In re J.G.

495 S.W.3d 354

In the Matter of J.G., Appellant

NO. 01–15–01025–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued May 5, 2016

Cheri Duncan, Assistant Public Defender, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Devon Anderson, District Attorney, Eric Kugler, Assistant District Attorney, Houston, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Higley.

OPINION

Evelyn V. Keyes, Justice

In this accelerated appeal, after the State alleged that appellant, J.G., who was sixteen years old at the time, had engaged in delinquent conduct, the trial court waived its jurisdiction and certified appellant to stand trial as an adult. Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated robbery in the criminal district court, but the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court abused its discretion in waiving jurisdiction and reversed appellant's conviction. See [J.G.] v. State, 471 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“J.G. I ”). On remand, the juvenile court again waived its jurisdiction and certified appellant, who was now over the age of eighteen, as an adult. In two issues, appellant contends that (1) Family Code section 54.02(j), which applies to a juvenile defendant who is over the age of eighteen and allows the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and certify the defendant as an adult, is unconstitutional as applied to him, when he had the court's previous waiver of jurisdiction reversed on appeal; and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it waived jurisdiction over him.

We affirm.

Background

On January 17, 2012, the State filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that appellant had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated robbery. Appellant was sixteen at the time the State filed its petition. On May 11, 2012, the State filed an amended petition, which also requested that the juvenile court waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer appellant to the criminal district court for further proceedings. On the same date, the State filed a separate motion to waive jurisdiction, arguing that because of the seriousness of the offense, “the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings and it is in the best interest of the State of Texas” and appellant that the juvenile court waive its exclusive jurisdiction.

In advance of the certification hearing, the trial court had prepared a “return to court summary,” which summarized the facts of the charged offense, appellant's behavior while in custody for the charged offense, his prior encounters with the juvenile court system, his behavior while on probation for prior offenses, and his educational history. The trial court also ordered a psychiatric evaluation, which was conducted in the presence of appellant's attorney approximately one month before the certification hearing, and an evaluation of his intellectual functioning. The latter evaluation specifically addressed factors relevant to the juvenile court's decision concerning certification, including the seriousness of the crime, appellant's level of sophistication and maturity, prior rehabilitation efforts, and risk of violence. The evaluator recommended that “[d]ue to [the] seriousness of the nature of his alleged offenses, if adjudicated, [appellant] will likely benefit from a highly structured environment that is instrumental in helping him regulate his involvement in negative activities,” that appellant “would benefit from intensive substance abuse treatment,” and that appellant “would benefit from participation in an independent living program and could benefit from training in a service trade.”

On July 18, 2012, less than one month after appellant turned seventeen, the juvenile court held a certification hearing. The order waiving jurisdiction specifically stated that after a “full investigation and hearing,” the court found that appellant

is charged with a violation of a penal law of the grade of felony, if committed by an adult, to wit: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY committed on or about the 11th day of JANUARY, 2012 : that there has been no adjudication of THIS OFFENSE; that he was 14 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged OFFENSE ...; that there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the OFFENSE alleged and that because of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires [a] criminal proceeding. In making that determination, the Court has considered among other matters:

1. Whether the alleged OFFENSE WAS against [a] person or property, with the greater weight in favor of waiver given to offenses against the person;

2. The sophistication and maturity of the child;

3. The record and previous history of the child; and

4. The prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.

The Court specifically finds that the said [appellant] is of sufficient sophistication and maturity to have intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived all constitutional rights heretofore waived by the said [appellant], to have aided in the preparation of HIS defense and to be responsible for HIS conduct; that the OFFENSE allege[d] to have been committed WAS against the person of another; and the evidence and reports heretofore presented to the court demonstrate to the court that there is little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public and likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the said [appellant] by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.

The juvenile court thus waived its original jurisdiction and ordered appellant transferred to Harris County criminal district court.

Upon being transferred to the criminal district court, appellant pleaded guilty to the charged offense of aggravated robbery. Appellant appealed his conviction to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals.¹ On appeal, appellant argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it waived jurisdiction over him, that the evidence was insufficient to support a waiver of jurisdiction, and that the juvenile court erred by not including specific evidentiary findings supporting its determination in the order waiving jurisdiction. See J.G. I, 471 S.W.3d at 4.

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals relied upon a recent Court of Criminal Appeals decision, Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex.Crim.App.2014), in holding that the juvenile court, in an order waiving its original jurisdiction, must state both the reasons for waiving its jurisdiction and the findings of fact that support those reasons. J.G. I, 471 S.W.3d at 4. The court noted that the transfer order in this case made “no findings about the specifics of the alleged offense” and found “no more than probable cause to believe that appellant committed ‘the OFFENSE alleged.’ ” Id. The court also noted that “the only stated reason given for appellant's transfer was that ‘because of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceeding[s,]’ and the only specific fact supporting this reason was that ‘the OFFENSE allege[d] to have been committed WAS against the person of another [.]’ ” Id. Our sister court thus concluded that “the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction ‘based on this particular reason fortified only by this fact’ constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. The court determined that the criminal district court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant, vacated the judgment of conviction, dismissed the case against appellant in the district court, and remanded the case to the juvenile court “for further proceedings.” Id.

After the Fourteenth Court of Appeals remanded the case to the juvenile court, the State filed an amended petition against appellant on March 20, 2015. At that point, appellant was nineteen years old. The State again sought certification of appellant as an adult, and the juvenile court ordered a new round of psychological and intellectual evaluations of appellant.

The juvenile court held a certification hearing on November 2, 2015. At this hearing, Houston Police Department Officer C. Elder testified concerning the facts of the underlying aggravated robbery offense. Officer Elder testified that he was on patrol around 10:30 p.m. on January 11, 2012, in southwest Houston when he received a dispatch concerning a robbery. Officer Elder drove to a nearby apartment complex and spoke with Antonio Duran, the complainant, who informed him that he arrived at the complex and honked his horn at a car that was blocking the gate into the complex. The other car allowed Duran to pass through the gate, and after he did he parked in a parking space. As he started walking to an apartment, appellant walked up to him with another man who pointed a gun in Duran's face and demanded his money and any property he had with him. Appellant and the other man then drove away in their own vehicle.

Duran gave Officer Elder a description of the vehicle, and, after Elder gave that information to the dispatcher, another officer, Officer Gerard, observed the vehicle at the scene of a second robbery. Appellant and his companion fled the scene of the second robbery, but they crashed at a nearby apartment complex. Officer Elder discovered Duran's property in the car that appellant was driving, and Duran arrived at the scene of the crash and gave a positive identification of appellant as one of the men who had robbed him. Officers recovered a pistol from appellant's companion, who was twenty years old at the time of the offense and was therefore tried in criminal district court.

At the hearing, appellant raised several objections to the juvenile court's proceeding with a certification decision. Appellant argued that re-certification was not proper because, under Family Code section 54.02(j), which applies to certification decisions made after the individual...