In re Interest of J.F.

338 Ga.App. 15

789 S.E.2d 274

In the Interest of J.F., a child.

A16A0395

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 12, 2016

G. Richard Stepp, for Appellant.

Daniel J. Porter, Lawrenceville, Nhan–Ai Du Simms, Pareesa Hanna Amjadi, for Appellee.

Dillard, Judge.

This Court is faced with a unique dilemma. On the one hand, the Georgia Constitution dictates that we decide each case within two terms of being docketed. On the other hand, that same Constitution also requires us to respect our place in this state's judicial hierarchy and steadfastly avoid encroaching upon the Supreme Court of Georgia's exclusive jurisdiction or domain. But in order to decide the case before us, we must choose between two conflicting precedents that are currently being reviewed by our Supreme Court as part of its certiorari process. And while our constitutional duty to decide cases within two terms of docketing may well authorize us to make this choice, we think that it is inadvisable to do so. Instead, we choose to exercise our authority under Article VI, Section V, Paragraph IV of the Georgia Constitution and certify the question presented in this case to our Supreme Court “for instruction,” to which we “shall then be bound.” We do not take this action lightly. And in doing so, we fully recognize that this Court is treading into murky jurisprudential waters. But faced with the choice of carving out a narrow (and perhaps temporary) exception to this state's certification jurisprudence or disrupting our Supreme Court's certiorari process, we choose the former.

Before fleshing out our reasoning for certifying the question presented in this case to our Supreme Court, we will briefly describe the procedural context of the case, as well as the parties' respective arguments. Specifically, J.F. appeals from the juvenile court's denial of his motion to dismiss the State's case against him with prejudice for failure to comply with OCGA § 15–11–521 (b). He argues that because the State failed to file a delinquency petition within 30 days after his release from detention and neglected to seek an extension of time to file same, the trial court was required to dismiss the State's case with prejudice.

The undisputed facts show that J.F. was detained on January 30, 2015, and charged with robbery by sudden snatching and aggravated assault. The juvenile court released him from custody following a February 2, 2015 detention hearing. But then, on March 16, 2015, J.F. moved to dismiss the case with prejudice due to the State's failure to file a delinquency petition.

On March 17, 2015, acknowledging that no delinquency petition had been filed within 30 days of J.F.'s release from custody as required by OCGA § 15–11–521 (b), the State simultaneously administratively dismissed the complaint and filed a new complaint identical to the one it had just dismissed. Then, the State filed a delinquency petition within 30 days of the new complaint.

At a March 25, 2015 hearing on J.F.'s motion to dismiss, the assistant district attorney explained that no delinquency petition had been timely filed within 30 days of J.F.'s release because, in the course of implementing a new organizational system within her office, J.F.'s case had been overlooked. The assistant district attorney further informed the court that (1) her office's procedure was to administratively dismiss and then re-file complaints when the original time limit was missed, and (2) a motion for an extension of time had not been filed because she thought such a motion “would just be a waste of the court's time.” Ultimately, the trial court denied J.F.'s motion to dismiss with prejudice, and this interlocutory appeal follows.

As always, our analysis necessarily begins with the text of the relevant statute, i.e. , OCGA § 15–11–521 (b), which provides that

[i]f a child is not in detention prior to adjudication, a petition alleging delinquency shall be filed within 30 days of the filing of the complaint alleging violation of a criminal law or within 30 days of such child's release pursuant to a determination that detention is not warranted. Upon a showing of good cause and notice to all parties, the court may grant an extension of time for filing a petition alleging delinquency. The court shall issue a written order reciting the facts justifying any extension.

This Court recently addressed this Code section in two procedurally similar cases, which were issued just three days apart: In the Interest of M.D.H.,¹ decided on November 10, 2015, and In the Interest of D.V.H.,² decided on November 13, 2015. However, on March 7, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an order granting petitions for a writ of certiorari in both cases .³ In doing so, our Supreme Court indicated that it was “particularly concerned” with whether this Court “correctly applied OCGA § 15–11–521 (b).”⁴

Again faced with the issue we addressed in M.D.H. and D.V.H., we recognize—as we did on motion for reconsideration in D.V.H.⁵ —that there is tension between the analyses employed in those cases. Indeed, the particular facts of this case, as well as our Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in M.D.H. and D.V.H., make this tension even more palpable. This tension, of course, should and must be resolved. And our Supreme Court has strongly signaled its intent to do just that with its consolidated grant of certiorari as to both of those cases. Nevertheless, some members of this Court propose that we should take the opportunity afforded by this case to revisit, clarify, and resolve the tension between M.D.H. and D.V.H. by overruling M.D.H. We think this course of action is inadvisable. To overrule—or even substantially revise or clarify—one of these cases would disrupt the status quo of the very precedents now pending before our Supreme Court and encroach upon that court's constitutional authority to review this Court's decisions.⁶ This brings us back to the question of whether certifying this case to the Supreme Court of Georgia is appropriate.

As previously noted, we are only faced with this unique dilemma because of Georgia's constitutionally mandated two-term rule.⁷ Unlike federal courts, we are not at liberty to delay the disposition of appeals in anticipation of pending decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States or our own Supreme Court.⁸ We have concluded, then, that the only meaningful course of action is for this Court to certify the question presented in this case to our Supreme Court for its consideration along with M.D.H. and D.V.H., as is permitted by the Constitution of the State of Georgia.⁹

In taking this course of action, we are mindful that our Supreme Court has previously held that “[a] certified question of law and fact will not be answered and, even if the question certified is one of law only, it will not be answered if such answer would necessarily control the decision of the case.”¹⁰ Although the answer to the question presented in this appeal would undoubtedly control the decision in this case, we have found no published opinion addressing whether this well-established principle applies in cases in which this Court's decision to answer such a question would necessarily disrupt our Supreme Court's certiorari process.¹¹ Nevertheless, out of respect for the “sacrosanct role” the Supreme Court of Georgia plays “in establishing and maintaining a coherent and consistent body of authoritative decisional law,”¹² the degree of consideration given by our Supreme Court before granting petitions for certiorari,¹³ and a desire to avoid confusing the bench and bar while a decision by the Supreme Court is pending,¹⁴ we choose to take the road that has yet to be traveled and certify the question before us (and thus this case) to the Supreme Court of Georgia. If we were merely faced with following a precedent under review by our Supreme Court, that would be one thing. But proposing to overrule or substantially clarify one or more precedents currently under consideration by our Supreme Court, and thereby disrupting that court's certiorari process, goes a bridge too far.¹⁵ As a result, we hereby certify the following question to our Supreme Court:

Does OCGA § 15–11–521 (b) require dismissal with prejudice when the State neither files a petition alleging delinquency within the applicable 30–day period nor seeks an extension of time in which to file such petition?

The Clerk of this Court is directed to prepare a certified copy of the foregoing question (as outlined in this opinion) and transmit this case, together with the record, to the Supreme Court of Georgia, as permitted by Georgia Constitution Art. VI, § V, ¶ IV and Georgia Constitution Art. VI, § VI, ¶ III (7).

Question and case certified to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Miller, P.J., Boggs, Branch, Rickman, Mercier, and Peterson, JJ., concur.

Barnes, P.J., Ellington, P.J., McFadden, and Ray, JJ., concur fully and specially.

Doyle, C.J., Andrews, P.J., Phipps, P.J., and McMillian, J., dissent.

Ray, Judge, concurring specially.

I join in the majority's decision to certify to our Supreme Court the question of whether OCGA § 15–11–521 (b) required the trial court to dismiss with prejudice the petition alleging delinquency when it was not filed within the 30–day period following the filing of the complaint. This course seems prudent given the Supreme Court's granting of certiorari to review our holdings in two somewhat procedurally similar cases, In the Interest of M.D.H.¹ and In the Interest of D.V.H.,² which were decided by different panels of this Court at or about the same time. Most assuredly, the Supreme Court's resolution of the issues in those cases will impact the ultimate resolution of the issues in the case herein.

In his dissent, Judge Andrews argues that not only should we decide this case on the merits and not forward the case to the Supreme Court for its consideration of the question that we certify, but also that we should reverse the decision of the trial court, thus requiring...