In re G.M.

1

IN THE INTEREST OF: G.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: G.A.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER

Nos. 1342 EDA 2023, 1343 EDA 2023

No. J-S31001-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

November 3, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered May 1, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s) CP-51-DP-0001196-2020, CP-51-AP-0000033-2023

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM

OLSON J.

Appellant, P.M. ("Mother"), appeals from the decree and order entered on May 1, 2023, granting a petition filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS") to involuntarily terminate Mother's right to her son, G.M., a/k/a G.A.M. ("Child") pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) and changing the goal of reunification to adoption. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as follows. In June 2020, DHS received a report that Mother, who was residing in a long-term residential drug and alcohol rehabilitation and mental health facility with Child who was 7 months old at the time, was under the influence of an unknown substance. In November 2020, DHS filed a dependency petition alleging that Mother was non-compliant with drug and mental health treatment and continued to abuse narcotics. On April 5, 2021, Child was adjudicated dependent, committed to DHS custody, and objectives for reunification were established. Initially, Child was placed with maternal grandmother, but he was moved into general foster care at the end of 2021. In May 2022, maternal relatives who were already foster parents, as well as parents to an adopted child, agreed to take Child. Child has lived there since that time. On January 31, 2023, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights and change Child's permanency goal from reunification to adoption. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 31, 2023. Mother was present; however, the case was continued until May 1, 2023. On May 1, 2023, the trial court held the scheduled hearing. Mother was not present for the hearing but was represented by counsel. DHS presented testimony from Child's case manager with the Community Umbrella Agency ("CUA"), Gaelle Beck.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined:

The testimony reflects that [Child] has been in care since October of 2020. Single case plan objectives were established for reunification. They included [Achieving Reunification Center ("ARC") programs for] parenting, housing, and employment as well as substance abuse [and mental health] treatment [and] attending [Child's] medical appointments[.]

[T]he testimony does reflect that [M]other has engaged in drug treatment programs and has [participated in visitation with Child], thus there's been some compliance. There has not been enough for reunification[, however].

[Mother has] engaged in approximately seven [treatment] programs and did not complete [any] with the exception of February of 2023 [when] she was successfully discharged from Kirkbride [Center, a behavioral health care facility in Philadelphia] for the third time. The record reflects that she's in yet another program now.

There was no initial record of [Mother] visiting [Child] prior to treatment and the visitation that she's had - sixto eight visits - has been inconsistent since [Child] was placed. Visits have not progressed beyond supervised.

Her compliance with single case plan objectives have been minimal as well as her progress has been minimal.

The testimony reflects that [Child] sees [Mother] as, according to the CUA case manager, a random person to hang out with. There's no mother/son bond. He never asks about her.

[The trial court finds Child] will suffer no irreparable harm if parental rights are terminated.

[Child's] been with his current foster family since May of 2022. He's bonded with his current foster parents who he refers to as mom and dad. The testimony reflects that he has a strong bond with them, and they attend to all of his needs.

The circumstances that led to placement will not be alleviated in a reasonable amount of time.

* * *

[C]hild deserves permanency and it's in his best interest for the goal to be changed to adoption and parental rights terminated.

N.T., 5/1/2023, at 31-33.

Accordingly, the trial court entered a decree on May 1, 2023, finding clear and convincing evidence that supported grounds for the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8). The trial court further found that there was no bond between Child and Mother, there would be no irreparable harm to severing their relationship, and that it was in Child's best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). In a separate order entered the same day, the trial court also changed Child's permanency goal from reunification to adoption.^[1] These timely appeals resulted.^[2]

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the trial [c]ourt erred by changing [] Child's goal to adoption and terminating parental rights of [] Mother[?]

B. Whether the trial court erred in terminating [Mother's] parental rights, the evidence having [b]een insufficient to establish M[other] caused [C]hild to be without essential parental care, nor could that not have been remedied[?]

C. Whether the trial court erred in terminating [Mother's] parental rights, when M[other] felt that she was going to have sufficient time to complete her objectives[?]

D.Whether the trial [c]ourt erred by finding that termination of [Mother's] rights best serves [] Child's developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare[?]

E. Whether the trial court erred in terminating [Mother's] parental rights, when M[other] wanted the opportunity to complete her objectives, and then effectively defend the [involuntary] termination of her parental rights[?]

F. Whether the errors committed by the [trial] court [] deprived [Mother] of her rights to due [p]rocess and equal protection under the law[?]

Mother's Brief at 3-4 (suggested answers omitted).^[3] From our review of Mother's brief, her appellate issues can be fairly separated into three distinct claims. First, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support involuntary termination of her parental rights under Section 2511(a). Next, Mother argues that the trial court erred by severing the bond between her and Child under Section 2511(b). Finally, Mother argues that she was denied due process of law by the trial court's reliance upon pronouncements made at the evidentiary hearing and its failure to file a substantive Rule 1925(a) opinion because she "shouldn't have to guess the reasoning for the trial court's ruling." Mother's Brief at 13. We will examine each of these three contentions in turn. Finally, we note that although Mother references the goal change from reunification to adoption in her statement of questions in her appellate brief, she presents no legal argument or discussion regarding goal changes, and we find that aspect of her claim waived.^[4] Regarding her first claim pertaining to Section 2511(a), Mother posits, in sum:

The court erred in terminating Mother's parenting rights and determining that said termination would best serve the needs and welfare of [C]hild, when [] Mother was visiting [C]hild, was seeking housing for herself and [C]hild, attended parenting class, was working towards completing her family service plan objectives, completed a drug and alcohol and mental health programs and then actively participated and had housing at the Jefferson program, and did not intend to relinquish her claim to [C]hild or did not intend to refuse and/or fail to perform parental duties and, [] when Mother wanted [an] opportunity to complete her objectives, and then effectively defend the involuntary termination of her parental rights and when Mother felt she was going to have sufficient time to complete [her] objectives from the time she completed her drug and mental health programs.

Mother's Brief at 6.

We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion, which requires an error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court's findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see also In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). "The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony." In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted). "In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence." Id. (citation omitted).

Pennsylvania's Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. Section 2511(a) provides grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights. If the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence of one of the grounds for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court must then consider whether termination would best serve the child under subsection (b). See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 509.

Here the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8), which provides, in pertinent...