In re D.F.

198 N.E.3d 126

In the MATTER OF: D.F.

No. 22CA9

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Jackson County.

Released September 27, 2022

Lauren Hammersmith, Assistant State Public Defender, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.

Justin Lovett, Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney, and William L. Archer, Jr., Special Assistant Jackson County Prosecutor, Jackson, Ohio, for appellee.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Hess, J.

{¶1} D.F. appeals from a judgment of the Jackson County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, classifying him as a tier II juvenile offender registrant ("JOR"). D.F. contends that the imposition of registration requirements on him violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the natural law rights afforded to him under the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 1, and his right to due process. For the reasons which follow, we reject these contentions and affirm the juvenile court's judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On August 27, 2020, a complaint was filed which alleged that D.F., d/o/b September 18, 2001, appeared to be a delinquent child because on or about July 1, 2018, when he was 16 years old, he engaged in conduct which would constitute rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a first-degree felony if committed by an adult. The juvenile court adjudicated him a delinquent child and committed him to the legal custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services ("DYS") for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of 12 months and a maximum period not to exceed his 21st birthday. The juvenile court also classified him as a tier III JOR, but we reversed that part of the disposition order and vacated the classification because pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(A)(1), the juvenile court had to wait until D.F.’s release from DYS to classify him as a JOR. In re D.F. , 4th Dist. Jackson No. 21CA5, 2021-Ohio-3109, 2021 WL 4099937, ¶¶ 6, 10, 14.

{¶3} On or about March 22, 2022, D.F. was released from DYS. Subsequently, D.F. filed a memorandum opposing classification. D.F. asserted that "imposition of registration" on him would violate several of his constitutional rights. Alternatively, D.F. asserted that the juvenile court should "classify him at the lowest possible level" given his "progress at DYS and that he is a low risk to reoffend." After a hearing, the juvenile court found that D.F. was 17 years old at the time of his offense and that R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) mandated that the court classify him as a JOR, and the court classified him as a tier II JOR.¹

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶4} D.F. presents three assignments of error:

I. The imposition of registration on D.F. violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because registering children as sex offenders is barbaric.

II. The imposition of registration on D.F. violates the natural law rights afforded to him under the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 1.

III. The imposition of registration on D.F. violates his right to due process because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that he is at a high risk to reoffend.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶5} The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law we review de novo. Hayslip v. Hanshaw , 2016-Ohio-3339, 54 N.E.3d 1272, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.). " ‘[L]aws are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.’ " Ohio Renal Assn. v. Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment Commt. , 154 Ohio St.3d 86, 2018-Ohio-3220, 111 N.E.3d 1139, ¶ 26, quoting Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div. , 101 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-357, 802 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 16. "A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional on its face or as applied to a particular set of facts." Harrold v. Collier , 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37. "A party asserting a facial challenge to a statute must prove beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid.’ " Ohio Renal Assn. at ¶ 26, quoting Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc. , 132 Ohio St.3d 167, 2012-Ohio-2187, 970 N.E.2d 898, ¶ 21. "An as-applied challenge requires the challenger to ‘present clear and convincing evidence of the statute's constitutional defect.’ " Id. , quoting State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn. , 111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 21.

IV. STATUTORY SCHEME

{¶6} " R.C. 2152.82 to 2152.86 and Chapter 2950 delineate Ohio's statutory scheme for juvenile-sex-offender classification and registration." In re D.S. , 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 13. R.C. 2152.191(A) states that these provisions apply to a child who "is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense, if the child is fourteen years of age or older at the time of committing the offense, and if the child committed the offense on or after January 1, 2002[.]" Whether the child is subject to mandatory or discretionary classification depends on the specific statutory provision under which the child is subject to classification.

{¶7} In this case, D.F. was classified as a JOR pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(A)(1), which states:

The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child shall issue as part of the dispositional order or, if the court commits the child for the delinquent act to the custody of a secure facility, shall issue at the time of the child's release from the secure facility an order that classifies the child a juvenile offender registrant and specifies that the child has a duty to comply with sections 2950.04, 2950.041, 2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised Code if all of the following apply:

(a) The act for which the child is or was adjudicated a delinquent child is a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense that the child committed on or after January 1, 2002.

(b) The child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of committing the offense.

(c) The court was not required to classify the child a juvenile offender registrant under section 2152.82 of the Revised Code or as both a juvenile offender registrant and a public registry-qualified juvenile offender registrant under section 2152.86 of the Revised Code.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) makes classification as a JOR mandatory for a child such as D.F. who meets the requirements of that section. However, the juvenile court has discretion to select the child's tier classification after conducting a hearing for that purpose. See R.C. 2152.83(A)(2) ("the judge shall conduct a hearing * * * to determine whether the child is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender, a tier II sex offender/child-victim offender, or a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender").

{¶8} JORs must register personally with the sheriff or sheriff's designee within three days of coming into a county in which the child "resides or temporarily is domiciled for more than three days." R.C. 2950.04(A)(3)(a). The duration of the duty to register and frequency with which a JOR must comply with certain address verification requirements varies depending on the JOR's tier classification. Tier I JORs must register for 10 years, R.C. 2950.07(B)(3), and comply with verification requirements annually, R.C. 2950.06(B)(1). Tier II JORs must register for 20 years, R.C. 2950.07(B)(2), and comply with verification requirements every 180 days, R.C. 2950.06(B)(2). Tier III JORs must register for life, R.C. 2950.07(B)(1), and comply with verification requirements every 90 days, R.C. 2950.06(B)(3). Under R.C. 2152.83(C)(2), the court also has discretion to impose a requirement subjecting a tier III JOR to the victim and community notification provisions of R.C. 2950.10 and 2950.11. The registration information of JORs is not disseminated on Ohio's public Internet database for sex offenders and child-victim offenders. See R.C. 2950.13(A)(11).

{¶9} A child classified under R.C. 2152.83(A) has opportunities for reclassification and declassification. R.C. 2152.84(A)(1) states that "upon completion of the disposition," the judge who classified the child or the judge's successor in office

shall conduct a hearing to review the effectiveness of the disposition and of any treatment provided for the child, to determine the risks that the child might re-offend, to determine whether the prior classification of the child as a juvenile offender registrant should be continued or terminated as provided under division (A)(2) of this section, and to determine whether its prior determination * * * as to whether the child is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender, a tier II sex offender/child-victim offender, or a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender should be continued or modified as provided under division (A)(2) of this section.

For tier II or III JORs classified under R.C. 2152.83(A), the judge must enter an order that either continues the child's original tier classification or reduces it to a lower tier. See R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(a)-(c). For tier I JORs classified under R.C. 2152.83(A), the judge must issue an order that maintains the child's original tier classification since the court cannot increase the child's tier classification or declassify the child at that time. See R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(a)-(c).² Three years after the judge enters the order required by R.C. 2152.84, a JOR may petition the judge for reclassification or declassification. R.C. 2152.85(A) & (B)(1). The child may petition the judge a second time three years after the court enters an order deciding the first petition. R.C. 2152.85(B)(2). The child may file additional petitions five years after the judge has entered an order deciding the child's most recent petition. R.C. 2152.85(B)(3). If the judge issues an order which declassifies the delinquent child, "the order also terminates all prior determinations that the child is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender, a tier II sex offender/child-victim offender, or a...