In re Det. of J.S.

In the Matter of the Detention of: J.S., Appellant.

No. 81209-2-I

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

April 12, 2021

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

ANDRUS, J. — J.S. challenges a trial court's order involuntarily committing him for 14 days of mental health treatment. J.S. contends that the written findings of fact entered at the conclusion of the commitment hearing are not sufficiently specific to permit appellate review, and that the supplemental findings entered after the notice of appeal was filed should be stricken from the record. J.S. further contends that insufficient evidence supports the trial court's conclusions that he was gravely disabled and not a good faith voluntary patient. He also maintains he was deprived of his right to trial by jury on the 14-day commitment petition. We affirm.

FACTS

On February 8, 2020, Designated Crisis Responder (DCR) David Cascella filed a petition for an initial 72-hour detention of J.S., a 31-year-old man from Whatcom County with a history of multiple psychiatric hospitalizations and a previous diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Cascella sought to detain J.S. because, while staying with his mother, he presented to the emergency room with multiple self-inflicted stab wounds. Cascella deemed J.S. an imminent risk of harm to himself and gravely disabled because of his mental health disorder. J.S. was placed on a 72-hour initial detention while he continued to recover in the intensive care unit of the PeaceHealth St. Joseph Medical Center (PeaceHealth).

On February 10, 2020, PeaceHealth filed a petition pursuant to Chapter 71.05 RCW seeking to involuntarily commit J.S. for a period of up to 14 days for evaluation and treatment. On February 11, 2020, a court commissioner held a probable cause hearing on the petition. The State presented the testimony of J.S.'s mother, Maude Anderson; DCR Cascella; and PeaceHealth licensed psychologist, Dr. Nate Reece.

Anderson testified that J.S. came to stay with her in January 2020, about three weeks before he was detained. She knew J.S. had become homeless and his mental state seemed "vulnerable and tenuous," so she allowed him to stay with her to get some rest. After that, J.S.'s mental state "went . . . downhill . . . rapidly." Anderson encouraged J.S. to obtain voluntary mental health treatment, but he refused. The day before J.S. was hospitalized, he drove by himself to Seattle in a confused state and called Anderson to pick him up because he had no money, no gas, and was hearing voices.

On the morning of February 6, 2020, J.S. told his mother he needed to see a doctor. While she was getting dressed to leave, she heard her dog "shrieking." She saw that J.S. "had the dog pinned down with a wrestling hold with blood squirting out of her neck and a boning knife in the other hand." She called 911 for J.S. and took the dog to a veterinary hospital. When she returned home, Anderson found that J.S. had spread blood and feces around the room. Anderson subsequently learned from police that J.S. had stabbed himself multiple times and been taken by police to the emergency department.

Cascella testified he was called to evaluate J.S. based on the concern that J.S. had stabbed both himself and his mother's dog. J.S. was "paranoid, guarded, and evasive of any questions" about his mental health during his first interview. Cascella said that J.S. minimized the significance of his situation and insisted his mother was a liar. During a second interview, J.S. admitted he had stabbed himself because he had ordered a "zygote, which he identified to be in all living things to be terminated." When Cascella asked J.S. why he had stabbed the dog, J.S. became "evasive and guarded" and denied that he ever said anything about zygotes or about stabbing himself.

Dr. Reece evaluated J.S. while still in the hospital's ICU. Dr. Reece opined that J.S. was "gravely disabled" as a result of his untreated mental disorder. Dr. Reece noted that J.S. had demanded to leave the hospital despite having multiple IVs and a chest tube in place and that, to the best of his knowledge, J.S. had shown no inclination to remain hospitalized voluntarily. Dr. Reece further opined that he did not believe any less restrictive alternative than hospitalization was in the best interest of J.S. or others.

J.S. also testified at the hearing. He acknowledged that he had expressed his desire to be released from the hospital, but denied that he had ever demanded to be released. He testified he would remain in the hospital voluntarily if necessary to maintain his Second Amendment right to bear firearms. However, when asked whether he would stay in the hospital as long as the doctors thought he should, he said "No. Because the doctors are biased because they work for the hospital where she gets money from their patients, so no."

At the conclusion of the evidence, the commissioner found that as a result of a mental disorder, J.S. was in danger of serious physical harm resulting from the failure toprovide for his essential human needs of health or safety. The commissioner also found that J.S. was not a good faith voluntary patient.

On February 11, 2020, the day of the hearing, the commissioner used a boilerplate form to enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order committing J.S. to up to 14 days of involuntary treatment. On February 19, 2020, J.S., through counsel, timely filed a motion to revise the commissioner's ruling.

On March 6, 2020, before his motion to revise was decided, counsel for J.S. filed a notice of appeal in this court.

On March 9, 2020, the State submitted a set of proposed supplemental findings of fact to the commissioner, noted the proposed findings for consideration by the commissioner on March 20, and served a copy of this notice on counsel for J.S. The commissioner signed these supplemental findings on March 20, 2020. J.S.'s attorney approved the entry of these findings.

On June 5, 2020, the superior court entered an agreed order dismissing the motion to revise the commissioner's order.

ANALYSIS

A. Supplemental Findings of Fact

J.S. moves to strike the March 20 supplemental findings of fact and contends that the 14-day order of commitment must be vacated because the boilerplate findings entered at the conclusion of the hearing are not sufficiently specific to permit appellate review.

Findings of fact are required following an involuntary commitment hearing. MPR 3.4(b). A superior court's written findings of fact "should at least be sufficient to indicate the factual bases for the ultimate conclusions." In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196,218, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the trial court has properly addressed all issues and that the parties and the appellate court are fully informed of the basis of the decision. Id. Boilerplate findings, without more, are insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review of a trial court's involuntary commitment order. In re Det. of G.D., 11 Wn. App. 2d 67, 70, 450 P.3d 668 (2019).

J.S. first argues we cannot rely on the March 20 supplemental findings because the commissioner entered them in violation of RAP 7.2. Under RAP 7.2(a), "[a]fter review is accepted by the appellate court, the trial court has authority to act in a case only to the extent provided in this rule . . . ." RAP 7.2(e) authorizes the trial court to hear or determine "(1) postjudgment motions authorized by the civil rules, the criminal rules, or statutes, and (2) actions to change or modify a decision that is subject to modification by the court that initially made the decision." However, "[i]f the trial court determination will change a decision then being reviewed by the appellate court, the permission of the appellate court must be obtained prior to the formal entry of the trial court decision." RAP 7.2(e).

J.S. asserts that this court accepted review when he filed his notice of appeal on March 6, 2020. He contends that under RAP 7.2, the trial court lacked authority to substantively alter the record without permission from this court or notice to appellate counsel. The State argues that RAP 7.2 did not restrict the trial court's authority to enter supplemental findings because J.S.'s February 19, 2020 motion to revise the commissioner's ruling pursuant to RCW 2.24.050 rendered his appeal premature. We agree with the State.

In relevant part, RCW 2.24.050 provides:

All of the acts and proceedings of court commissioners hereunder shall be subject to revision by the superior court. . . . Such revision shall beupon the records of the case, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the court commissioner, and unless a demand for revision is made within ten days from the entry of the order or judgment of the court commissioner, the orders and judgments shall be and become the orders and judgments of the superior court, and appellate review thereof may be sought in the same fashion as review of like orders and judgments entered by the judge.

Under the plain and unambiguous language of this statute, when a timely motion to revise a court commissioner's order is filed, the court commissioner's order is not yet final and appealable. RAP 2.2(a)(1) provides that a party may appeal from "[t]he final judgment entered in any action or proceeding." Thus, until the court rules on a pending motion to revise a commissioner ruling or until the party withdraws that motion, an appeal is premature.¹

Here, J.S.'s motion to revise remained pending when J.S. filed his notice of appeal on March 6, 2020 and when the commissioner entered the supplemental findings on March 20, 2020. Accordingly, J.S.'s appeal had not yet been perfected, and RAP 7.2 did not yet apply.

A premature filing of the notice of appeal is not fatal to J.S.'s claim. A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision but before entry of the final decision is treated as if it had been filed on the day following entry of the decision. RAP 5.2(g...