In re J.J.C.

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.J.C., III

APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.M.C.

APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.J.F.

APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.E.F., III

APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.S.T.C.

APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother

J-S75045-13

No. 2249 EDA 2013

No. 2287 EDA 2013

No. 2288 EDA 2013

No. 2289 EDA 2013

No. 2290 EDA 2013

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

September 11, 2013

FILED: MARCH 14, 2014

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000355-2013;

CP-51-DP-0116572-2006

Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000356-2013;

CP-51-DP-0116570-2006

Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000357-2013;

CP-51-DP-0116571-2006

Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000358-2013;

CP-51-DP-0116569-2006

Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000359-2013;

CP-51-DP-0052658-2007

BEFORE: GANTMAN, SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:

M.M.C. ("Mother") appeals from the Decrees and Orders, entered by the trial court on July 12, 2013, which involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her children, J.J.C., III (born in March 2005), M.M.C. (born in March 2004); J.J.F., (born in September 2001), J.E.F., III (born in September 2001), and J.S.T.C. (born in May 2007) (collectively, the "Children") pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and changedChildren's permanency goal to adoption pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.¹ We affirm.

In its September 11, 2013 Opinion, the trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history of this appeal, which we incorporate herein by reference. Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/13, at 1-14. We additionally point out the following pertinent facts.

On May 6, 2011, the trial court ordered the removal of J.E.F. and J.J.F. from the care and custody of Mother, and placed them in Bethana treatment foster care home. Ten days later, the trial court adjudicated J.E.F. and J.J.F. dependent, and committed them to the custody and care of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS").

M.M.C., J.J.C., and J.S.T.C. resided with Mother and friends of the family from October 14, 2011 through October 17, 2011. However, on October 17, 2011, the trial court temporarily placed M.M.C., J.J.C., and J.S.T.C. in DHS's custody, with foster care provided through Bethana. On December 16, 2011, the trial court adjudicated M.M.C., J.J.C., and J.S.T.C. dependent, and fully committed them to DHS's custody.

On June 20, 2013, the DHS filed Petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights to Children, and to change the permanency goals for each child to adoption. The trial court held a hearing on the Petitions, atwhich DHS presented the testimony of Asia Cooper and Steve Dehais, both of whom are social workers at Bethana, and DHS social worker Rae Griffin. Mother testified on her own behalf. On July 12, 2013, the trial court entered Decrees granting DHS's Petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to Children, and changing the goal for each child to adoption.

Mother filed her Notices of Appeal from the trial court's termination Decrees, and simultaneously filed Concise Statements of Errors Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). With the trial court's permission, Mother subsequently filed Amended Notices of Appeal and Concise Statements challenging the permanency goal change for each child to adoption.²

Mother presents the following claims for our review:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error, when it involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights where such determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence under the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8)?

[2]. Whether the trial court erred because the evidence was overwhelming and undisputed that Mother[] demonstrated a genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain a parent-child relationship with [C]hildren?

[3]. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights without giving primary consideration to the effect that the termination would have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the child as required by the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

4. Whether the trial court erred when it changed the goal to adoption when there did not exist clear and convincing evidence to do so?

Brief of Appellant at 4 (renumbered).

We address Mother's first and second claims together, as they are related. Mother first claims that, in relation to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), DHS failed to satisfy its burden of establishing sufficient grounds to prove that she "refused or failed to perform parental duties." See Brief of Appellant at 8, 14. Mother contends that she had successfully completed, or was near completion of most of her Family Service Plan ("FSP") goals. Similarly, in her second claim, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights because there was overwhelming and undisputed evidence that she demonstrated a genuine interest, and a sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain a parent-child relationship with the Children. Id. at 16. In support, Mother relies on this Court's decision in In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2003). Mother argues that J.L.C. holds that a trial court must consider the history of the case and its individual circumstances, including any explanation offered by the parent for his/her conduct. See Brief of Appellant at 16.

We review Mother's appeal in accordance with the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition fortermination of parental rights. ... [O]ur standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id. ... As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. [The Supreme Court] observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as "testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing" as to enable the fact-finder to come toa clear conviction, "without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d at 1251).

This Court may affirm the decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will review the appeal pursuant to section 2511(a)(5) and (b), as discussed by the trial court in its Opinion.

Sections 2511(a)(5) and (b) of the Adoption Act provide as follows:

(a) General rule. --The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

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(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

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(b) Other considerations. --The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and

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