shall be entitled to 100% of any [VCF] award paid pursuant to the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act [("ATSSSA"² )] ( Public Law 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 ).

20 Pa.C.S. § 2102(2).

While Decedent had not been eligible for a VCF award pursuant to the original terms of the ATSSSA, and the initial window for filing claims for compensation from the VCF expired long before Decedent's death, subsequent amendments rendered him eligible. Therefore, Executor retained counsel to submit a claim. As a result, on August 22, 2020, the Estate received $731,662.58, representing an award, less counsel fees, from the VCF pursuant to the subsequent amendments to the ATSSSA.

On September 8, 2020, Executor filed a first interim account, which, due to the anticipated dispute over the VCF award, included two different proposed distribution plans for the Estate. One proposal allocated the VCF award to the residuary of the Estate, while the other distributed the whole of the award to Ms. Newman through the Estate. Both proposed distributions deducted estate administration expenses from the VCF award, including a commission payable to Executor.

Ms. Newman filed objections to the proposed distribution and a petition for adjudication, asserting, inter alia , that she is entitled to 100% of the VCF award pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 2102(2). Executor, both in his representative capacity and individually as a beneficiary of the will, filed objections to Ms. Newman's petition.³ Executor took the position that the VCF award should be distributed as any other asset of the Estate, as it was not paid pursuant to P.L. 107-42, the original version of the ATSSSA referenced in § 2102(2). Rather, Executor contended, the award was made pursuant to later enactments which amended the ATSSSA, namely the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-347, 124 Stat. 3623 (2010) )⁴ , the James Zadroga 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund Reauthorization Act ( P.L. 114-113, Title IV),⁵ and the Never Forget the Heroes: James Zadroga, Ray Pfeifer, and Luis Alvarez Permanent Authorization of the September 11^th Victim Compensation Fund, ( P.L. 116-34, 133 Stat. 1040 (2019) )⁶ .

The orphans’ court agreed with Executor, holding that the VCF award was an asset of the Estate. In its accompanying opinion, the orphans’ court reasoned that the plain language of § 2102(2) provided for 100% spousal entitlement only if the payment was made pursuant to the ATSSSA as it existed in 2003, and Decedent was not eligible for an award pursuant to that legislation and the regulations promulgated in accordance therewith. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/12/21, at 7-8.

Ms. Newman filed a timely notice of appeal, and both she and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Ms. Newman presents the following questions for our resolution:

1. Was the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Award received by Decedent's Estate "paid pursuant to the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act ( Public Law 107-42, 155 Stat. 230 )" as stated in 20 Pa.C.S. § 2102(2) ?

2. Is Lauren Newman, as Decedent's surviving spouse, entitled to 100% of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Award pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 2102(2) ?

3. Is the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Award subject to the Administration of the Estate?

Ms. Newman's brief at 4.

We begin our consideration of these questions with a review of the governing legal principles. We observe at the outset that when, as here, "the orphans’ court arrives at a legal conclusion based on statutory interpretation, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." In re Estate of Emery , 262 A.3d 1260, 1264 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up).

Our object in interpreting and construing a statute "is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The General Assembly has provided a non-exhaustive list of presumptions pertinent to ascertaining its intent, including the presumption that it "intends the entire statute to be effective and certain," that it "does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth," and that it "does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) - (3).

It is axiomatic that "when the words of a statute have a plain and unambiguous meaning, it is this meaning which is the paramount indicator of legislative intent." McKelvey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Health , ––– Pa. ––––, 255 A.3d 385, 398 (2021). In such instances where the words of a law are clear, "the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).

In considering the plain meaning of our legislature's chosen words, "[w]e construe words and phrases according to their common and approved usage. ..." Linkosky v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing , ––– Pa. ––––, 247 A.3d 1019, 1026 (2021). "Words having a precise and well-settled legal meaning must be given that meaning when they appear in statutes unless there is a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary." Commonwealth v. Lee , 260 A.3d 208, 212 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up).

"[I]n determining whether language is clear and unambiguous, the court should assess it in the context of the overall statutory scheme, construing all sections with reference to each other, not simply examining language in isolation." Linkosky , supra at 1026. A statute is ambiguous "if a statutory term, when read in context with the overall statutory framework in which it appears, has at least two reasonable interpretations or where any reading of the statute's plain text raises non-trivial interpretive difficulties[.]" McCloskey v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n , ––– Pa. ––––, 255 A.3d 416, 424 n.13 (2021) (cleaned up). See also Commonwealth v. Sanchez-Frometa , 256 A.3d 440, 446 (Pa.Super. 2021) ("A statute is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text." (cleaned up)).

Cognizant of these principles, we re-examine the statutory language at issue:

The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is:

....

(2) If there is no surviving issue of the decedent but he is survived by a parent or parents, the first $30,000 plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the case of a decedent who died as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a surviving spouse shall be entitled to 100% of any compensation award paid pursuant to the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act ( Public Law 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 ) .

20 Pa.C.S. § 2102(2) (emphasis added).

The trial court and all parties assert that the emphasized language unambiguously expresses a clear legislative intent, yet they reach entirely different conclusions about what that intent is.

Executor contends, and the orphans’ court held, that Decedent's VCF award does not fall within § 2102(2) ’s "notwithstanding" exception because it was not paid pursuant to Public Law 107-42. Ex...