In re Estate of Ellis

923 N.E.2d 237

236 Ill.2d 45

337 Ill. Dec. 678

In re ESTATE OF Grace ELLIS, Deceased (Shriners Hospitals for Children, Appellant, v. James G. Bauman, Indiv. and as Ex'r of the Estate of Grace Ellis, Deceased, et al., Appellees).

No. 106461.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 29, 2009.

Rehearing Denied January 25, 2010.

Wayne T. Lofthouse and Andrew Lofthouse, Park Ridge, for appellant.

Kerry R. Peck, Ray J. Koenig III and Timothy J. Ritchey, of Peck, Bloom, Austriaco & Koenig, LLC, Chicago, for appellee James G. Bauman.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Grace Ellis executed a will in 1964 naming Shriners Hospitals for Children (Shriners) as beneficiary of her estate if she died without direct descendants. In 1999, she executed a new will naming James G. Bauman as sole beneficiary. Bauman was the pastor of the church of which Ellis was a member. When Ellis died in 2003, the 1999 will was admitted to probate. It was not until 2006 that Shriners became aware of its interest in the 1964 will. Shriners filed the instant action to contest the 1999 will based on theories of undue influence and fraud and included a tort count for intentional interference with an expectancy of inheritance. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed all counts as untimely pursuant to section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2006)). On appeal, Shriners challenged only the dismissal of the tort claim. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 381 Ill.App.3d 427, 320 Ill.Dec. 323, 887 N.E.2d 467.

We allowed Shriners' petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill.2d R. 315(a)) and now hold that Shriners' tort claim for intentional interference with an expectancy of inheritance is not limited by the six-month limitation period in section 8-1. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court's judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

On December 3, 1964, Ellis executed a will designating her elderly parents as the primary beneficiaries of her estate, and designating her descendants and petitioner Shriners as contingent beneficiaries. On August 9, 1999, Ellis executed a new will designating Bauman as sole primary beneficiary and Ellis' surviving heirs at law as contingent beneficiaries of her estate.

Ellis died on October 8, 2003, at the age of 86, leaving no direct descendants. Her estate was worth more than $2 million dollars. The 1999 will was filed with the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County on October 9, 2003, and admitted to probate on October 29, 2003. Bauman was named independent executor of the estate.

Shriners first became aware of its interest in the 1964 will when Bauman filed the will with the circuit court in 2006 as part of a separate will contest brought by several of Ellis' heirs at law. Shriners filed its "Petition to Contest Will and For Other Relief" on August 8, 2006. Shriners alleged that Ellis met Bauman in 1994 and became a member of St. John's Lutheran Church in Glenview, Illinois, where Bauman was a pastor. Ellis subsequently gave Bauman powers of attorney over her health care and property, changed title to more than $1 million of her assets to Bauman, and purchased gifts and an automobile for Bauman. Counts I and II of the petition contested the validity of the 1999 will based on theories of undue influence and mental incapacity. Both counts requested the vacation of the order admitting the 1999 will to probate, and the admission to probate of the 1964 will.

Count III, the count that is at issue in this appeal, set forth a tort claim for intentional interference with an expectancy of inheritance. It alleged that: (1) but for the 1999 will obtained by Bauman, Shriners would have received Ellis' entire estate; (2) with knowledge of the 1964 will, Bauman set forth on an intentional scheme to interfere with Shriners' expectancy for his personal benefit; (3) Bauman interfered with Shriners' expectancy by abusing his position of trust, unduly influencing Ellis to execute a new will and to buy him gifts, violating his fiduciary duty to Ellis, taking advantage of her age and diminished capacity, and failing to notify beneficiaries and interested parties after her death; and (4) but for Bauman's actions, the bequest to Shriners would have been received. Shriners asked that the circuit court enter judgment against Bauman. In its prayer for relief, it requested compensatory damages in excess of $2 million dollars, an accounting of all inter vivos transfers and gifts, and punitive damages.

Bauman filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting that it was filed more than six months after admission to probate of the 1999 will, in violation of section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2006)).

Section 8-1 provides, in relevant part:

"Within 6 months after the admission to probate of a domestic will * * *, any interested person may file a petition in the proceeding for the administration of the testator's estate or, if no proceeding is pending, in the court in which the will was admitted to probate, to contest the validity of the will." 755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2006).

The circuit court granted Bauman's motion, dismissed the entire petition with prejudice, and denied Shriners leave to amend.

On appeal, Shriners challenged only the dismissal of the tort claim in count III. The appellate court affirmed. 381 Ill.App.3d 427, 320 Ill.Dec. 323, 887 N.E.2d 467. The appellate court held that the allegations in Shriners' tort claim were virtually identical to those in its will contest count based on undue influence. The court concluded that the legislature could not have intended "to bar a will contest as untimely after six months yet allow the same allegations to proceed in the tort arena." 381 Ill.App.3d at 431, 320 Ill.Dec 323, 887 N.E.2d 467. Therefore, the appellate court held, Shriners' tort claim amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on the order admitting the 1999 will to probate and was properly dismissed as time-barred under section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975. 381 Ill.App.3d at 435, 320 Ill.Dec. 323, 887 N.E.2d 467.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue in this appeal is the timeliness of Shriners' tort claim. As noted, the appellate court applied the six-month limitation period for filing a will contest set forth in section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975. This six-month limitation period is jurisdictional and not subject to tolling by fraudulent concealment or any other fact not expressly provided for by the Probate Act. Ruffing v. Glissendorf, 41 Ill.2d 412, 419, 243 N.E.2d 236 (1968) (interpreting section 90 of the Probate Act, a predecessor of section 8-1). If a challenger to a will fails to initiate a direct proceeding to contest the will within the six-month statutory time period, the validity of the will is established for all purposes. Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello, 97 Ill.2d 174, 182-83, 73 Ill.Dec. 428, 454 N.E.2d 288 (1983); In re Estate of Mohr, 357 Ill.App.3d 1011, 1013-14, 294 Ill.Dec. 398, 830 N.E.2d 810 (2005). Whether the six-month limitation is applicable to a tort claim is a question of statutory construction subject to de novo review. People v. Lewis, 223 Ill.2d 393, 402, 307 Ill.Dec. 645, 860 N.E.2d 299 (2006).

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill.2d 169, 181, 314 Ill.Dec. 91, 874 N.E.2d 1 (2007). The best indication of the legislature's intent is the language of the statute, to which we ascribe its plain and ordinary meaning. In re E.B., 231 Ill.2d 459, 466, 326 Ill.Dec. 1, 899 N.E.2d 218 (2008). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resort to other tools of statutory construction. Board of Education, Joliet Township High School District No. 204 v. Board of Education, Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210, 231 Ill.2d 184, 198, 325 Ill.Dec. 217, 897 N.E.2d 756 (2008). We will not depart from the plain statutory language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature. People ex rel. Madigan v. Kinzer, 232 Ill.2d 179, 184-85, 327 Ill.Dec. 546, 902 N.E.2d 667 (2009).

Shriners contends that the appellate court's application of section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975 to a tort claim for intentional interference with expectancy of inheritance contradicts the clear and unambiguous language of the statute and confuses the tort with a will contest. We agree. Under the plain language of section 8-1, the six-month statutory limitation period applies to a "petition * * * to contest the validity of the will." 755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2006). A tort action for intentional interference with inheritance is distinct from a petition to contest the validity of a will, in several important respects. The single issue in a will contest is whether the writing produced is the will of the testator. Mount v. Dusing, 414 Ill. 361, 365, 111 N.E.2d 502 (1953); Hall v. Eaton, 259 Ill.App.3d 319, 321, 197 Ill.Dec. 583, 631 N.E.2d 805 (1994). Any ground which, if proved, would invalidate the will, including undue influence, incapacity, fraud, or revocation, may state a cause of action. Hall, 259 Ill.App.3d at 321, 197 Ill.Dec. 583, 631 N.E.2d 805. The object of a will contest proceeding is not to secure a personal judgment against an individual defendant but is a quasi in rem proceeding to set aside a will. In re Estate of Spaits, 104 Ill.2d 431, 435-36, 84 Ill.Dec. 647, 472 N.E.2d 784 (1984); Nupnau v. Hink, 33 Ill.2d 285, 288, 211 N.E.2d 379 (1965). See also Merrick v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 10 Ill.App.3d 104, 114, 293 N.E.2d 767 (1973) ("An action to set aside a will is against the will itself and not the beneficiaries").

By contrast, in a tort claim for intentional interference with inheritance, "[o]ne who by fraud, duress or...