In re Interest of A.E.M.

455 S.W.3d 684

In the Interest of A.E.M., A Minor Child

NO. 01–14–00123–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.

Opinion issued December 16, 2014

Rehearing Overruled February 3, 2015

Timothy A. Hootman, Lianna Garza, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Jay M. Wright, Conroe, Texas, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Sharp.

OPINION

Laura Carter Higley, Justice

After meeting with an officer from the Child Support Division of the Office of the Attorney General, the parents of A.E.M. could not reach an agreement on all the terms for a child support and custody order. The only issue left unresolved was whether the child's last name should be changed to his father's last name. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the child's surname to include his father's surname. In three issues on appeal, the mother argues (1) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order the child's last name to be changed, (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to support the change of the child's last name, and (3) the written judgment does not conform to the trial court's orally rendered judgment.

We reverse and render.

Background

After A.E.M. was born, his parents attended a negotiation conference with an officer from the Child Support Division of the Office of the Attorney General. The parents reached agreement on most of the issues discussed, but could not reach an agreement on the last name of the child. The father wanted the child's last name changed to his last name. The mother wanted the child to keep her last name. The Office of the Attorney General filed a petition for confirmation of a non-agreed order with the trial court. The father filed a request for a hearing on the non-agreed issues. Specifically, the father requested the trial court to resolve his request to change the child's name to his last name.

The trial court held a hearing. At the hearing, the father testified that he wanted to change the child's name to his last name because he had a daughter who had his last name and he wanted them to have the same last name. The father explained that he had visitation rights with his daughter. The father and mother in this case had agreed that the father would also have visitation rights with A.E.M. The father testified that he also wanted the child to have his last name so there would be someone to carry on his family name and so that the child would have his name if the child entered the military. He acknowledged, however, that the child's keeping his mother's last name would not be detrimental to the child.

The mother testified that her last name held respect in the community because her father had run a business for 33 years in the small town where she lived. She also testified that the father had indicated he was attending visitation periods only in an attempt to get their son's last name changed to his and had told her at, one time, that he was willing to sign his parental rights away.

The trial court's judgment orders the child's last name to be changed to the father's last name.

Subject–Matter Jurisdiction

In her first issue, the mother asserts that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order the child's last name to be changed.

The dispute over their child's last name arose during meetings with the Child Support Division of the Office of the Attorney General. Pursuant to Chapter 233 of the Texas Family Code, the Office of the Attorney General is authorized to attempt expedited administrative actions concerning child support and medical support obligations. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 233.001 (Vernon 2014) (explaining purpose of chapter is to authorize “Title IV–D” agency to take expedited administrative actions concerning child support and medical support obligations); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 231.001 (Vernon 2014) (designating Office of the Attorney General as Title IV–D agency in Texas). If, as here, the parties cannot reach complete agreement in the administrative process, the Office of the Attorney General may file a petition for confirmation of a non-agreed child support order. Id. §§ 233.012(3), .020 (Vernon 2014). After the petition has been filed, certain strict deadlines apply before a hearing is held on the issues that remain outstanding. See id. §§ 233.023, .026 (Vernon 2014).

The thrust of the mother's complaint is that the Office of the Attorney General lacked the authority to negotiate the last name of the child during the administrative process and, therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter in the subsequent hearing. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the last name of the child.

Generally, family courts in Texas have “the jurisdiction and power provided for district courts by the constitution and laws of this state.” Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.601(a) (Vernon 2004). Additionally, they have primary responsibility for cases involving family law matters. Id. § 24.601(b). The law on changing a child's name is contained in the family code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 45.001 –.005 (Vernon 2014). Accordingly, it is undisputable that the family court generally had jurisdiction to determine the child's last name.

The question we must address, then, is whether anything in Chapter 233 of the Family Code excluded the consideration of the child's name from the trial court's jurisdiction. We apply statutory construction principles in determining whether a statutory requirement is jurisdictional. City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex.2009). We review the matter de novo. Id. “We resist classifying a provision as jurisdictional absent clear legislative intent to that effect.” Crosstex Energy Servs., L .P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tex.2014). “Since the Legislature is bound to know the consequences of making a requirement jurisdictional, one must ask, in trying to determine legislative intent, whether the Legislature intended those consequences.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tex.2004), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 511 (Tex.2012). In determining the legislative intent, we consider “(1) the plain meaning of the statute; (2) ‘the presence or absence of specific consequences for noncompliance’; (3) the purpose of the statute; and (4) ‘the consequences that result from each possible interpretation.’ ” Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392 (quoting White, 288 S.W.3d at 396 ).

In determining whether Chapter 233 limits the jurisdiction of the trial court, we must look at the plain language of the statute. Section 233.001 provides that the purpose of the procedures specified in the chapter is to enable the Office of the Attorney General “to take expedited administrative actions to establish, modify, and enforce child support or medical support obligations, to determine parentage, or to take any other action authorized or required under Part D, Title IV, of the federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. Section 652 et seq. ) and Chapter 231.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 233.001(a).

The purpose of the administrative conference between the parties “is to provide an opportunity to reach an agreement on a child support order.” Id. § 233.012(1). The child support review order is meant to cover topics such as “current child support, medical support, a determination of any arrearages or retroactive support, and, if not otherwise ordered, income withholding.” Id. § 233.017(a).

However, if the parties do not agree on an order, the child support review order “may specify and reserve for the court at the confirmation hearing unresolved issues relating to conservatorship or possession of a child.” Id. § 233.017(d). At the hearing on the non-agreed order, “any issues in dispute shall be heard in a trial de novo.”Id. § 233.025(b).

Even if we concluded that the administrative conference can only cover matters relating to paternity determinations, child support obligations, and medical support obligations, the hearing before the trial court on the unresolved issues is intended to allow matters beyond those limitations, including conservatorship and possession of a child. See id. § 233.017(d). While it does not specifically include name changes as a matter that can be resolved by the trial court, the statute also does not exclude it. See id.; see also Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392 (holding presence or absence of specific consequences for noncompliance is factor for determining whether statute is jurisdictional). Moreover, even if we interpreted these statutes to restrict the considerations to be taken by the trial court, nothing in the statutory framework suggests the limitations are jurisdictional. See White, 288 S.W.3d at 395 (holding fact that statutory requirement is mandatory does not mean compliance with it is jurisdictional).

At best, the fact that changing a child's name was not identified as a topic to be resolved in the Chapter 233 hearing before the trial court suggests that it was not generally intended to be resolved in the hearing. From there, there is no more than a weak inference to conclude that the legislature intended this to be a strict jurisdictional limitation. See Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392 (“Although the plain meaning might suggest a jurisdictional bar, it does not meet the requisite level of clarity to establish the statute as jurisdictional.”).

Finally, we see no negative consequences that might arise from holding any limitations on the hearing are not jurisdictional. See id. (holding consequences that result from each possible interpretation is factor for determining whether statute is jurisdictional). Even if the name of the child is not generally intended to be part of the trial court's hearing, any injured party can object to its inclusion. See id. at 391 (“A party may waive a mandatory, non-jurisdictional requirement by failing to timely object.”). Here, instead, the mother...