In re Civil Commitment of Moen, A13–0602.

837 N.W.2d 40

In the Matter of the CIVIL COMMITMENT OF Kevin Lee MOEN.

No. A13–0602.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Aug. 5, 2013.

Review Denied Oct. 15, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

1. If a person committed as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) brings a motion for relief from a commitment order pursuant to rule 60.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure based on the alleged inadequacy of treatment in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), without specifying the nature of the relief sought, the motion is barred by the exclusive transfer-or-discharge remedies of the Minnesota Commitment Act and the supreme court's opinion in In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d 635 (Minn.2012).

2. If a person committed as an SDP brings a motion for relief from a commitment order pursuant to rule 60.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure based on the alleged inadequacy of treatment in the MSOP, the motion does not state a viable claim for relief under the rule.

3. A person committed as an SDP does not have a statutory right to counsel under section 253B.07, subdivision 2c, of the Minnesota Statutes for purposes of pursuing a motion for relief from a commitment order pursuant to rule 60.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.

Kevin Lee Moen, Moose Lake, MN, pro se appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, John D. Gross, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and James E. O'Neill, Pipestone County Attorney, Pipestone, MN, for respondent Pipestone County Family Service Agency.

Considered and decided by JOHNSON, Chief Judge; HALBROOKS, Judge; and RODENBERG, Judge.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Chief Judge.

In 2008, Kevin Lee Moen was civilly committed by the Pipestone County District Court as a sexually dangerous person (SDP). In 2013, Moen brought a motion for relief from the district court's commitment order pursuant to rule 60.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied the motion. The district court also denied Moen's motion for appointment of counsel in connection with his rule 60.02(e) motion. We affirm.

FACTS

Moen is a 32–year–old man who is committed to the custody of the commissioner of human services. He was civilly committed after he was convicted of three counts of criminal sexual conduct. In June 2004, Moen pleaded guilty in the Pipestone County District Court to three offenses, based on three incidents in 2002 and 2003 involving three different children. The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 18 months, 27 months, and 33 months of imprisonment, but stayed the prison sentences. The district court placed Moen on probation and ordered him to serve six months in jail and fifteen years on supervised probation. In December 2006, the district court executed the prison sentences after finding that Moen had violated the terms of probation.

In May 2008, Pipestone County commenced this action by filing a petition for civil commitment, alleging that Moen is an SDP and a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP). The petition recited the factual background of Moen's three criminal offenses and also alleged that, between 1992 and 2003, Moen had sexually assaulted 16 other children. In October 2008, Moen entered into a stipulation in which he acknowledged that the district court likely would grant the petition, and he agreed to the filing of a commitment order pursuant to the SDP statute. In December 2008, the district court issued a commitment order in which it concluded that Moen is an SDP and committed him to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP).

In January 2013, Moen brought a motion for relief from the commitment order pursuant to rule 60.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. At the same time, Moen moved for the appointment of counsel to assist him with the rule 60.02(e) motion. In his rule 60.02(e) motion, Moen made allegations about the effectiveness of the MSOP treatment program, which appear to be based, at least in part, on a report of the Legislative Auditor. See generally, Minn. Office of Leg. Auditor, Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders (Mar.2011), available at http:// www. auditor. leg. state. mn. us/ ped/ pedrep/ ccso. pdf. Moen alleged that the MSOP “no longer offers adequate treatment,” that he has not been offered adequate treatment to meet his needs, and that he “does not receive clear and useful treatment plans or treatment reviews, so he does not know how to advance through treatment.” He also alleged that the MSOP treatment program violates both Minnesota and federal law.

The county submitted a response to the motion, and Moen submitted a reply. In March 2013, the district court issued an order denying the rule 60.02(e) motion. The district court also denied the motion for appointment of counsel. Moen appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err by denying Moen's motion for relief from the commitment order pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(e)?

II. Did the district court err by denying Moen's motion for appointment of counsel for purposes of the rule 60.02(e) motion?

ANALYSIS

I.

Moen argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for relief from the commitment order. The applicable rule provides, in part, as follows:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment ..., order, or proceeding and may order a new trial or grant such other relief as may be just for the following reasons:

....

(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application....

Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(e). A rule 60.02(e) motion must be brought “within a reasonable time,” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, which depends on “all of the facts and circumstances involved,” Simons v. Schiek's Inc., 275 Minn. 132, 138, 145 N.W.2d 548, 552 (1966). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court's denial of a rule 60.02 motion. In re Children of Coats, 633 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn.2001).

The district court denied Moen's motion for two reasons. First, the district court determined that Moen's motion is barred by provisions of the Commitment Act that provide the exclusive remedies for an SDP who seeks transfer or discharge from his civil commitment. Second, the district court determined that the substance of the motion is without merit. We will analyze both of the district court's reasons for denying the motion.

A.

Moen argues that the district court erred by determining that his motion is barred by the Commitment Act.

The district court relied on the supreme court's recent opinion in In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d 635 (Minn.2012). In Lonergan, two civilly committed persons, one an SDP and one an SPP, brought motions for relief from their respective commitment orders pursuant to rule 60.02, and the motions were denied. Id. at 637–39. In one of the appeals, this court held that section 253B.17, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes “prohibits [an SDP] from petitioning the committing court for discharge from his indeterminate commitment” and “preclude[s] a rule 60.02 motion to vacate [an] indeterminate-commitment order.” In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan, 792 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Minn.App.2011), rev'd in part,811 N.W.2d 635 (Minn.2012). In the other appeal, this court held that rule 60.02 “is not the mechanism for relief from an indeterminate civil commitment order.” In re Civil Commitment of Kunshier, No. A10–1270, 2011 WL 500070, at *2 (Minn.App. Feb. 15, 2011), rev'd in part,811 N.W.2d 635 (Minn.2012).

The supreme court began its review of this court's opinions by asking whether rule 60.02 is in conflict with or inconsistent with the Commitment Act, which would make the rule inapplicable. Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d at 639, 641. The supreme court identified two situations in which such a conflict or inconsistency exists. First, rule 60.02 is inapplicable if there is a “distinct conflict” between the rule and the statute. Id. at 641 (quotation omitted). Second, even if no distinct conflict exists, rule 60.02 is inapplicable if “the ‘purpose of the [statute] would be so frustrated by an application of the [rule] that the rule and the statute must be deemed inconsistent.’ ” Id. at 641 (quoting Guillaume & Assoc. v. Don–John Co., 336 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Minn.1983)).

The supreme court noted that the Commitment Act prescribes procedures by which a person committed as an SDP or an SPP may petition a special review board for discharge or transfer and may appeal an unfavorable decision by the special review board to a judicial appeal panel. Id. at 640 (citing Minn.Stat. §§ 253B.185, subds. 9, 18; .9, subd. 2(b) (2012)); see alsoMinn.Stat. §§ 253B.14, .15, .16 (2012). Specifically, “the Commitment Act is the exclusive remedy for patients committed as SDPs and SPPs seeking a transfer or discharge.” Id. at 642 (quotation omitted). The supreme court reasoned that rule 60.02(e) “distinctly conflicts” with the Commitment Act to the extent that an SDP or an SPP seeks a discharge from commitment or a transfer out of a secure facility. Id. Thus, to the extent that an SDP or an SPP seeks transfer or discharge, he may not do so pursuant to rule 60.02 but, rather, “must exclusively follow the Commitment Act's specific procedures for petitioning for a transfer or discharge.” Id.

The supreme court noted that the remedies available under the Commitment Act are not so broad as to bar all conceivable motions brought pursuant to rule 60.02. The supreme court observed that “the Commitment Act does not provide any procedures for [an SDP or an SPP] to raise nontransfer, nondischarge claims such as ineffective assistance of counsel and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. For this “narrow class of claims,” rule 60.02(e) and the Commitment Act do not distinctly conflict. Id. at 643. But it is necessary to determine whether the...