In re Drummond

543 P.3d 1022

IN RE: Steven R. DRUMMOND, Mary A. Drummond, Debtors.

No. CV-23-0009-CQ

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed February 23, 2024

Certified Question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona, The Honorable Paul Sala, Bankruptcy Judge, No. 0:22-BK-01765-PS. QUESTION ANSWERED

Keith S. Knochel, Nicholas R. Darus (argued), Knochel Knochel & Darus, Bullhead City, Attorneys for Steven R. Drummond and Mary A. Drummond

Terry A. Dake (argued), Terry A. Dake, Ltd., Phoenix, Attorney for Lawrence J. Warfield

Brett W. Johnson, Benjamin W. Reeves, Tracy A. Olson, Ryan P. Hogan, Charlene A. Warner, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Creditors Bar Association, et al.

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, and JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, MONTGOMERY, and KING joined. VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER dissented.

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona certified the following question to this Court: "Whether a motor home in which a person over 18 years of age resides qualifies as a mobile home for the purpose of claiming an Arizona homestead exemption pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3)." For the reasons explained below, we hold that a motor home does not qualify for an exemption.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Steven and Mary Drummond (the "Drummonds") filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in March 2022. The question here centers around the Drummonds’ self-propelled motor home, a 2017 Tiffin Allegro recreational vehicle, which they use as a full-time residence. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the Drummonds claimed that their motor home is subject to the homestead exemption as a "mobile home" under § 33-1101(A)(3).¹ The trustee objected to this exemption, arguing that the Drummonds’ motor home is not a mobile home under Arizona law. Following the parties’ arguments regarding the applicability of § 33-1101(A)(3), the bankruptcy judge certified the question to this Court.

¶3 Because no Arizona precedent exists determining whether a motor home qualifies as a mobile home under Arizona’s homestead exemption statute, we agreed to resolve the certified question pursuant to article 6, section 5(6) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-1861.

DISCUSSION

¶4 Section 33-1101(A) sets out Arizona’s homestead exemption. The statute applies to four residence types and reads in relevant part:

A. Any person eighteen years of age or over, married or single, who resides within this state may hold as a homestead exempt from execution and forced sale, not exceeding $250,000 in value, any one of the following:

1. The person’s interest in real property in one compact body on which exists a dwelling house in which the person resides.

2. The person’s interest in one condominium or cooperative in which the person resides.

3. A mobile home in which the person resides.

4. A mobile home in which the person resides plus the land on which that mobile home is located.

§ 33-1101(A). Determining whether a motor home qualifies for a homestead exemption compels us to interpret § 33-1101(A).

[1–6] ¶5 We "determine the plain meaning of the words the legislature chose to use, viewed in their broader statutory context." See Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 255 Ariz. 382, 385 ¶ 11, 532 P.3d 757, 760 (2023). "Our task in statutory construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous." BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9, 417 P.3d 782, 784 (2018). Absent ambiguity, we interpret statutes according to their plain language. Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro, 240 Ariz. 193, 195 ¶ 9, 377 P.3d 988, 990 (2016). When a statute’s plain language is unambiguous in context, it is dispositive. See Shea v. Maricopa County, 255 Ariz. 116, 120–21 ¶ 19, 528 P.3d 471, 475–76 (2023); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Gamer, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (explaining that courts must interpret a statute’s plain language in context, because "[c]ontext is a primary determinant of meaning"). Additionally, "[i]n construing a specific provision, we look to the statute as a whole and we may also consider statutes that are in pari materia—of the same subject or general purpose—for guidance and to give effect to all of the provisions involved." Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 574, 575 (2017). However, if more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we will examine secondary interpretation methods, including the statute’s subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, as well as its spirit and purpose to aid with interpretation. See Romero-Millan v. Barr, 253 Ariz. 24, 27–28 ¶ 13, 507 P.3d 999, 1002–03 (2022).

I.

[7] ¶6 The Drummonds argue that their motor home qualifies for the homestead exemption under § 33-1101. Title 33 does not expressly define "motor home," but Title 28, which governs transportation, defines "motor home" as "a motor vehicle that is primarily designed as temporary living quarters and that [i]s built onto as an integral part of, or is permanently attached to, a motor vehicle chassis." A.R.S. § 28-4301(19)(a). This definition suggests that a "motor home" is a vehicle and is therefore readily and inherently movable. Consistent with this definition, the Drummonds used their 2017 Tiffin Allegro to travel around the United States from February through October 2019.

[8, 9] ¶7 Section 33-1101 allows certain "mobile homes" to qualify for the homestead exemption, but the statute does not define the term. Absent a statutory definition, courts generally give words their ordinary meaning and may look to dictionary definitions. Chaparro v. Shinn, 248 Ariz. 138, 141 ¶ 14, 459 P.3d 50, 53 (2020). When dictionary definitions are unavailing, however, context is critical. See DBT Yuma, L.L.C. v. Yuma Cnty. Airport Auth., 238 Ariz. 394, 396 ¶ 10, 361 P.3d 379, 381 (2015).

¶8 Here, dictionary definitions of "mobile home" are too varied to categorically establish any plain meaning. See, e.g., Mobile Home, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mobile%20home (last visited Feb. 20, 2024) (defined since 1934 as "a dwelling structure built on a steel chassis and fitted with wheels that is intended to be hauled to a usually permanent site"); Mobile Home, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/mobile-home (last visited Feb. 20, 2024) ("[A] type of building that people live in, usually staying in one place, but able to be moved using a vehicle or sometimes its own engine."); Mobile Home, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/mobile-home (last visited Feb. 20, 2024) ("[A] large house trailer, designed for year-round living in one place."). One definition allows for self-propulsion, while another only allows the mobile home to be "hauled." But despite these differences, the dictionary definitions all suggest a mobile home must generally have a permanent location—either by design or intent. However, none of these definitions describe what makes such a location permanent.

[10, 11] ¶9 But inconclusive dictionary definitions do not render the term ambiguous. Rather, as previously noted, "[w]e do not view statutory words in isolation, but rather draw their meaning from the context in which they are used." See DBT Yuma, 238 Ariz. at 396 ¶ 10, 361 P.3d at 381. And considering the term "mobile home" in the context of § 33-1101(A)’s other subsections dispels any purported ambiguity regarding the term’s meaning.

¶10 Sections 33-1101(A)(1), (2), and (4) each describe a permanent residence in which a person seeking a homestead exemption resides. Each subsection describes a home that is permanently attached to land—often anchored to a foundation or at least with its wheels and axles removed, hardwired to electrical services, and hard-plumbed to both water and sewer. Examined in this context, the Drummonds’ argument that the subsection (A)(3) definition of "mobile home" includes a readily movable "motor home" fails.

[12, 13] ¶11 First, § 33-1101(A)(1)’s exemption includes a "person’s interest in real property in one compact body on which exists a dwelling house in which the person resides." This subsection describes an occupied structure permanently located on a parcel of land—and it is axiomatic that both land and structures attached to it are real property. See Real Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("Land and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land."). And real property inherently has a permanent location.

[14, 15] ¶12 Second, § 33-1101(A)(2)’s exemption includes a "person’s interest in one condominium or cooperative in which the person resides." A condominium is also real property permanently located where it is built. See A.R.S. § 33-1202(10) ("‘Condominium’ means real estate …." (emphasis added)). The same is true for a person’s cooperative interest. See Kadera v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 557, 563, 931 P.2d 1067, 1073 (App. 1996) ("[T]he cooperator has a real property ownership interest."). And both a condominium and a cooperative are immobile structures inherently tied to the location on which they were constructed. See Condominium, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionaiy/condominium (last visited Feb. 20, 2024) ("[I]ndividual ownership of a unit in a multiunit structure (such as an apartment building) or on land owned in common (such as a town house complex)."); Cooperative, Dictionary.com, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/cooperative (last visited Feb. 20, 2024) ("[A] building owned and managed by a corporation …."). Though the dictionary definition of "cooperative" is not limited to dwellings, § 33-1101(A)(2)’s reference to "in which the person resides" plainly identifies a cooperative in the context of a cooperative dwelling.

[16] ¶13 Lastly, § 33-1101(A...