In re Estate of Martin

IN RE: ESTATE OF EDWARD A. ROSBOSCHIL APPEAL OF: CRAIG MARTIN

J-S15026-14

No. 1055 MDA 2013

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FILED MAY 1, 2014

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order May 16, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2209-877

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON AND FITZGERALD,^* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:

Appellant, Craig Martin, appeals from an order entered on May 16, 2013 in the Orphans' Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County that denied his amended petition to revoke previously issued letters of administration and to grant him letters of administration de bonis non¹ based upon a holographic will. We affirm.

The historical facts of this case are not in dispute. Edward A. Rosboschil (Decedent) died on June 29, 2009. Thereafter, on or around September 11, 2009, Mary J. Rosboschil, Decedent's wife, secured letters of administration for Decedent's estate. Mary Rosboschil then died on February 22, 2010. Because of Mary's death, Glenn M. Lampert, the executor of MaryRosboschil's estate, petitioned the Dauphin County Register of Wills on March 24, 2010 for letters of administration de bonis non on behalf of Decedent's estate. The Register issued the letters pursuant to Mr. Lampert's request.

On December 8, 2011, Appellant filed an amended petition asking the court to revoke the letters of administration granted to Mr. Lampert.² In addition, the amended petition asked the court to grant letters testamentary to Appellant based upon a holographic will allegedly executed by Decedent on March 17, 2003. Appellant attached the holographic will to the amended petition. It read:

3-17-03

To whom it may concern,

[Appellant], as of this date, is my power of attorney and may enter my office or automobile and take anything he so desires, to do with what he wants, i.e., keep, sell or give away.

This may take place in the event of my death.

[/s/] Dr. Edward Rosboschil

Car combination [XXXXX] POLE [XX] [over]

Appellant's Amended Petition, 12/8/11, Exhibit A.³

The Orphans' Court convened an evidentiary hearing on April 25, 2013. At the hearing, the court received testimony from Appellant, Dr. Steven Hobkirk (a friend and colleague of both Appellant and Decedent), Loretta Jean Enders (Appellant's long-time employee who also assisted Decedent with administrative tasks relating to his medical practice), and Virginia Hobkirk (the wife of Dr. Hobkirk and Decedent's friend). Neither Mr. Lampert nor his counsel appeared at the hearing.

By opinion and order entered on May 16, 2013, the Orphans' Court denied Appellant's amended petition. In its opinion, the court explained that the proffered instrument could not be treated as a will because it did not contain a testamentary disposition. Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/16/13, at 3. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 13, 2013. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the Orphans' Court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant filed a timely concise statement on July 5, 2013. On July 18, 2013, the Orphans' Court issued an order declaring that its May 16, 2013 opinion set forth its reasons for denying Appellant's amended petition.

In his brief, Appellant asks us to consider the following question:

Did the [Orphans' Court] err and abuse his discretion in ruling that the writing submitted on behalf of the Appellant was not a holographic will, making a ruling of law on the document itself without regard to the testimony of the witnesses?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

Our standard and scope of review over Appellant's claim is as follows:

Our scope of review in this appeal from an Orphan's Court decree is limited. We will not disturb the trial court's findings absent a manifest error; we may modify the decree only if the findings upon which the decree rests are unsupported by the evidence or if there has been an error of law, an abuse of discretion or a capricious disbelief of competent evidence.

In re Estate of Yorty 761 A.2d 187, 188 (Pa. Super. 2000), quoting In re Estate of McCutcheon, 699 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. Super. 1997).

Appellant argues that the Orphans' Court erred and abused its discretion in concluding, as a matter of law and without relying on the testimony of the witnesses, that the writing in question did not meet the requirements for a valid holographic will under Pennsylvania law. Specifically, Appellant argues that the March 17, 2003 document was in writing, signed by Decedent, and revealed his testamentary intent. Appellant also asserts that, because the writing was prepared by a layman, it is entitled to "liberal construction" and should be reviewed "without reference to technical rules of construction." Appellant's Brief at 7 (case citations omitted).

In passing upon the validity of the proffered writing, we must determine whether the document is testamentary as a matter of law, non-testamentary as a matter of law, or ambiguous, in which case extrinsic evidence may be considered to resolve the ambiguity. See In re Estate of Moore, 277 A.2d 825, 826 (Pa. 1971). Testamentary intent is the focus of our inquiry in assessing the validity of an alleged holographic will:

If a testator intends to make a testamentary gift, it can be done in many ways and in many forms, and the intent, as we have often said, is the polestar. Papers—holographic and otherwise—have been sustained as wills where a testamentary disposition of property was clearly contained in a letter or a deed or a certificate of deposit or a power of attorney or an agreement or a check or a note or an assignment, and even in a letter of instructions to an attorney where it was later proved that the writer intended such letter to be a will[.]

In re Estate of Fick, 211 A.2d 425, 427 (Pa. 1965) (citations omitted).

Pennsylvania courts have not restricted the form that a valid will may take nor prescribed the language necessary to effectuate the drafter's intention.

The rule has been repeatedly stated that no formal words are necessary to make a valid will. The form of the instrument is immaterial so long as in substance it is a gift intended to take effect after testator's death. The important and usual incident of such testamentary document is that it vests no present interest but is intended to become operative only after the death of the maker, and until that time it continues to be ambulatory and may be revoked by testator[.] A[ny] writing . . . may operate as a will if the intention is that it should take effect only at the death of the maker[ ] and it is immaterial that the paper may have been delivered to the beneficiary during the lifetime of the maker[.]

In re Wolfe's Estate, 130 A. 501, 502 (Pa. 1925) (emphasis added; citations omitted).

No rule regarding wills is more settled than the general rule that the testator's intent, if it is not unlawful, must prevail. In re Estate of Conlin, 131 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa. 1957) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the testator's intention must be ascertained from the language and scheme of his will; it is not what the Court thinks he might or would have said in the existing circumstances, or even what the Court thinks he meant to say, but is what is the meaning of his words. [Id.] (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In re Estate of Shelly, 950 A.2d 1021, 1025 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis in original; parallel citations omitted), appeal denied, 962 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 2008).

As a preliminary matter, we conclude that the Orphans' Court correctly focused its inquiry upon Decedent's intent, as expressed in the March 17, 2003 writing, and disregarded the testimony of the witnesses at the April 25, 2013 hearing. Our review of the March 17, 2003...