In re Dodier

174 N.H. 548

267 A.3d 383

APPEAL OF ESTATE OF Peter DODIER (New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board)

No. 2020-0185

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: November 19, 2020

Opinion Issued: October 14, 2021

Law Office of Manning & Zimmerman, PLLC, of Manchester (Anna Goulet Zimmerman and Maureen Raiche Manning on the brief, and Anna Goulet Zimmerman orally), for the petitioner.

Trombley & Kfoury, PA, of Bedford (Paul R. Kfoury, Jr. and J. Kirk Trombley on the brief, and Paul R. Kfoury, Jr. orally), for the respondents.

BASSETT, J.

The petitioner, the Estate of Peter Dodier, appeals an order of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) denying the estate's claim for workers’ compensation and death benefits following Peter Dodier's death. See RSA 281-A:2, XI, XIII, :26 (2010). The CAB denied the estate's claim based on its determination that Dodier's anxiety and depression were not a compensable injury. It therefore did not reach the issue of death benefits. Because we conclude that Dodier's anxiety and depression are compensable, we reverse the CAB's decision and remand for its consideration of whether the estate is entitled to death benefits.

The following facts are derived from the CAB's orders, are supported by the record, or are otherwise undisputed. Peter Dodier was employed as a branch manager in the Exeter office of respondent OL International Holdings, LLC (OL), an international shipping and logistics company. His responsibilities included overseeing logistics for export and import operations, managing budgets for the Exeter office, engaging in sales, and managing sales staff. At the time of his death, Dodier had worked in the transportation industry, including international transportation, for approximately 30 years.

In 2016, Dodier began to express feelings of stress related to both work and his personal life. His stress worsened over a period of months, and on February 18, 2017, he was admitted to the hospital with symptoms resembling a panic attack. Dodier told hospital personnel that, over the prior six weeks, he had experienced increasing stress at work and feelings of personal inadequacy. He was prescribed anxiety medication, and was discharged the next day with a diagnosis of unspecified anxiety disorder.

On February 20, Dodier attended a doctor's appointment, where he stated that he had felt increased stress from work for about two months, was unsure if he could meet the demands of his job, and was concerned about losing his job. He stated that he had thought about hurting himself, including thoughts of suicide.

On February 23, Dodier was admitted to the hospital again, expressing worsening anxiety and suicidal thoughts. He remained in the hospital for several days, receiving medication and attending therapy groups. On February 28, he appeared to be in full control of his behavior and denied having "safety issues." He requested discharge, and was discharged with a plan for treatment with a psychiatrist and therapist. Following his discharge, Dodier returned to work full-time.

From March 1 to March 9, Dodier attended numerous medical and therapy appointments with multiple providers, during which he expressed feeling significant stress related to his employment. At multiple appointments he described persisting anxiety, largely attributable to feelings of inadequacy at work. He stated that he was looking for a new job and felt guilty about taking anxiety medication. He also stated that he was experiencing financial stress.

On Sunday, March 12, Dodier completed errands in the morning. Later that day, he died by suicide.

In May 2018, Dodier's estate provided a notice of accidental injury or occupational disease to OL. See RSA 281-A:19, :20 (2010). The notice stated that Dodier had "developed severe depression and anxiety from the stress of his job." Respondent Utica National Insurance Group — OL's workers’ compensation insurer — denied the estate's claim for benefits. The estate challenged the denial in the Department of Labor, which upheld Utica's decision.

The estate then appealed to the CAB, arguing that Dodier's employment had caused his depression, anxiety, and, ultimately, his death by suicide. The estate asserted that his depression and anxiety were a compensable injury or occupational disease under the Workers’ Compensation Law. See RSA 281-A:2, XI, XIII. The estate also argued that Dodier's dependents were entitled to compensation for his death. See RSA 281-A:26.

In a 2-1 decision, the CAB disagreed, ruling that the estate "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that ... Dodier's anxiety and major depression illness was causally-related to his employment." Dr. Albert Drukteinis and Dr. Lloyd Price opined that Dodier's employment had substantially contributed to his depression. In finding for the respondents, the CAB observed that those opinions were based in part on representations about Dodier's work environment made by his wife, who was not familiar with his day-to-day employment responsibilities. The CAB noted that many of the wife's assertions were contradicted by Dodier's colleagues, who "describe[d] a generally normal, reasonable, and functional work environment." Importantly, the CAB stated that Dr. Drukteinis's opinion "that work ‘substantially contributed’ to causing the injury does not permit us to find that the burden of proving causation has been met. This does not meet the legal requirement that the injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ the work stress."

The CAB concluded that the estate had failed to prove causation in regard to Dodier's underlying anxiety and depression, finding that Dodier experienced several sources of stress, and that "the largest number" were personal stressors unrelated to his employment. The CAB relied upon the opinion of the respondents’ expert, Dr. David Bourne. Dr. Bourne had concluded that "in the final analysis, one cannot attribute ... Dodier's depression to any specific cause. This means that one should not conclude that work stressors played a substantial contribution to the depression, because the substantial contributor to the depression was the depression itself, rather than any external cause." The CAB did not reach the issue of whether Dodier's death by suicide was caused by his employment.

The estate filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the CAB had applied the incorrect causation standard, and that it erred in weighing the evidence, resulting in an unjust and unreasonable decision. The estate asserted that the CAB's use of a "but for" causation standard was error, and that the applicable standard was whether Dodier's employment was a "substantial contributing factor" to his anxiety and depression. The estate also argued that the CAB had erred by failing to adequately consider Dodier's medical records, which provided extensive evidence that his employment substantially contributed to his anxiety and depression.

The CAB denied the motion, relying on its previous findings that Dodier had not experienced an increase in work pressure in the months before his death, and that his work environment was not unusually stressful. The CAB reiterated that it had credited the opinion of Dr. Bourne, and summarily maintained that it "did not apply a ‘but for’ legal standard" in regard to causation. This appeal followed.

"We will not disturb the CAB's decision absent an error of law, or unless, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, we find it to be unjust or unreasonable." Appeal of Kelly, 167 N.H. 489, 491, 114 A.3d 316 (2015) (quotation omitted); see RSA 541:13 (2007). We review the CAB's factual findings deferentially, and we review its statutory interpretation de novo. Appeal of Northridge Envtl., 168 N.H. 657, 660, 135 A.3d 945 (2016). "We construe the Workers’ Compensation Law liberally to give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose." Appeal of Phillips, 165 N.H. 226, 230, 75 A.3d 1083 (2013). "Thus, when construing it, we resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the injured worker." Id.

On appeal, the estate first argues that the CAB erred when it concluded that the estate did not demonstrate that Dodier's depression and anxiety were caused by his employment. The estate contends that the CAB applied too demanding a standard in determining causation, and that it unreasonably disregarded evidence from Dodier's medical records, which establish that his work "caused or contributed" to his depression and anxiety. The respondents counter that the CAB's decision is consistent with New Hampshire law and supported by the evidence, and is therefore neither unjust nor unreasonable. We agree with the estate.

To recover under the Workers’ Compensation Law, an employee must demonstrate that his injury or occupational disease arose "out of and in the course of" his employment. RSA 281-A:2, XI, XIII; see Appeal of Margeson, 162 N.H. 273, 277, 27 A.3d 663 (2011). In Margeson, we explained that the phrase "in the course of" employment refers to whether the injury occurred within the boundaries of time and space created by the terms of employment and occurred in the performance of an activity related to employment. Margeson, 162 N.H. at 277, 27 A.3d 663. We further explained that the phrase "arising out of" employment refers to the causal connection between the injury and the risks of employment, and requires proof that the injury resulted from a risk created by the employment. Id. We set forth a framework for determining when an injury arises out of employment. See id. at 277-79, 284-85, 27 A.3d 663 ; see also Kelly, 167 N.H. at 492-94, 114 A.3d 316 (recounting our decision in Margeson ).

There are four types of injury-causing risks commonly faced by an employee at work: (1) risks directly associated with employment; (2) risks personal to the claimant; (3) mixed risks; and (4) neutral risks. Margeson, 162 N.H. at 277, 27 A.3d 663. The first category, employment-related risks, includes the risk of injuries generally...