In re Harris

322 Cal.Rptr.3d 157

550 P.3d 116

IN RE John HARRIS, Jr., on Habeas Corpus.

S272632

Supreme Court of California.

June 27, 2024

First Appellate District, Division Three, A162891, San Mateo County Superior Court, 21-NF-002568-A, Amarra A. Lee, Judge

Marsanne Weese and Rose Mishaan, San Francisco, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner John Harris, Jr.

Michael C. McMahon, Santa Barbara; Salil Dudani, Katherine Hubbard, Carson White; Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Daniel S. Volchok and Allison M. Schultz for The California Public Defenders Association, the Ventura County Public Defender, Civil Rights Corps and The ACLU of Northern California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner John Harris, Jr.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant, Attorney General, Aimee Feinberg and Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State Solicitors General, Katie L. Stowe, Deputy Attorney General; Stephen M, Wagstaffe, District Attorney, Alpana Samant and Nicole A. Sato, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent the People.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

The California Constitution guarantees a person charged with a noncapital offense the right to pretrial release on bail, subject to narrow exceptions. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12.) One exception appears in article I, section 12, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution (article I, section 12(b)), which authorizes a trial court to detain an individual without bail for "[f]elony offenses involving acts of violence on another person, or felony sexual assault offenses on another person, when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds based upon clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great bodily harm to others." We granted review to decide whether an order denying bail pursuant to article I, section 12(b) requires evidence that would be admissible at a criminal trial, and if not, whether the prosecution may meet its burden under this provision through a proffer describing the evidence supporting pretrial detention.

Here, petitioner John Harris, Jr., filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the trial court’s pretrial order detaining him without bail pursuant to article I, section 12(b). The Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments that under the state Constitution and federal and state due pro-, cess principles, only evidence that would be admissible at a criminal trial could support pretrial detention without bail. However, because the trial court failed to also make findings on the record that there were no less restrictive alternatives to detention that could reasonably protect the government’s interests in pretrial detention (see In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135, 156, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 232, 482 P.3d 1008 (Humphrey)), the Court of Appeal conditionally vacated the order denying bail and remanded the matter to the trial court for further findings.

We conclude that when a trial court makes a pretrial detention determination under article I, section 12(b), the court must be guided by a duty to ensure that the evidence it considers is reliable given an arrestee’s fundamental right to pretrial liberty. In protecting these interests and in determining whether "the facts are evident or the presumption great" that the defendant committed the underlying offense, and whether there is "clear and convincing evidence" of "a substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great bodily harm to others," the court is not limited to considering only evidence that would be admissible at a criminal trial. The text of article I, section 12(b) does not contain such a limitation, which would deviate from standard practices at bail hearings, and significant policy considerations counsel against the categorical rule that petitioner proposes. When deciding whether to detain a defendant without bail under article I, section 12(b), the trial court may properly consider hearsay and documents tendered without the full evidentiary foundation that would be required at trial. In evaluating such evidence, the trial court should reject or discount material it regards as unreliable and retains discretion to demand the production of additional, admissible evidence, including live testimony, in appropriate circumstances. We further hold that the trial court’s consideration of reliable proffers and hearsay evidence at a pretrial detention hearing does not offend federal or state due process principles.

In this case, the trial court identified evidence supporting its no-bail determination, but the record does not establish that the court conducted a proper evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence of petitioner’s guilt, rather than simply presuming the truth of the charges. We conclude the best course is to remand the case so the trial court can apply the standards discussed in this opinion in addition to considering less restrictive alternatives to detention in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s instruction.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner was arrested on February 24, 2021, after DNA obtained from the victim of a violent rape committed more than 30 years prior was found to match petitioner’s DNA. The People charged petitioner with attempted first degree murder and aggravated mayhem in connection with that incident. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a), 189, 205.) The People alleged that petitioner used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of both offenses (id., § 12022, subd. (d)), and in- flicted great bodily injury in the commission of attempted murder (id., §§ 1203.075, 12022.7, subd. (a)).

Prior to petitioner’s arraignment, the San Mateo County Probation Department submitted a pretrial services report indicating that petitioner was an appropriate candidate for release on his own recognizance with enhanced monitoring. On February 26, 2021, the trial court appointed counsel for petitioner and set bail at $5 million dollars. Defense counsel requested a continuance of the arraignment to review discovery. On March 25, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to all charges.

On April 16, 2021, several weeks after this court decided Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th 135, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 232, 482 P.3d 1008, petitioner filed a motion requesting release on his own recognizance. The motion acknowledged that petitioner had two prior misdemeanor convictions (a 1991 conviction for theft and a 1998 conviction for driving without a license), but emphasized that petitioner successfully completed probation in both cases and had no known bench warrant history. The motion also alleged that petitioner did not present a flight risk, he had significant community ties, and there was no identifiable threat that petitioner would pose a risk of harm to the alleged victim or the public if released. Petitioner attached supporting statements from family and friends. He also attached a declaration from defense counsel, attesting to petitioner’s indigency.

The People opposed petitioner’s motion. They requested that bail remain set at $5 million dollars, or, alternatively, that the trial court deny bail altogether under article I, section 12(b). The People alleged that petitioner would be a significant danger if released to the community and there were no viable conditions of release that would ensure public safety.

The People’s opposition also described the severity of the charged offenses, petitioner’s criminal history, and petitioner’s subsequent conduct with his former wives and girlfriends that bore similarities to the underlying incident. Regarding the charged offenses, the People detailed the responding police officer’s observations of the alleged victim’s injuries, a summary of the victim’s interview with police officers, and a statement from the victim’s treating physician, with the responding officer and treating physician both being identified by name.

As described in the opposition, on March 4, 1989, the victim woke up in her bed with scarves tied around her ankles. She saw a man kneeling at the foot of her bed with one scarf on his forehead and another covering his mouth. The perpetrator tied bandanas tightly around the victim’s eyes and neck, held a serrated knife to her throat, and ordered her to spread her legs. The perpetrator then raped the victim, tried to strangle her with a scarf, and sawed at the back of her neck with the knife. As the perpetrator struggled with the victim, he slashed her neck with the knife and threatened to cut her eye out. The victim pleaded for her life and begged the perpetrator to leave, but he expressed concern that she would call the police. The victim then told him to unplug her phone, which she said would slow her down, and the perpetrator eventually left. According to the opposition brief, one of the responding officers found the victim slumped on the floor in her apartment with a scarf on her neck saturated in blood. The officer described the victim’s injury as one of the worst neck wounds he had ever seen. The People represented that the victim’s treating physician similarly described the victim’s neck injury as "pretty horrific." He reported that if the laceration to the victim’s throat had been "a hair more," the cut would have severed the external jugular and like- ly resulted in her death. The opposition also explained that DNA analysis comparing semen located on a floral scarf found at the scene and the victim’s vaginal swab matched petitioner’s DNA. Photographs of the victim’s injuries and of the serrated knife and bloody scarves found at the scene were attached as exhibits to the opposition.

The People’s opposition also described the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s 1991 conviction for petty theft, albeit without connecting these facts to any witnesses or other sources. As specified in the...