In re D.E.

313 A.3d 692

IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF D.E.

No. 2021-0408

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Submitted: January 5, 2023

Opinion Issued: November 16, 2023

6th Circuit Court-Concord Probate Division

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor general (Laura E. B. Lombardi, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief), for the petitioner.

Brown & Bouchard PLLC, of Concord (Cassandra A. Brown on the brief), for the respondent.

G.E., of Boxford, Massachusetts, on the brief, the self-represented guardian.

HANTZ MARCONI, J.

The respondent, D.E., appeals two decisions of the Circuit Court (Maloney, J.). The first denies the respondent’s motion to dismiss and grants New Hampshire Hospital’s (NHH) petition for guardianship. The second grants NHH’s petition for involuntary admission. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

I

On June 15, 2021, the respondent was admitted to NHH. At the time he was admitted and detained in the NHH facility, the respondent was subject to a lawful involuntary emergency admission effective as of June 13, 2021. See RSA 135-C:27 (2021). After a hearing on June 18, 2021, the circuit court found probable cause for the involuntary emergency admission. See RSA 135-C:31 (2021). A subsequent involuntary emergency admission petition was not filed. On June 29, 2021, NHH filed a petition for non-emergency involuntary admission. The court scheduled a hearing on NHH’s involuntary admission petition for July 15, 2021. On June 30, 2021, NHH filed a petition for guardianship and requested that it be heard simultaneously with the involuntary admission petition. The court held a hearing on both petitions over two days on July 15, 2021 and August 5, 2021, after which it concluded that the respondent "is in such mental condition as a result of mental illness as to create a potentially serious likelihood of danger to himself’ and ordered him committed to NHH for a period of two years. The trial court further concluded that a power of attorney and springing medical proxy given by the respondent to the respondent’s brother, G.E., were "insufficient to provide care" to the respondent and appointed G.E. as the respondent’s guardian. This appeal followed.

II

[1, 2] Before we turn to the merits of the two petitions, we address the respondent’s argument that the trial court erred in hearing both the guardianship petition and the involuntary admission petition simultaneously. It is the respondent’s position that "[c]onducting both the involuntary admissions hearing and the guardianship hearing together deprived [him] of due process rights." (Bolding omitted.) We note that the respondent does not specify a state constitutional provision under which his argument arises; thus, we construe his argument to be made under the Federal Constitution. See Vincent v. Mac-Lean, 166 N.H. 132, 135, 89 A.3d 1208 (2014) (where the plaintiff did not identify whether his due process claims arise under the State or Federal Constitutions and failed to cite a provision of either constitution, the argument was deemed to be made under the Federal Constitution only). Nevertheless, we will not review constitutional issues on appeal that were not presented to the trial court. N.H. Dept. of Corrections v. Butland, 147 N.H. 676, 679, 797 A.2d 860 (2002). At the joint hearing, the respondent objected to the hearings being held simultaneously because granting the involuntary admission petition "would resolve the issues that were raised in the guardianship petition" and if it were not granted, "it would then make the guardianship petition moot." He also articulated that he believed Massachusetts would be a more appropriate venue for a guardianship petition, should one be necessary. However, he raised no constitutional objection, predicated on due process or otherwise, to the hearings being held simultaneously. Thus, the respondent’s due process argument, raised for the first time on appeal, is not preserved. Id.

Further, even if we were to construe the respondent’s arguments to the trial court as raising a constitutional issue, the issue has not been sufficiently developed in his brief. The respondent does not support, with any legal authority, his position that he "was entitled to have two separate final evidentiary hearings for the two separate petitions." Rather, he summarily states that doing so "deprived [him] of due process rights." (Bolding omitted.) As a result, even if preserved in the trial court, we conclude that the issue is insufficiently developed for our review. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49, 816 A.2d 1014 (2003) ("[A] mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review." (quotation omitted)).

III

[3–5] We now turn to the trial court’s order on the petition for involuntary admission. The respondent asserts that, because he was not a resident of New Hamp- shire, nor was he "under arrest or held in protective custody by law enforcement," the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition under RSA 135-C:20, II (2021). Subject matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought: the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things. In re D.O., 173 N.H. 48, 51, 237 A.3d 256 (2020). A court lacks power to hear or determine a case concerning subject matter over which it has no jurisdiction. Id. A party may challenge subject matter jurisdiction at any time during the proceeding, including on appeal, and may not waive subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

[6–11] Determining whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition requires us to engage in statutory interpretation. Id. at 51-52, 237 A.3d 256. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Avery v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 173 N.H. 726, 733, 248 A.3d 1179 (2020). In matters of statutory interpretation, we first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. We do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole, which enables us to better discern the legislature’s intent in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id. Absent an ambiguity, we will not look beyond the language of the statute. Id.

[12] RSA 135-C:20, II states, in relevant part: "For proceedings under RSA 135-C:34-54, jurisdiction is vested in the probate court in the county where the person sought to be admitted resides or is detained." "Although RSA chapter 135-C refers to the ‘district court’ and the ‘probate court,’ those references are ‘deemed to be to the New Hampshire circuit court’ pursuant to RSA 490-F:18." Doe v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 174 N.H. 239, 250 n.1, 261 A.3d 968 (2021) (quoting RSA 490-F:18 (Supp. 2022)); see also RSA 490-F:3 (Supp. 2022). "Each circuit court location shall have the authority to hear all cases within the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court." RSA 490-F:2 (Supp. 2022). Thus, any circuit court location has authority over proceedings under RSA 135-C:34-54 (2021), so long as "the person sought to be admitted resides or is detained" within any county in New Hampshire. See RSA 135-C:20, II; RSA 490-F:2. Accordingly, in order for the circuit court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the petition, the respondent must either: (1) be lawfully detained in New Hampshire; or (2) reside in New Hampshire. RSA 135-C:20, II; RSA 490-F:2, :3. The respondent asserts that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction because he was not lawfully detained at the time the nonemergency involuntary admission petition was filed and because he was not, nor has he ever been, a resident of New Hampshire.

[13] We first address the issue of detention. When an involuntary emergency admission petition is filed under RSA 135-C:27, the subject of the petition must be examined by an "approved physician, approved PA, or approved APRN, as defined in RSA 135-C:2, II-a." RSA 135-C:28, I (2021). If the approved medical provider finds "that the person to be admitted meets the criteria of RSA 135-C:27," then the person may be admitted after the provider completes a certificate explaining the basis for admission. Id. Once the certificate for an involuntary emergency admission is completed, the person at issue is not free to leave, but, rather, is deemed to be in the custody of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services. Doe, 174 N.H. at 252, 261 A.3d 968. Thus, once a certificate for involuntary emergency admission is issued, the admitted person is not free to leave and is, therefore, "detained" within the plain meaning of RSA 135-C:20, II. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 616 (unabridged ed. 2002) (defining "detain" as "to hold or keep in or as if in custody").

However, detention pursuant to an involuntary emergency admission is limited by RSA 135-C:32 (2021). RSA 135-C:32 provides that "[n]o person shall be admitted for an involuntary emergency admission under RSA 135-C:27-33 for longer than a 10-day period, not including Saturdays and Sundays, unless a subsequent petition for involuntary emergency admission … is ordered … or unless a petition requesting a judicial hearing on the issue of involuntary admission under RSA 135-C:34-54 has been filed with the appropriate probate court within the involuntary admission period." RSA 135-C:32.

[14, 15] Here, NHH concedes that the petition for non-emergency involuntary admission was filed...