In re Estate of Morris

IN RE ESTATE OF BILL MORRIS

No. M2016-02557-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

August 16, 2017 Session

November 13, 2017

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Franklin County

No. 19721

Jeffrey F. Stewart, Judge

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Appellants' motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. In In re Estate of Morris, No. M2014-00874-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 557970, (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2015) (Morris I), this Court held that Decedent's will was invalid for failing to comply with the statutory formalities for executing a will. Following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, the parties entered into an agreed order declaring the will invalid and agreeing to administer the Decedent's estate as an intestate estate. After our decision in Morris I and entry of the agreed order, the legislature amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104 to validate wills executed in the manner of the will at issue here. Relying on this amendment, Proponents of the will filed a Rule 60.02 motion asserting that "it is no longer equitable that the [agreed final judgment] should have prospective effect and relief from the operation is justified." The trial court denied Rule 60.02 relief and proponents of the will appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed and Remanded.

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B. GOLDIN and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

Donald Capparella and Tyler Chance Yarbro, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Gary Lee Morris and Pamela Jean Morris.

Eddy R. Smith and Katie Tolliver Jones, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Estate of Bill Morris, Deceased, Bill Morris, Jr., and Cheryl Morris.

OPINION

I. Background

This is the second appeal of this case. In In re Estate of Morris, No. M2014-00874-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 557970, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2015) (Morris I), we held that the signatures of the witnesses on an affidavit, but not on the will, did not satisfy the statutory formalities for the valid execution of a will. Morris I at *4. Consequently, we concluded that the Decedent died intestate. Id. After the Tennessee Supreme Court denied certiorari, the parties entered an agreed final judgment on October 13, 2015. The agreed final judgment states that the "putative will of Bill Morris is not a will and Bill Morris died intestate." The judgment goes on to state that "[u]pon entry of this final judgment, the probate of the estate of Bill Morris shall commence immediately. . ." and defines the terms of the estate's administration.

After Morris I was decided, in April 2016, the legislature added subsection (b) to Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104. This statutory amendment allows the integration of the attestation affidavit to the will itself such that wills not otherwise validly executed under the prior law may be entered into probate. The new section of the statute reads as follows:

(b)(1) For wills executed prior to July 1, 2016, to the extent necessary for the will to be validly executed, witness signatures affixed to an affidavit meeting the requirements of § 32-2-110 shall be considered signatures to the will, provided that:

(A) The signatures are made at the same time as the testator signs the will and are made in accordance with subsection (a); and

(B) The affidavit contains language meeting all the requirements of subsection (a).

(2) If the witnesses signed the affidavit on the same day that the testator signed the will, it shall be presumed that the witnesses and the testator signed at the same time, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. If, pursuant to this subsection (b), witness signatures on the affidavit are treated as signatures on the will, the affidavit shall not also serve as a self-proving affidavit under § 32-2-110. Nothing in this subsection (b) shall affect, eliminate, or relax the requirement in subsection (a) that the testator sign the will.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104(b).

On May 13, 2016, proponents of the will, Pamela Morris and Gary Morris (together "Appellants"), filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 (4) and (5) in the trial court. Appellants asserted that "it is no longer equitable thatthe October 13, 2015 order should have prospective effect and relief from the operation of the judgment is justified." On August 22, 2016, Bill Morris, Jr. and Cheryl Morris (together "Appellees"), filed a response to Appellants' Rule 60 motion and an accompanying memorandum. Appellees argued that a change in the law is not generally a basis for relief under Rule 60 and that an intervening change in the law does not exempt parties from the doctrines of res judicata. Appellees also argued that the separation of powers doctrine prevents the legislature from changing the law to alter the result of a final judgment. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Appellants' Rule 60.02 motion on October 13, 2016. Appellants appeal.

II. Issues

Appellants raise three issues for review as stated in their brief:

1. Whether Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(4) or (5) applies to grant relief from the final judgment declaring that Decedent died intestate, when subsequent legislation make it inequitable and unjust to not allow Decedent's will to be probated?

2. Whether the doctrines of res judicata or separation of powers apply to bar the application of Rule 60.02(4) or (5), when such doctrines have no application to relief sought under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.

3. Whether Appellees have waived any claim that Rule 60.02 relief sought in this case is unconstitutional by failing to give notice to the Tennessee Attorney General as required under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04?

Appellees contend that Appellants' appeal is frivolous and request an award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

III. Standard of Review

Generally, we review the trial court's decision to grant a Rule 60.02 motion under the abuse of discretion standard. Federated Ins. Co. v. Lethcoe, 18 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tenn. 2000); Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co., 854 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tenn. 1993). In Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82 (Tenn. 2001), our Supreme Court discussed the abuse of discretion standard, stating:

Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's ruling "will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to propriety of the decision made." State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tenn. 2000). A trial court abuses its discretion only when it "applie[s] an incorrect legal standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining." State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999). The abuse of discretion standard does not permit the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998).

Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 85. Appellate courts ordinarily permit discretionary decisions to stand even though reasonable judicial minds can differ concerning their soundness. Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). When reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial court, the "appellate courts should begin with the presumption that the decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision." Silliman v. City of Memphis, 449 S.W.3d 440, 447-48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014)(citations omitted).

Although we review the trial court's overall decision to grant Rule 60.02 relief under the abuse of discretion standard, this case involves the proper interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law. Consequently, we review the trial court's interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104(b) de novo, with no presumption of correctness. See Pickard v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd., 424 S.W.3d 511, 518 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Tenn. 2012)); see also Silliman, 449 S.W.3d at 455.

IV. Analysis

A. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02

As is relevant to this appeal, a trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment if "a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective application" or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(4) and (5). The trial court's order denying Appellants' Rule 60 motion states, in pertinent part:

2. No parties appealed the Agreed Final Judgment or filed a petition to rehear, reconsider, set aside, alter or amend the Agreed Final Judgment.

***

5. Movants' sole basis for their motion was the subsequent legislation. Movants allege no new or additional facts.

6. The parties' previous litigation already determined their rights under the applicable law and settled their claims in this matter.

Therefore, the Court finds the movants have failed to meet their burden under Rule 60 to set aside the final agreed order in this case . . . .

The burden of proof under Rule 60.02 is on the party seeking relief, and "the burden borne by the movant is heavy." Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W. 3d 892, 895 n. 2 (Tenn. 2001). The Tennessee Supreme Court has described the high threshold for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02:

[W]e have characterized relief under Rule 60.02 as an "exceptional remedy," Nails v. Aetna Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 289, 294 (Tenn. 1992), "designed to strike a proper balance between the competing principles of finality and justice," Jerkins v. McKinney, 533 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tenn. 1976). Rule 60.02 provides an "escape valve," Thompson v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 798 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tenn. 1990), that "should not be easily opened." Toney v. Mueller Co., 810 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tenn. 1991). We have reversed relief

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