In re Christopher H.

123 A.D.3d 713

997 N.Y.S.2d 682

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 08434

In the Matter of CHRISTOPHER H. (Anonymous), appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Dec. 3, 2014

Affirmed. Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Judith Waksberg of counsel; Asha Sairah George on the brief), for appellant.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Benjamin Welikson and Francis F. Caputo of counsel), for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.

Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Terrence J. McElrath, J.), dated September 30, 2013. The order adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period expiring on January 6, 2015. The appeal brings up for review a fact-finding order of the same court dated May 21, 2013, which, after a hearing, found that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the third degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review ( see Matter of Rani Z., 120 A.D.3d 824, 825, 991 N.Y.S.2d 376; Matter of Tori S., 119 A.D.3d 697, 989 N.Y.S.2d 616; Matter of Robert M., 71 A.D.3d 896, 897, 896 N.Y.S.2d 456). In any event, “[t]he evidence supporting a fact-finding in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is legally sufficient if, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, any rational trier of fact could have found the appellant's commission of all the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt” ( Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d 757, 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685; see Matter of Chakelton M., 111 A.D.3d 732, 733, 975 N.Y.S.2d 95; Matter of Imani Mc., 78 A.D.3d 705, 706, 911 N.Y.S.2d 381). Mindful of these principles, we find that the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing was legally sufficient to support the determinations made in the order of fact-finding.

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Dashawn R., 120 A.D.3d 1250, 992 N.Y.S.2d 122; Matter of Kaseem R., 113 A.D.3d 779, 780, 978 N.Y.S.2d 886; Matter of Racheal M., 108 A.D.3d 770, 771, 970 N.Y.S.2d 249), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the factfinder to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Dajahn M., 110 A.D.3d 812, 813, 973 N.Y.S.2d 248; Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d at 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685; Matter of Jamel C., 92 A.D.3d 782, 782–883, 938 N.Y.S.2d 456; Matter of Kalexis R., 85 A.D.3d 927, 928–929, 925 N.Y.S.2d 356), and the Family Court's credibility determinations should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see Matter of Dashawn R., 120 A.D.3d 1250, 992 N.Y.S.2d 122). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the determination of the Family Court was not against the weight of the evidence.

“The Family Court has broad discretion in entering dispositional orders, and its determination is accorded great deference” ( Matter of Isaiah...