In re I.J.D.

1

IN THE INTEREST OF I.J.D., A CHILD

No. 13-23-00005-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi-Edinburg

August 24, 2023

On appeal from the 444th District Court of Cameron County Texas.

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORA L. LONGORIA Justice

J.D.L (Father) and J.M. (Mother) are the parents of I.J.D., a minor child.^[1] Father filed a petition to modify child support order, arguing that his circumstances had materially and substantially changed due to a reduction in his income since the rendition of a prior order. The trial court denied his petition. On appeal, Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion (1) by failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law and (2) in denying his petition. We affirm.

I. Background

On September 9, 2015, the trial court entered an agreed order in a suit to modify the parent child relationship. This agreed order, among other things, set Father's monthly child support obligation for I.J.D. at $1,231.78 ^[2] and his monthly medical support obligation at $105.00. This agreed order did not include any findings regarding Father's net resources or indicate that Father's child support obligation was based on application of the child support guidelines.

On October 25, 2021, Father filed his "Original Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship." In his motion, Father alleged that his circumstances had materially and substantially changed "due to his income" since the rendition of the prior order, requested that his child support obligation be decreased, and alleged that modification was in the best interest of the child. Mother filed a response generally denying the allegations in Father's petition on December 13, 2021. In addition Mother filed her "Objections to Reduction in Child Support," arguing that the modification agreement in 2015 "was not based on the standard Family Code guideline amount." She asserted that the 2015 order contained no indication that the parties relied on Father's income in establishing his child support amount, and therefore, any changes in Father's income could not qualify as a material and substantial change because Father's income was not a "material" consideration to begin with.

The trial court held a hearing on Father's motion on September 2, 2022. At the hearing, Father stipulated that the cost of medical, dental, and vision insurance for I.J.D. had increased to $159.46 and he agreed that his medical support obligation should be modified to reflect that amount. Father testified that in 2015, he had three children, and that I.J.D. was the only child he had with Mother. In addition, Father had another child that was born after entry of the 2015 order. Father indicated that the 2015 agreed order took into account that he had two children outside his relationship with Mother. A 2015 paystub was admitted into evidence, which indicated that Father's year-to-date earnings through the end of April 2015 was $53,089.57. Father testified that this paystub was used to calculate or assist in calculating his child support obligation. However, Father admitted there was nothing in the 2015 order which indicated what number or percentage was used to calculate his child support obligation.

Father testified that, in 2015, he worked in the "auto industry" with Bert Ogden Auto Group (Bert Ogden) and earned close to $120,000.00 in total earnings for that year. Two W-2 forms admitted into evidence indicated that Father had earned $119,089.57 in gross income in 2015. According to Father, "100 percent of the income [from Bert Odgen was] commission" and he had no guaranteed salary. Father then quit Bert Ogden and subsequently worked for Gillman Auto Group (Gillman) in 2020. A W-2 form admitted into evidence indicated that Father had earned $136,184.49 in gross income at Gillman in 2020. Father then left Gillman and worked for Boggus Auto Group. Thereafter, Father had a period of unemployment, after which he became employed at First Innovations, Inc. (First Innovations) in August 2021.

At the time of the hearing, Father indicated he still worked in the auto industry but no longer sold vehicles and that his annual salary at First Innovations as a regional manager was $72,000.00 of "guaranteed pay," plus commission. According to Father, commission was not guaranteed and it would vary each month. An employment agreement signed by Father and First Innovations on August 3, 2021, was admitted into evidence. An "Employee Compensation and Benefits" form signed by Father on that same day was also admitted and indicated that Father's "base salary" of $72,000.00 would be paid via direct deposit to his bank twice a month, each deposit consisting of $3,000.00. This form also stated that "if employee is a commissioned employee, the commissions are established separately by management per employee, job duty, account performance, territory, production, etc. Commission compensation can be changed at any time at the discretion of management."

A W-2 from First Innovations was admitted into evidence, indicating that Father had earned $29,500.00 in wages, tips and other compensation in 2021. Father testified that this particular W-2 represented his earnings from August until the end of 2021. A 2022 paystub admitted into evidence indicated that Father's total year-to-date earnings through July 31, 2022 were $58,973.00-comprising $45,000.00 in salary and $13,973.00 in commissions. Father testified that his commissions were not contractually capped. Father was not actively seeking other employment and testified that the pandemic affected the auto industry when he was a car salesman, that he had sold less cars and earned less money at that time, and that his current employment provided security and a guarantee of income.

Father further testified that he did not know whether he would earn $120,000 in 2022, but nevertheless projected he would earn $98,922.20 in 2022 based on his year-to-date earnings at First Innovations. According to Father, he divided $98,922.20 by 12 "to come up with a monthly amount" of $8,234.51. After inputting the stipulated $159.46 for "medical, dental, [and] vision," Father concluded that his monthly child support amount should be $920.77 "based on one child with [J.M.] and three children outside the relationship." He claimed the requested amount was based on the "Attorney General guidelines" and the "Attorney General calculator."

On October 10, 2022, the trial court entered its "Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship." In said order, the trial court denied Father's request to modify his monthly child support obligation, finding that "[Father] has failed to establish the material allegations in his Petition to Modify."^[3]

On October 17, 2022, Father requested findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 296 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. On November 8, 2022, Father filed his "Notice of Past Due Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law" pursuant to Rule 297 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. On the same day, Father filed his "Motion to Reconsider and Motion for New Trial." Father filed his "First Amended Motion to Reconsider and Motion for New Trial" on November 28, 2022.

On December 16, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Father's motion for new trial and denied it. The trial court did not file separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.^[4]

I. Failure to Issue Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

In a sub-issue, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to issue findings of facts and conclusions of law regarding its decision to deny his child support modification motion.

The record demonstrates that Father requested findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.^[5] In any case tried in a district or county court without a jury, a party may request the court to state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 296. Once a party makes a proper request under Rule 296, the trial court is generally obligated to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id. R. 297 ("The court shall file its findings of fact and conclusions of law within twenty days after a timely request is filed."). "However, a party is not entitled to findings and conclusions in every case." Hous. Auth. of City of El Paso v. Beltran Elec. Contractors, Inc., 550 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2018, pet. denied.).

"When a trial court makes a discretionary decision-one we review under the abuse-of-discretion standard-the trial [court] can but is not required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id.; see IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1997) (Baker, J., dissenting) ("Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither appropriate nor required."); Davis v. Spring Branch Med. Ctr., Inc., 171 S.W.3d 400, 413 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (concluding trial court did not err in denying request for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 296 because standard of review was abuse of discretion); Samuelson v. United Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 79 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (noting that when abuse-of-discretion review applied to trial court's ruling, findings of fact and conclusions of law are helpful, but not required); Keever v. Finlan, 988 S.W.2d 300, 306-07 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. dism'd) (same); Crouch v. Tenneco, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied) (same); see also Wiltshire v. Humpal Physical Therapy, P.C., No. 13-04-00310-CV, 2005 WL 2091092, at *8...