In re Estate of Baker

IN RE ESTATE OF HATTIE FAYE BAKER

No. W2020-00460-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs January 4, 2021

April 6, 2021

Appeal from the Chancery Court for McNairy County

No. P-1252

Don R. Ash, Senior Judge

The petitioner claims an interest in the estate of the second wife of her uncle, who was originally married to the petitioner's aunt. Because the property at issue was held by the petitioner's aunt and uncle as a tenancy by the entireties, the uncle owned the property in fee simple upon the aunt's death. We conclude that the petitioner's claim is without merit, and we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

Mary Kay Mutters-Edelman, Benton, Arkansas, pro se.

Terry Abernathy, Selmer, Tennessee, for the appellees, Timothy E. Baker, Peggy Jo Berryman, and Kathy Ann Berryman.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Brooks Derryberry inherited from his father a large piece of property in McNairy County consisting of an old family homestead and farmland ("the Farm"). Mr. Derryberry married Rubye¹ Blackwood in May 1936. On December 7, 1967, Mr. Derryberry executed a deed ("1967 deed") stating his intention "to create a tenancy by the entireties in and to the entire interest" in the Farm with Rubye. Rubye died in November 1970 having never had any children.

In 1983, Mr. Derryberry married Hattie Faye Baker. Mr. Derryberry died in November 1997 having no children. No will was found following Mr. Derryberry's death, thus leaving Ms. Baker as his sole heir under the laws of intestate succession. Ms. Baker died in 2015. By the terms of her will, Ms. Baker's property was devised in equal shares to her three children, Peggy Jo Berryman, Kathy Ann Berryman, and Timothy Baker ("the Baker heirs"). In March 2015, an executor's deed was recorded by the executor of Ms. Baker's estate granting the Farm to the Baker heirs, who subsequently quit claimed their interests in the Farm to other members of their family.

On October 7, 2019, Mary Kay Mutters-Edelman ("Petitioner"), Rubye Derryberry's niece, filed this lawsuit against Ms. Baker's estate and the Baker heirs (collectively, "the Estate"). Petitioner claimed to be "Heir to the Derryberry Estate" and requested that the trial court set aside the executor's deed and the Baker heirs' quit claim deeds and enter an order ejecting the Berryman family members from the Farm. In addition to the 1967 deed, the petition referenced a will executed by Mr. Derryberry on January 4, 1963, in which he gave and devised to Rubye all of his real and personal property, including "all my interest in my father's estate." This will was never probated.

The Estate filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the petition did not entitle Petitioner to any relief and citing, in part, Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3-105(a), the anti-lapse statute. After a hearing in February 2020, the trial court entered an order granting the Estate's motion to dismiss. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in granting the Estate's motion to dismiss and in failing to address allegations of fraud.

ANALYSIS

We begin by noting that Petitioner represented herself at trial and is representing herself on appeal. As a pro se litigant with no legal training, Petitioner is "entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts." Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Paehler v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). The following principles apply to pro se litigants:

The courts should take into account that many pro se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant's adversary. Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.

Young, 130 S.W.3d at 62-63 (citations omitted); see also Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct App. 2003). We grant pro se litigants "a certain amount of leeway" in the preparation of their appellate briefs. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d at 903 (citing Whitaker, 32S.W.3d at 227; Paehler, 971 S.W.2d at 397). This means that courts "measure the papers prepared by pro se litigants using standards that are less stringent than those applied to papers prepared by lawyers." Id. at 903-04 (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Tenn. 1975); Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)).

I. Procedural issues.

Petitioner's first argument is that the trial court erred in granting the Estate's motion to dismiss because the motion was "procedurally flawed." More specifically, Petitioner asserts that the Estate did not address the allegations in her complaint and "did not assert that the allegations in the Motion to Set Aside the Executor's Deed failed to establish a cause of action . . . ." We respectfully disagree.

In its motion to dismiss, the Estate argued that "all of the claims and demands and allegations or opinions of fact or law as raised in the pleadings . . . should be summarily dismissed as a matter of law." Thus, the Estate essentially asserted that the allegations in Petitioner's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(6).

The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss involves a question of law, which we review de novo, without any presumption of correctness. Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011). A party who files a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) asserts that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion "challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the strength of the plaintiff's proof or evidence." Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011); see also Willis v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2003). A Rule 12.02(6) motion is resolved by examining the pleadings alone; if the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in support of the claim(s) asserted, the motion should be denied. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 426. The moving party "'admits the truth of all the relevant and material allegations contained in the complaint, but . . . asserts that the allegations fail to establish a cause of action.'" Phillips v. Montgomery Cnty., 442 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 426) (further citations omitted). When ruling on Rule 12.02(6) motions, courts are to "'construe the complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.'" Id. (quoting Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 426) (further citations omitted).

Although a trial court must liberally consider and construe all factual assertions in ruling upon a motion to dismiss, this rule does not extend to conclusory allegations. See Polite v. Metro. Dev. & Hous. Agency, No. M2007-02472-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3982915, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) (finding that the plaintiff "failed to state 'factual' allegations, as distinguished from 'conclusory' allegations," that would entitle herto relief). In the present case, Petitioner's requests for relief were based upon her interpretation of the 1967 deed and Mr. Derryberry's unprobated will. The proper construction of a deed or a will is a question of law, a matter we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. KT Grp., LLC v. Lowe, 578 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018); In re Estate of Christian, No. E2015-02276-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 729753, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2017) (citing McBride v. Sumrow, 181 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). The trial court here considered the facts alleged in the complaint and construed Mr. Derryberry's (unprobated) will and the 1967 deed in the context of those facts. As discussed in full below, we have concluded that the trial court properly granted the Estate's motion to dismiss under the applicable law.

Petitioner also raises the argument that the Estate "failed to file a responsive pleading" to her petition and that the allegations in the petition should therefore be "deemed admitted in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.04." However, Petitioner misconstrues the applicable law. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.01 addresses the timeliness of pleadings and provides, in pertinent part: "The service of a motion permitted under this rule alters these periods of time . . . ." Rule 12.02 describes motions permitted under Rule 12, including a motion for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." TENN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(6). The rule further requires that "[a] motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted." TENN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(6). If the motion to dismiss had been denied by the trial court, the Estate would have had "15 days after notice of the court's action" within which to file a responsive pleading. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 12.01.

We find no merit in Petitioner's arguments concerning Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6).

II. Construction of 1967 deed.

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in interpreting the 1967 deed as conveying a tenancy by the entireties. According to Petitioner's reasoning, the deed created an "estate by the entireties" and entitles Petitioner to relief. For the reasons set forth below, this argument fails.

The primary concern of a court when interpreting a deed is "ascertaining the intention of the grantor." Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 466 (Tenn. 2012). We "ascertain the grantor's...