In re D. J. M.

In the Matter of D. J. M.

NO. 03-18-00476-CV

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

January 14, 2019

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF FAYETTE COUNTY, 155TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 807, HONORABLE JEFF R. STEINHAUSER JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On July 13, 2013, the State filed an original petition in Fayette County alleging that D.J.M., who was then sixteen years old, had engaged in delinquent conduct, "to wit: Capital Murder . . . by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of an individual" while "in the course of attempting to commit and committing robbery."¹ See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03. The petition was supported by the sworn affidavit of an investigator with the Fayette County Sheriff's Office, who stated that on June 17, 2013, D.J.M. was apprehended in connection with the death of a woman in La Grange, Texas. According to the investigator's affidavit, D.J.M. admitted to law enforcement that he had stabbed the victim multiple times with a knife in the course of a physical altercation at her residence, took her car keys, and then drove the victim's vehicle to Smithville, Texas, where he was later apprehended.

Following a transfer hearing, the district court, sitting as a juvenile court, signed an order waiving jurisdiction and transferring D.J.M. to "the appropriate criminal district court of Fayette County, Texas for criminal proceedings as an adult." See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02 ("Waiver of Jurisdiction and Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court"). D.J.M. has filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the transfer order. See id. § 56.01(c)(1)(A). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the juvenile court's order.

BACKGROUND LAW

The Juvenile Justice Code, Title 3 of the Texas Family Code, governs proceedings in cases involving the delinquent conduct of a person who was a child at the time they engaged in the conduct. See id. §§ 51.01-61.107. The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile proceedings, id. § 51.04(a), and although quasi-criminal in nature, the proceedings are considered civil cases, see id. § 51.17 (subject to certain exceptions, or when in conflict with provisions of Juvenile Justice Code, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure govern proceedings under Juvenile Justice Code); In re Hall, 286 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. 2009) (noting that juvenile proceedings are civil cases, "although quasi-criminal in nature"). The Juvenile Justice Code provides that, under certain circumstances, a juvenile court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer an alleged juvenile offender to criminal district court for prosecution. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02.

Section 54.02 provides two separate procedures for the discretionary transfer of juvenile proceedings, and a determination of which procedure applies generally depends on the age of the juvenile offender at the time of transfer. See id. § 54.02(a), (j); but see id. § 51.041 (under certain circumstances, juvenile court retains jurisdiction over person, without regard to person's age,in transfer proceeding under Section 54.02(a) that is filed but not completed before person turns eighteen). When the alleged juvenile offender that is the subject of the transfer proceedings is under the age of eighteen, the transfer is governed by subsection (a) of Section 54.02. See id. § 54.02(a) ("The juvenile court may . . . transfer a child to the appropriate district court . . . ."). In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to waive jurisdiction under Section 54.02(a), the juvenile court must consider certain non-exclusive statutory factors aimed at balancing "the potential danger to the public" posed by the alleged juvenile offender "with the juvenile offender's amenability to treatment." Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(f) (listing factors). If the juvenile court decides to waive its jurisdiction and transfer the juvenile, the statute requires the court to "state specifically" in a written order "its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including the written order and findings of the court." Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 38 (quoting Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(h)).

Once the alleged juvenile offender turns eighteen, the juvenile court's jurisdiction is limited, generally, to either dismissing the case or transferring the case to the criminal district court pursuant to section 54.02(j). Moore v. State, 532 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); In re B.R.H., 426 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding); but see Tex. Fam. Code § 51.041. To obtain a discretionary waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of a person who is eighteen or older, the State must prove that the requirements of Section 54.02(j) are satisfied. In relevant part, Section 54.02(j) provides that the juvenile court may waive its jurisdiction when:

(1) the person is 18 years of age or older;

(2) the person was:

(A) 10 years of age or older and under 17 years of age at the time the person is alleged to have committed a capital felony;

. . .

(3) no adjudication concerning the alleged offense has been made or no adjudication hearing concerning the offense has been conducted;

(4) the juvenile court finds from a preponderance of the evidence that:

(A) for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person; or

(B) after due diligence of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person because

. . .

(iii) a previous transfer order was reversed by an appellate court or set aside by a district court; and

(5) the juvenile court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court committed the offense alleged.

Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j).

In this case, it is undisputed that D.J.M. was over the age of eighteen when the State filed the petition for waiver of jurisdiction and transfer that resulted in the transfer order that is the subject of this appeal. Consequently, the transfer order is governed by Section 54.02(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

All of D.J.M.'s issues on appeal are, in effect, challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's discretionary decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer D.J.M. to criminal district court. As an appellate court, we review D.J.M.'s challenges to the juvenilecourt's findings under traditional standards for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence. See Collins v. State, 516 S.W.3d 504, 520 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet. denied) ("Because the judge's ruling on a motion for discretionary transfer uses the preponderance of the evidence standard, which is a civil standard of proof, we use the standard of review that we utilize in civil cases to review the court's findings." (citing Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 45)). Under a legal sufficiency challenge, we credit evidence favorable to the challenged finding and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not reject the evidence. Moon v. State, 410 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff'd, 451 S.W.3d 28; In re H.Y., 512 S.W.3d 467, 478-79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). We will not second-guess the factfinder "unless only one inference can be drawn from the evidence." In re J.G., 495 S.W.3d 354, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (quoting Faisst v. State, 105 S.W.3d 8, 12 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.)). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the no-evidence challenge fails. Moon, 410 S.W.3d at 370. Under a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all of the evidence presented to determine if the court's finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id.

We also review the juvenile court's ultimate decision to waive jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion.² In re H.Y., 512 S.W.3d at 479 (citing Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47). That is, weevaluate whether the court's decision was "essentially arbitrary, given the evidence upon which it was based, or [whether] it represent[ed] a reasonably principled application of the legislative criteria." In re J.G., 495 S.W.3d at 369 (quoting Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47).

ANALYSIS

In his first issue on appeal, D.J.M. argues that the transfer was improper because the State failed to meet its burden of proof at the discretionary hearing. According to D.J.M., the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings that: (1) there was no prior adjudication for the offense; (2) the State exercised due diligence to obtain an adjudication of the offense in the juvenile court before he turned eighteen; (3) a previous transfer order was reversed by an appellate court or by a district court; and (4) D.J.M. received the statutorily required notice by service of the petition.³ In his second issue, D.J.M. asserts that the record shows that the summons he received failed to comply with certain statutory requirements. In considering D.J.M.'s arguments, we first examine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that "after duediligence of the State, it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before [D.J.M.'s] [eighteenth] birthday." See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(4)(B). We also consider the related issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that "no adjudication hearing has been conducted to this point concerning the felony offenses." See id. § 54.02(j)(3).

The record shows that in July 2013, one month before D.J.M.'s seventeenth birthday and within a month of the alleged delinquent conduct, the State filed its original petition in Fayette County Court, acting as juvenile court, alleging that D.J.M. had engaged in delinquent conduct, namely, causing the death of the victim. That same month, the parties filed an agreed motion for a finding of probable cause of unfitness to proceed, which the trial...