In re Cristian C.

104 A.D.3d 941

962 N.Y.S.2d 335

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 02072

In the Matter of CRISTIAN C. (Anonymous), appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 27, 2013.

Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.

David L. Darwin, County Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Allan Y. Drian of counsel), for respondent.

DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and PLUMMER E. LOTT, JJ.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Cristian C. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Orange County (Kiedaisch, J.), dated January 27, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated September 12, 2011, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and, upon his consent, placed him on probation for a period of two years under stated terms and conditions, including directing him to undergo sex offender-specific therapy. This appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated September 12, 2011.

ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as, upon his consent, placed the appellant on probation for a period of two years, under stated terms and conditions, includingdirecting him to undergo sex offender-specific therapy, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellant is not aggrieved by that part of the order of disposition which placed him on probation for a period of two years under stated terms and conditions, including directing him to undergo sex offender-specific therapy, since he waived his right to a dispositional hearing and consented to the disposition ( see Matter of Khalil H., 80 A.D.3d 83, 93, 910 N.Y.S.2d 553;Matter of Kemar G., 72 A.D.3d 965, 966, 898 N.Y.S.2d 518;Matter of Shaheen P.J., 29 A.D.3d 996, 997, 817 N.Y.S.2d 304).

The appellant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review ( see Matter of Danasia Mc., 94 A.D.3d 1122, 1123, 943 N.Y.S.2d 549;Matter of Kalexis R., 79 A.D.3d 755, 756, 913 N.Y.S.2d 922;Matter of Anthony R., 43 A.D.3d 939, 939–940, 841 N.Y.S.2d 642;cf.CPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, viewing the evidence at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621;Matter of Kemar G., 72 A.D.3d at 965, 898 N.Y.S.2d 518;Matter of Summer D., 67 A.D.3d 1008, 1009, 890 N.Y.S.2d 562;Matter of Davonte B., 44 A.D.3d 763, 844 N.Y.S.2d 68), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree ( seePenal Law § 130.65[1]; see generally People v. Jessup, 90 A.D.3d 782, 783–784, 934 N.Y.S.2d 225). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( cf.CPL 470.15[5]; see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we...