In re Interest of T.B.

313 Ga. 846

874 S.E.2d 101

In the INTEREST OF T.B., a child.

S22A0287

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: June 1, 2022

Yolanda Bacharach, Amanda Jones Walker, Eastern Judicial Circuit Office of the Public Defender, 724 E. 36th, Savannah, Georgia 31401, for Appellant.

Randee J. Waldman, Emory University School of Law, Barton Child Law and Policy Center, 1301 Clifton Road, Atlanta, Georgia 30322, for Amicus Appellant.

Michael Lanier Edwards, Chief A.D.A., Shalena Cook Jones, District Attorney, Eastern Judicial Circuit Office of the District Attorney, Chatham County Courthouse, 133 Montgomery St., Ste. 600, Savannah, Georgia 31401, Nancy Michele Harris, Deputy Chief A.D.A., Brittany Lee Padgett, A.D.A., District Attorney's Office Eastern Judicial Circuit, 41 Park of Commerce Drive, Suite 306, Savannah, Georgia 31405, Margaret Ellen Heap, District Attorney, Office of the District Attorney Eastern Judicial Circuit, P. O. Box 2309, Savannah, Georgia 31402, for Appellee.

Bradford Lee Rigby, District Attorney, Cordele Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, PO Box 5510, Cordele, Georgia 31010, Robert Wright Smith, Jr., William D. Johnson, A.D.A., Prosecuting Attorneys' Council of Georgia, 1590 Adamson Parkway, 4th Floor, Morrow, Georgia 30260, Shannon Glover Wallace, District Attorney, Cherokee County District Attorney's Office, 90 North Street, Suite 390, Canton, Georgia 30114, for Amicus Appellee.

Colvin, Justice.

This case requires us to determine whether a child charged with delinquency based on an alleged violation of Georgia's Criminal Code may assert an affirmative defense of insanity or delusional compulsion, under OCGA § 16-3-2 or 16-3-3, in a juvenile-court proceeding. The Juvenile Code does not expressly state whether affirmative defenses provided for in the Criminal Code are available in juvenile court. Based on the Juvenile Code's text and structure, however, we conclude that insanity and delusional-compulsion defenses are available in most delinquency proceedings. As explained below, we specifically hold that, in a delinquency proceeding, a child may assert an insanity or delusional-compulsion defense under OCGA § 16-3-2 or 16-3-3 when the child's delinquency charge is based on an allegation that the child committed "[a]n act ... designated a crime by the laws of this state." OCGA § 15-11-2 (19) (A). Because the juvenile court erred in concluding that a child could never raise an insanity or delusional-compulsion defense in a delinquency proceeding, we vacate the court's order denying the motion of T.B., a minor, which sought a forensic psychological evaluation for purposes of raising a defense under OCGA § 16-3-2 or 16-3-3, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. In 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court, alleging that T.B. was a delinquent child. According to the petition, on January 24, 2019, T.B., who was then 16 years old, attempted to evade the police by entering a hotel in Savannah and locking himself in the hotel's storage closet. When officers attempted to remove T.B. from the closet, the petition alleged, T.B. pushed the officers, attempted to strike and bite the officers, and assaulted one officer with liquid glass cleaner, which T.B. poured on the officer's face such that some of the liquid went down the officer's throat. The petition further alleged that officers found marijuana and marijuana-related paraphernalia in T.B.’s possession. Based on these allegations, the petition charged T.B. with aggravated assault on a peace officer, see OCGA § 16-5-21, aggravated battery, see OCGA § 16-5-24, two counts of obstruction of an officer, see OCGA § 16-10-24 (b), possession of less than an ounce of marijuana, see OCGA § 16-13-30 (j), two counts of possession of drug-related objects, see OCGA § 16-13-32.2, and two counts of criminal trespass, see OCGA § 16-7-21 (a) and (b).

Following a detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered that T.B. receive a psychological evaluation and be released the next day on house arrest with conditions. Before he was released, however, T.B. was involuntarily hospitalized for several days, pursuant to OCGA § 37-3-41 (a),¹ because he was experiencing symptoms of psychosis, including delusions.

Approximately four months later, a forensic psychologist performed a competency evaluation. The psychologist noted that T.B. had previously been diagnosed with, among other things, Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders, Substance Induced Psychotic Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder. The psychologist diagnosed T.B. with Schizophreniform Disorder, in Partial Remission, and concluded that T.B. understood the nature of the proceedings and was capable of assisting his attorney with his defense. Based on the competency evaluation, the juvenile court found T.B. competent to proceed.

Prior to the adjudication hearing, T.B. filed a notice of intent to offer a defense of insanity or delusional compulsion and moved the juvenile court to order a forensic psychological evaluation to determine whether he was incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his acts when the incident occurred. During a hearing on the matter, T.B.’s counsel acknowledged that the Juvenile Code did not specifically address whether insanity and delusional-compulsion defenses were available in delinquency proceedings. Relying in part on constitutional principles of due process and equal protection, however, counsel argued that T.B. should be permitted to assert such a defense.² The juvenile court rejected T.B.’s arguments and ruled that insanity and delusional-compulsion defenses are unavailable in juvenile-court proceedings. The court reasoned that insanity is irrelevant in a delinquency proceeding because an insanity defense seeks to establish that a defendant is not "guilty," and delinquency proceedings do not adjudicate "guilt." The court further reasoned that the Juvenile Code does not expressly provide for an insanity defense, even though it refers to an alibi defense, and that children do not have a constitutional right to raise an insanity defense in delinquency proceedings. Accordingly, the court prohibited T.B. from asserting such defenses and denied his request for a forensic evaluation.³

2. As a general matter, delinquency proceedings operate in a manner analogous to criminal cases. They begin when the State files "[a] petition alleging delinquency" in juvenile court. OCGA § 15-11-520. The case then moves to an adjudication phase, where the juvenile court holds a hearing to determine whether the child committed "the delinquent acts" alleged in the delinquency petition. OCGA § 15-11-582 (b) (1), (d), (e). If the court finds "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the "child has committed a delinquent act," the case proceeds to a disposition phase, where the court will enter a disposition order if it finds that the child is "in need of treatment or rehabilitation[.]" OCGA §§ 15-11-582 (e) ; 15-11-600 (b); 15-11-601 (a).

The question here is whether, during the adjudication phase of a juvenile-court proceeding, a child who has been charged with having committed a "delinquent act" by virtue of having committed a crime under state law may raise an affirmative defense of insanity or delusional compulsion.

Georgia's Criminal Code incorporates two insanity defenses. See Clark v. State , 245 Ga. 629, 629 (1), 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980) ; see also OCGA § 17-7-131 (a) (1) (defining "[i]nsane at the time of the crime" as "meeting the criteria of Code Section 16-3-2 or 16-3-3"). First, OCGA § 16-3-2 recognizes a defense of insanity based on mental incapacity, providing that

[a] person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence.

OCGA § 16-3-2. Second, OCGA § 16-3-3 recognizes an insanity defense based on delusional compulsion, providing that

[a] person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person, because of mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.

OCGA § 16-3-3. The delusional-compulsion defense applies only when a defendant both "suffer[ed] under delusions of an absurd and unfounded nature" and "was compelled by that delusion to act in a manner that would have been lawful and right if the facts had been as the defendant imagined them to be." McElrath v. State , 308 Ga. 104, 107 (1) (b), 839 S.E.2d 573 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Georgia's insanity defenses are "affirmative defenses." See McClure v. State , 306 Ga. 856, 857-858 (1), 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019) (noting that many affirmative defenses are found in Chapter 3 of Georgia's Criminal Code, where the insanity defenses are codified); Jackson v. State , 301 Ga. 878, 881 (3), 804 S.E.2d 357 (2017) (discussing a defendant's burden to prove the "affirmative defense of insanity"). In other words, by raising an affirmative defense of insanity or delusional compulsion under OCGA § 16-3-2 or 16-3-3, "a defendant argues that he should be acquitted of the offense regardless of whether he committed the act charged because of circumstances other than those that make out the material allegations of the charging instrument." McClure , 306 Ga. at 859 (1), 834 S.E.2d 96.

3. Juvenile-court proceedings are governed by the Juvenile Code, OCGA § 15-11-1 et seq. Accordingly, to determine whether insanity defenses under OCGA §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3 are available to children charged with delinquency in juvenile-court proceedings, we turn first to the Juvenile Code's text. See In the Interest of K.S. , 303 Ga. 542, 543, 814 S.E.2d 324 (2018). "[W]e must...