In re Interest of A.C.

237 A.3d 553

In the INTEREST OF: A.C., a Minor

Appeal of: D.C., Mother

No. 3251 EDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted May 19, 2020

Filed August 19, 2020

Caroline T. Buck, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Caroline B. Curley, Robert D. Aversa, Kathleen B. Kim, Philadelphia, for Dept. of Human Services, appellee.

John J. Capaldi, Langhorne, for Martinez-Cabrera, participating party.

Elizabeth A. Herdmann, Philadelphia, Guardian Ad Litem, for A.C., participating party.

Ilana F. Ehrlich, Philadelphia, Guardian Ad Litem, for A.C., participating party.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.^*

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

D.C. ("Mother") appeals from the October 15, 2019 order finding Mother to be a perpetrator of child abuse against A.C., born in August of 2018 ("Child"), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303, adjudicating Child dependent, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1), and transferring custody of Child to the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS"). After careful review, we affirm.¹

The trial court issued the following Findings of Fact in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

On May 27, 2019, [DHS] received a Child Protective Services ("CPS") report that Child arrived at St. Christopher's Children[’s] Hospital on March 26, 2019. DHS learned that Child was taken to St. Christopher's by Mother and Father[,] and that Child was suffering from hematomas on the right side of her head. A retinal exam also indicated additional trauma. Hospital staff told DHS that Mother stated that Child had fallen from [Mother and Father's] bed. Also, Mother and Father could not explain the cause of older injuries discovered by CAT scans revealing that Child had subdural^{[2 ]} hematomas which likely occurred prior to March 26, 2019. DHS interviewed Mother who stated that ... Child's injury was caused when ... Child fell from a three-foot high bed when Mother was changing ... Child's diaper upstairs. Mother denied that Child experienced pervious [sic ] trauma. DHS interviewed Father who stated that he heard Child fall from the bed when he was downstairs. On May 28, 2019, a report by Dr. Bryan Spellman of St. Christopher's Hospital indicated that Child suffered from non-accidental trauma to the right side of her head, showing layered hematomas, both old and new. Child also suffered from retinal hemorrhaging, indicative of non-accidental trauma in which ... [C]hild could have been shaken, dropped[,] or pushed very hard. Dr. Spellman reported that the ten (10) month[-]old Child could not have sustained these types of injuries from solely falling from a bed. On May 30, 2019, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody ("OPC") for Child. At a Shelter Care Hearing on May 31, 2019, the court lifted the OPC and ordered the temporary commitment to DHS to stand. DHS filed the underlying Petition for Dependency on June 5, 2019. Thereafter, on October 15, 2019, the [c]ourt held an Adjudicatory Hearing to determine if Mother was a perpetrator of child abuse and if ... Child should be adjudicated dependent. Mother was present at the hearing and represented by counsel. After extensive testimony, the trial court made a finding of child abuse versus Mother.^{[3 ]} The trial court also adjudicated the Child dependent.

Trial Court Opinion ("TCO"), 1/3/20, at 1-3 (citations to record omitted).

On November 14, 2019, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). Mother presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by entering a finding of child abuse against Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1)(1) when insufficient evidence was introduced to demonstrate that Mother intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to [Child] through a recent act or failure to act?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by applying 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d) to presume Mother responsible for [Child's] injury in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that [Child's] injury was child abuse as defined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1)(1) ?

3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by finding that Mother failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of responsibility for [Child's] injury pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d) ?

4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by adjudicating [Child] to be a "dependent child" pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that [Child] was "without proper parental care and control ... as required by law?"

5. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by committing [Child] to the legal custody of [DHS] in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that removal was clearly necessary?

Mother's Brief at 3-4.

Preliminarily, we note:

The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court's inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.

Interest of S.L. , 202 A.3d 723, 727 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting In re R.J.T. , 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010) ).

The Child Protective Services Law, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301 - 6387 ("CPSL"), defines "child abuse," in relevant part, as follows:

(b.1) Child abuse.—The term "child abuse" shall mean intentionally, knowingly or recklessly doing any of the following:

(1) Causing bodily injury to a child through any recent act or failure to act.

...

(5) Creating a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury to a child through any recent act or failure to act.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1)(1), (5). "Bodily injury" is defined as "[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain." 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a) ("Bodily Injury").

Additionally, for the purposes of the CPSL, the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," and "recklessly" have the same meaning as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 302. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a). Section 302 of the Crimes Code defines these kinds of culpability as follows:

(1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when:

(i) If the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and

(ii) If the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.

(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:

(i) If the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and

(ii) If the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.

(3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.

18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b).

The requisite standard of proof for a finding of child abuse pursuant to Section 6303(b.1) is clear and convincing evidence. In re L.Z. , 631 Pa. 343, 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (2015). Clear and convincing evidence is "evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." G.V. v. Department of Public Welfare , 625 Pa. 280, 91 A.3d 667, 672 (2014). In certain situations, however, the identity of the abuser need only be established through prima facie evidence:

Evidence that a child has suffered child abuse of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child shall be prima facie evidence of child abuse by the parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child.

In re L.Z. , 111 A.3d at 1170 (quoting 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d) ).

This Court has long recognized the applicability and importance of the evidentiary presumption in Section 6381(d) regarding the identity of the abuser in dependency cases. See In the Interest of J.R.W. , 428 Pa.Super. 597, 631 A.2d 1019 (1993). In J.R.W. , we explained:

Prima facie evidence is not the standard that establishes the child has been abused, which must be established by clear and convincing evidence; it is the standard by which the court determines whom the abuser would be in a given case. There is no conflict, constitutional or otherwise, with the clear and convincing evidence standard imposed by the Juvenile Act[, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301 - 6375 ("Juvenile Act"),] to establish child abuse. The Legislature has determined that the likelihood clearly established abuse has occurred, other than at the hands of the custodian, is so small that prima facie evidence the custodian has caused the injury, either by acts or omissions, is all that is required.... Such a standard provides maximum protection for the child victim.... Thus[,] the Legislature has balanced the needs of society and children for protection against the abuser's possible patterned behavior and his/her right to freedom unless found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 1024.

Our Supreme Court reiterated our observation that "the Legislature deemed it wise and necessary to establish a different evidentiary standard by enacting Section 6381(d) ’s presumption," to avoid the evidentiary conundrum...