In re Grandt

2022 IL App (2d) 210648

217 N.E.3d 413

466 Ill.Dec. 586

IN RE MARRIAGE OF Judith GRANDT, Petitioner-Appellant, and Laurence J. Grandt, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2-21-0648

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Opinion Filed November 9, 2022

Rehearing Denied December 1, 2022

Matthew Kaplan, of Libertyville, for appellant.

Dwayne Douglas, of Douglas Law PC, of Bannockburn, for appellee.

JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Petitioner, Judith Grandt, appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County denying her petition for enforcement of judgment and restitution. In her petition, Judith sought to treat the disability pension of respondent, Laurence J. Grandt, as a retirement pension subject to division by the terms of the parties’ dissolution of marriage judgment and the marital settlement agreement (MSA) incorporated therein. On appeal, Judith argues that, where Laurence is eligible to receive a retirement pension, he should not be allowed to frustrate the intent of the MSA by claiming that it remains a disability pension. We reverse and remand.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The relevant portions of the record reveal that, on May 21, 1997, the parties’ nearly 20-year marriage was dissolved. At the time of the dissolution, Judith was 46 years of age, was employed as a route manager for a newspaper and as a babysitter and day care provider, and was earning approximately $12,000 per year. Laurence was 43 years of age, was employed as a firefighter with the Countryside Fire Protection District (District), and was earning approximately $62,000 per year. The parties had two children during the marriage, an 18-year-old attending college and a 14-year-old attending high school.

¶ 4 In the parties’ MSA, they agreed that Judith would receive in maintenance $150 per month for 24 months, after which either party could file a petition to terminate the maintenance or to modify it based on the parties’ financial circumstances. In addition, the MSA recited that there was "an affirmative obligation on [Judith] to be independently capable of obtaining employment or finances to meet her reasonable needs." The MSA also included a specific provision about the division of Laurence's pension from the District (pension provision):

"With respect to [Laurence's] pension with Countryside Fire Protection District, they will not honor a [qualified domestic relations order (QDRO)], therefore either a withholding order shall be placed against [Laurence] or he shall be directly ordered to pay [Judith] in accordance with a formula of 20 years of marriage over years of participation times one half, which shall be paid to [Judith] only in the event it is received by [Laurence] if it is paid to him as a pension benefit. [Laurence] shall make every effort to segregate the funds if possible, by having the Plan Administrator segregate those funds into the name of [Judith], or by direct payment to her as [Laurence] receives his funds. [Laurence] shall also make an effort to name [Judith], allowing her the surviving widow's award in the event of the death of [Laurence] prior to his receiving his pension benefits."

¶ 5 On February 17, 1999, Laurence filed a pro se motion seeking, among other things, the suspension of his child support and maintenance obligations. Laurence stated in the motion that he had lost his employment due to medical disability but was pursuing both workers’ compensation and an on-duty disability pension.¹ The parties entered an agreed order, suspending Laurence's obligations for 90 days or until he began receiving an on- or off-duty disability pension. The matter was continued by agreement until July 22, 1999, at which time the parties entered another agreed order setting a temporary child support amount.

¶ 6 On November 1, 1999, Judith filed a petition for rule to show cause, alleging that Laurence had not paid his share of the minor child's medical and educational expenses. On December 14, 1999, the parties entered an agreed order in which Laurence agreed to pay the medical and educational cost arrearage at the rate of $100 per week.

¶ 7 On September 12, 2000, Laurence filed a petition to terminate child support because the minor child had experienced an "emancipation event" as defined in the MSA in that he had been expelled from high school for truancy, would not be returning to school, and was working full time. On September 20, 2000, the trial court determined that the minor child was emancipated and terminated Laurence's obligation to pay child support for the minor child.

¶ 8 On May 1, 2001, the trial court entered a qualified Illinois domestic relations order (QILDRO) specifying that Judith was to receive her marital portion of Laurence's "retirement benefit *** when benefits become payable" or "on the date the retirement benefit commences." Also on May 1, Laurence filed his consent to issue the QILDRO. No further postdissolution motions appear in the record until February 25, 2020.

¶ 9 On February 25, 2020, Judith filed a petition for issuance of a QILDRO and for restitution. There were apparent notice issues, and on June 12, 2020, the trial court ordered Judith to effect personal service on Laurence, which appears to have been accomplished. On July 24, 2020, the court entered a default judgment against Laurence on the February 25, 2020, petition. On August 12, 2020, Laurence filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, and on August 18, 2022, the court granted Laurence's motion to vacate. On September 2, 2020, Laurence filed a response to Judith's petition for issuance of a QILDRO and alleged that he had been receiving a disability pension from the District, beginning about a year after the dissolution judgment and "long before [he reached] retirement age."

¶ 10 The parties appear to have engaged in settlement discussions. The proceedings were continued, with the trial court recognizing that no settlement had been achieved and setting the matter for hearing. On March 29, 2021, on its own motion, the court dismissed Judith's petition for issuance of a QILDRO for being "insufficiently pled." The court also expressly invited Judith to replead her petition.

¶ 11 On April 22, 2021, instead of filing an amended petition, Judith filed a petition for enforcement of judgment and for restitution.² Judith alleged that the District, had a unified employee disability and pension plan under article 4 (titled "Firefighters’ Pension Fund—Municipalities 5000,000 and Under") of the Illinois Pension Code ( 40 ILCS 5/4-101 et seq. (West 1996)) and Laurence, as an employee, was entitled to benefits under the pension plan. Judith alleged that, after the entry of the judgment of dissolution, Laurence was injured in the course of his employment, stopped working for the District, and began receiving disability benefits. Judith alleged, on information and belief, that, at some point after Laurence had attained 50 years of age, Laurence had elected to retire, resulting in the conversion of disability pension payments into retirement pension payments, and that she was entitled under the judgment of dissolution to her marital portion of Laurence's retirement benefits. In count I, Judith sought enforcement of the pension provision, going forward. In count II, Judith sought to determine the date on which Laurence began receiving his retirement pension payments and the arrearage arising from that, and she sought an order requiring Laurence to pay the arrearage.

¶ 12 On May 10, 2021, Laurence filed his response to the petition for enforcement of judgment. Laurence admitted that the District had a statutory unified employee disability and pension plan under the Pension Code but denied that he had elected to retire or that he had received retirement pension payments. Laurence also maintained throughout the response to the petition that he was receiving disability benefit payments and that, as a result, Judith was not entitled to any portion of his disability payments.

¶ 13 The trial court ordered the parties to prepare an agreed stipulation of facts, but the record does not show that any such stipulation was filed. The court set the matter for hearing, and the hearing date was continued. The record does not contain an affirmative indication of whether the parties argued Judith's petition before the court. On October 18, 2021, the court denied Judith's petition. In expressing its reasoning, the court stated that it had been guided by the Second District case of In re Marriage of Belk , 239 Ill. App. 3d 806, 178 Ill.Dec. 647, 605 N.E.2d 86 (1992), which it found helpful in analyzing the MSA. The court found the term "pension" in the MSA to be ambiguous but ultimately concluded from the MSA as a whole and the Pension Code that the parties intended the division of an age-related or retirement pension and did not contemplate the division of any disability pension benefits.

¶ 14 Judith timely appeals.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, Judith argues that Laurence's receipt of a disability pension should not defeat her right to receive the agreed-upon portion of his pension benefits once Laurence had fully attained eligibility to retire. Judith argues that the weight of authority and the structure of the Pension Code support her contention. We begin by considering the standards that govern our review.

¶ 17 A. Applicable Standards of Review

¶ 18 Review of the trial court's decision involves several aspects. First, we must look to the judgment of dissolution and the MSA incorporated therein. We must also interpret relevant and applicable provisions of the Pension Code. Finally, we must account for the effect, if any, of the procedural posture in the trial court on our review.

¶ 19 Turning to the standard governing the interpretation of the MSA, we first note that any marital settlement agreement is a contract and interpreted according to the rules and principles of contract interpretation. In re Marriage of Andres , 2021 IL App (2d) 191146, ¶...