In re H.C.

313 A.3d 728

IN RE H.C.

No. 2022-0257

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: February 23, 2023

Opinion Issued: November 14, 2023

7th Circuit Court-Rochester Family Division

Law Office of Joshua L. Gordon, of Concord (Joshua L. Gordon, on the brief and orally), for the petitioners.

John A.M. Hinsman III, of Dover, on the brief and orally, for the respondent.

BASSETT, J.

The respondent, the mother of H.C., appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Cross, J.) that terminated her parental rights after the court found that she had been convicted of a felony assault which resulted in injury to H.C.’s sibling. See RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) (2022). This appeal requires that we address the following issues: (1) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applies in this case when H.C. was born after the date of the felony assault; (2) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applies to convictions obtained outside the State of New Hampshire; and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest. Because we conclude that RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applies and that the trial court did not err in ruling that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest, we affirm its decision.

I. Background

The following facts were found by the trial court or are supported by the record. H.C. was born in December 2015. Prior to H.C.’s birth, in 2014 and 2015, the respondent sexually assaulted H.C.’s sibling. In 2017, the respondent was convicted in Maine of a Class A felony for the December 2014 sexual assault of the sibling, see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 253 (Supp. 2023), and she was sentenced to prison for a minimum of eight years. The respondent’s parental rights over H.C.’s sibling were terminated in 2017.

At the time of H.C.’s birth, the respondent was under house arrest for several pending Maine charges and the respondent’s two sisters were appointed as coguardians of H.C. After one year, one of the sisters became H.C.’s sole guardian. The respondent has not seen H.C. since she was "not quite 2 years old."

In January 2020, H.C.’s guardian and her husband filed a petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights alleging that the respondent: (1) had abandoned H.C., see RSA 170-C:5, I (2022); (2) had failed to support, educate or care for H.C., see RSA 170-C:5, II (2022) (amended 2022); and (3) had been convicted of felony assault against a sibling of H.C., see RSA 170-C:5, VII(d). Following a three-day hearing, the trial court granted the petition, ruling that the respondent "was convicted of a felony sexual assault that resulted in injury to [H.C.]’s sibling," see RSA 170-C:5, VII(d), and that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

[1] Before a court may order the termination of parental rights, the petitioning party must prove a statutory ground beyond a reasonable doubt. In re S.T., 169 N.H. 441, 448, 151 A.3d 522 (2016). RSA 170-C:5 (2022) (amended 2022) sets forth the grounds upon which a petition to terminate parental rights may be granted. In this case, we are asked to interpret RSA 170-C:5, VII(d), which provides that a petition to terminate parental rights may be granted when:

VII. The parent has been convicted of one or more of the following offenses:

(a) Murder, pursuant to RSA 630:1-a or 630:1-b, of another child of the parent, a sibling or step-sibling of the child, the child’s other parent, or other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, including a minor child who resided with the defendant.

(b) Manslaughter, pursuant to RSA 630:2, of another child of the parent, a sibling or step-sibling of the child, the child’s other parent, or other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, including a minor child who resided with the defendant.

(c) Attempt, pursuant to RSA 629:1, solicitation, pursuant to RSA 629:2, or conspiracy, pursuant to RSA 629:3, to commit any of the offenses specified in subparagraphs VII(a) and VII(b). (d) A felony assault under RSA 631:1, 631:2, 632-A:2, or 632-A:3 which resulted in injury to the child, a sibling or step-sibling of the child, the child’s other parent, or other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, including a minor child who resided with the defendant.

[2] The respondent first argues that RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) does not apply in this case because H.C. had not yet been born at the time the assault was committed; therefore, she posits: (1) H.C. was not a sibling of the respondent’s older child at the time that the respondent committed the charged assault; and (2) H.C. "was incapable of being injured pursuant to RSA 170-C:5, VII(d)." The petitioners contend that this issue has not been preserved for our review because the respondent first raised it in the motion for reconsideration that she filed in the trial court. The record reflects that the petitioners filed an objection to the motion and that the trial court denied the respondent’s motion "for the reasons cited in the [petitioners’] objection."

[3] The purpose of our preservation rule is to ensure that trial courts have the opportunity to rule on issues and to correct errors before parties seek appellate review. State v. Perez, 173 N.H. 251, 258, 239 A.3d 975 (2020). Here, because the trial court had an opportunity to consider this purely legal question of statutory interpretation when it reviewed and denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration, we conclude that the issue has been preserved for our review. See State v. Gross-Santos, 169 N.H. 593, 598, 154 A.3d 652 (2017).

[4–8] Before addressing the merits of the respondent’s arguments, we summarize our well-established principles of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. Avery v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 173 N.H. 726, 733, 248 A.3d 1179 (2020). We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written. Id. However, we do not read words or phrases in isolation, but, rather, in the context of the entire statutory scheme. State v. Folds, 172 N.H. 513, 521, 216 A.3d 58 (2019). Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Id. We will give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute unless such an interpretation would lead to an unjust and seemingly illogical result.

See, e.g., State v. Carpentino, 166 N.H. 9, 20, 85 A.3d 906 (2014).

With these principles in mind, we address the respondent’s argument that RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) does not apply because H.C. was born after the respondent assaulted H.C.’s sibling. RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) authorizes the termination of an individual’s parental rights when the individual has been convicted of "[a] felony assault under RSA 631:1, 632:2, 632-A:2 or 632-A:3 which resulted in injury to the child, a sibling or step-sibling of the child …." RSA 170-C:2 (2022) defines "child" as "a person less than 18 years of age." The respondent argues that, because H.C. was not yet born, she "was not a ‘child’ within the meaning of RSA 170-C:2 when the assault occurred." Accordingly, she argues, H.C. "was incapable of being injured pursuant to RSA 170-C:5, VII(d)." She further asserts that, because H.C. was not yet born, she was not a sibling of the victim at the time the assault was committed and "[t]herefore she was incapable of being injured" pursuant to RSA 170-C:5, VII(d). We disagree.

[9, 10] "Sibling" is defined as "one of two or more persons who have the same parents but who are not necessarily of the same birth; sometimes one of two or more persons having one common parent." Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2110 (unabridged ed. 2002). We decline to read a requirement into the statute that the child who is the subject of the termination petition must have been injured by the felony assault of the child’s sibling. See In re J.P., 173 N.H. 453, 460, 242 A.3d 823 (2020) (when interpreting statutes, we give effect to every word of the statute whenever possible and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include). Moreover, the statute does not require that the child who is the subject of the termination petition have been born at the time of the assault. Rather, the statute makes clear that a child whose sibling has been injured in a felony assault, as described in the statute, may be the subject of a petition to terminate the parental rights of the perpetrator parent.

Review of the legislature’s expressed purpose in enacting the statute supports our conclusion. Paragraph VII of RSA 170-C:5 was enacted in 1999 to bring New Hampshire "into compliance with the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act" (ASFA) and to ensure that New Hampshire qualified for the continued receipt of federal funding for its child protection system. See Laws 1999, ch. 133; N.H.H.R. Jour. 227 (1999). Section 1 of Chapter 133 provides:

Purpose; Intent. The purpose of this amendment to RSA 170-C is to initiate New Hampshire’s compliance with the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 that became effective on November 19, 1997. The Adoption and Safe Families Act is designed and intended to reform parts of the current child welfare system and to promote the safety, permanency and well-being of children in out-ofhome placements.

Laws 1999, 133:1. In 2005, the legislature expanded the protection provided by RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) to cases in which the parent had been convicted of a felony assault which resulted in injury to a sibling or step-sibling of the child. Laws 2005, ch. 235.

Prior to passage of the federal ASFA, "state and federal law appeared to give primary consideration to the rights of parents, as opposed to the welfare of their children." State ex rel. Children, Youth v. Amy B., 133 N.M. 136, 61 P.3d 845, 847 (N.M. Ct. App. 2...