In re Civil Commitment of DeRosia

In re the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Matthew Lee DeRosia.

A19-1350

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

February 24, 2020

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed

Slieter, Judge

Washington County District Court

File No. 82-PR-09-2776

Matthew Lee DeRosia, St. Peter, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ali P. Afsharjavan, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Human Services)

Peter Orput, Washington County Attorney, James Zuleger, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent Washington County)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SLIETER, Judge

Appellant Matthew Lee DeRosia challenges the district court's order authorizing the administration of neuroleptic medication pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 5 (2018), to address his mental illness. DeRosia, appears pro se on appeal,¹ and he assertsthat: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the district court's order is not supported by the record.² We affirm.

FACTS

On July 16, 2009, the district court committed DeRosia as mentally ill and dangerous (MI&D) pursuant to what is now Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.02, subd. 17, 253B.18 (2018). Prior to DeRosia's MI&D commitment proceedings, DeRosia was on provisional discharge from a commitment order when he intentionally drove a vehicle onto a sidewalk and collided with the front entrance to a Planned Parenthood building in Saint Paul, resulting in damage to the building. After first striking the building, DeRosia intentionally struck the building a second time with the vehicle. The district court found DeRosia's act of driving into the Planned Parenthood building constituted an overt dangerous act capableof causing serious physical harm to others. Additionally, the district court found that DeRosia's behavior was such that his mental illness presented a clear danger to the safety of others. DeRosia, through counsel, executed a waiver of a review hearing and stipulated to entry of a final order committing him for an indefinite period. The district court granted DeRosia's waiver. DeRosia has been committed since 2009.

While DeRosia has been subject to his MI&D commitment, the district court has granted approximately seven orders authorizing the administration of neuroleptic medications to address DeRosia's mental illness. On March 14, 2019, a petition for administering neuroleptic medication to address DeRosia's schizoaffective disorder, depressive type, was filed. The petition requested the authority to administer the following medications to DeRosia: Clozaril, Zyprexa, Haldol, and Loxitane. A subsequent request to the district court also sought authorization to administer Seroquel to DeRosia. The district court scheduled a hearing on the petition.

On June 14, 2019, DeRosia appeared at the hearing with his court-appointed counsel. DeRosia's counsel indicated that DeRosia wanted to discharge counsel and represent himself. The district court denied DeRosia's request and accordingly DeRosia was represented by counsel for the proceeding.

The district court heard testimony from a psychiatric mental-health nurse practitioner, the court-appointed examiner, and DeRosia. The district court found that DeRosia suffers from a major mental illness based on his diagnosis for schizoaffective disorder, which "primarily manifests itself through agitation, feeling of persecution, and grandiose thoughts." The district court also found that DeRosia does not acknowledge hismental illness and the consequences of DeRosia not taking this medication includes "[DeRosia] continuing to have limited awareness of his condition, continued agitation, and the inability to meaningfully participate in his treatment." The district court further noted a concern that "[t]hroughout [DeRosia's] placement, he has refused to take the neuroleptic medication prescribed to him, and he is only medication compliant due to court orders or emergency situations. Absent a court order, [DeRosia] would stop taking the neuroleptic medication prescribed to him."

In reaching its conclusion on the request to administer neuroleptic medication, the district court credited the testimony of the two experts who testified and opined that DeRosia lacks the capacity to consent or refuse the administration of neuroleptic medication because he does not understand his mental illness, its symptoms, treatment options, or the need for the medication. The district court explained that both experts opined that "[DeRosia] lacks the capacity to give informed consent or refusal to the administration of neuroleptic medication in that he does not have the ability to understand and use information about his mental illness, its symptoms, and treatment, or to determine whether neuroleptic medication is reasonable and necessary."

DeRosia appeals.

DECISION

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying DeRosia's request to discharge counsel.

DeRosia claims the district court erred by denying his request to discharge court-appointed counsel so that he may represent himself. This claim requires us to construe thelanguage of both procedural rules and statutes regarding the right to counsel in civil commitments. Construction of rules and statutes are questions that we address de novo. See Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Minn. 2016) (holding that interpreting rules "is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo"); Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016) (holding that interpreting statutes "is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo").

"The object of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent." In re Welfare of Hofmaster, 434 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. App. 1989); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). If the meaning of the statute or rule is unambiguous, we interpret the text according to its plain meaning. Brua v. Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 778 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2010); see also Sela Inv. Ltd., LLP v. H.E., 909 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Minn. App. 2018).

The rules involved in civil-commitment proceedings reflect that under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act (MCTA), Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.01-.24 (2018), "[a]n attorney shall represent the respondent until the court dismissed the petition or the respondent is discharged from commitment, and the conclusion of any related appeal." Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9(a) (emphasis added); see also Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 2c ("The court shall appoint a qualified attorney to represent the proposed patient if neither the proposed patient nor others provide counsel."). The intention of rule 9 is to "ensure that committed individuals are continuously represented by counsel during commitment proceedings and during all times the individual is under commitment." Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9 2016 advisory comm. cmt. But see Commandeur LLC v.Howard Harty, Inc., 724 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Minn. 2006) ("[A]dvisory committee comments are included for convenience and are not binding on the court.") (quotation omitted). A proposed patient or patient is permitted to "employ private counsel at [their own] expense." Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9(b). "If private counsel is employed, the court shall discharge the appointed counsel." Id.

Both the applicable procedural rules and statutory scheme apply the mandatory word shall to the appointment of counsel. Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9(a) ("An attorney shall represent the respondent . . . .") (emphasis added); Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 2c ("The court shall appoint a qualified attorney to represent the proposed patient if neither the proposed patient nor other provide counsel.") (emphasis added). The meaning of "shall" reflects a mandatory requirement that counsel be appointed for the committed person. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2018). Because the plain language of both the procedural rule and statute mandate that counsel be appointed to represent a proposed patient or patient throughout the commitment process, the district court's denial of DeRosia's request to proceed pro se was mandated and, therefore, proper.

II. DeRosia failed to show that his counsel provided ineffective assistance.

DeRosia also contends that his court-appointed counsel did not believe him and refused to properly defend him at the hearing. We construe this as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. In commitment matters, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are examined in the same manner as criminal cases. See In re Civil Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Minn. App. 2019) ("This court analyzes ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in civil-commitment cases under the Strickland standard thatapplies in criminal cases."), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal case, an appellant bears the burden to show that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984). We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. Johnson, 931 N.W.2d at 657.

Counsel appointed to represent a patient in a civil-commitment proceeding bears the ethical obligation "to ensure that arguments, positions, and pleadings are meritorious with the responsibility to be a vigorous advocate for the individual." Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9 2016 advisory comm. cmt. An attorney in civil-commitment proceedings shall:

(1) consult with the person prior to any hearing;

(2) be given adequate time and access to records to prepare for all hearings;

(3) continue to represent the person throughout any

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