In re J.R.

501 S.W.3d 738

In the Interest of J.R., S.R., C.R., and C.R., Children

No. 10-16-00088-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.

Opinion delivered and filed August 31, 2016

Mary Clymer Brownlee, Attorney at Law, Ovilla, TX, Richard De Los Santos, Ricardo De Los Santos PC, Cleburne, TX, for Appellant/Relator.

Leslie Capace, Tex. Dept. of Fam. & Pro. Serv., Austin, TX, Natalie Cobb Koehler, Bosque County Attorney, Meridian, TX, for Appellees/Respondents.

Brittany L. Lannen, Attorney at Law, Valley Mills, TX, for Real Party in Interest.

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins

OPINION

AL SCOGGINS, Justice

Raising four issues each, appellants, Earl and Cathy, challenge the trial court's order terminating their parental rights to J.R., S.R., C.R., and C.R.¹ Because we overrule all of the issues raised by both appellants, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Earl and Cathy are the biological parents of four children, who, at the time of trial, were the following ages: fifteen-year-old J.R., thirteen-year-old S.R., nine-year-old C.R., and seven-year old C.R. Earl and Cathy also have two adult children who are not the subject of this lawsuit.

In August 2014, the Department of Family and Protective Services filed its original petition for termination of the parental rights of both Earl and Cathy as to J.R., S.R., C.R., and C.R. Specifically, the Department sought to terminate Earl and Cathy's parental rights on numerous grounds, including those in section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (O) and section 161.003(a) of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (O ), 161.003(a) (West Supp. 2016).

After a trial, the jury found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship between Earl and Cathy and their four minor children was in the best interest of the children and that Earl and Cathy both engaged in acts or conduct that satisfied several of the alleged statutory grounds for termination. The trial court's order of termination reflects that the jury concluded that the Department established by clear and convincing evidence that Earl and Cathy both: (1) "knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the children"; (2) "failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the mother [and father] to obtain the return of the children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the children's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the children"; and (3) "[have] a mental or emotional illness or mental deficiency that renders [them] unable to provide for the physical, emotional, and mental needs of the children and will continue to render [them] unable to provide for the children's needs until the 18th birthday of the children despite at least 6 months of reasonable efforts to return the children to the parent." See id. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (O), 161.003(a).

At the conclusion of the trial, Cathy filed a motion for new trial challenging the jury's findings; however, Earl did not. In any event, both Earl and Cathy filed separate notices of appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A parent's rights to "the companionship, care, custody, and management" of his or her children are constitutional interests "far more precious than any property right." Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ; In re M.S. , 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). "While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right." In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002) ; see In re A.V. , 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) ("But this Court has stated that ‘the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is paramount. ... The rights of parenthood are accorded only to those fit to accept the accompanying responsibilities.’ " (quoting In re J.W.T. , 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted))). In a termination case, the petitioner seeks not only to limit parental rights but to eradicate them permanently by divesting the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child's right to inherit. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b) (West 2014); Holick v. Smith , 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. See Holick , 685 S.W.2d at 20–21.

In an involuntary termination proceeding brought under section 161.001 of the family code, the Department must establish: (1) at least one ground under subsection (b)(1) of section 161.001 ; and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 ; In re J.L. , 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Both elements must be established; termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. See Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a). Evidence is clear and convincing if it "will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Id. § 101.007 (West 2008). Due process demands this heightened standard because termination results in permanent, irrevocable changes for the parent and child. In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002) ; see In re J.A.J. , 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting the standards for termination and modification).

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental-termination cases, we determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven. In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment. Id. We resolve any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all contrary evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. Id. We consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id. In other words, we consider evidence favorable to termination if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. We cannot weigh witness-credibility issues that depend on the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, for that is within the province of the factfinder. Id. at 573–74. And even when credibility issues appear in the appellate record, we defer to the factfinder's determinations as long as they are reasonable. Id. at 573.

In reviewing for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to the factfinder's findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the parent committed the predicate ground alleged and that the termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1) ; see In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief in the truth of its finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient. In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d at 108.

III. CATHY'S APPELLATE ISSUES

A. The Predicate Grounds and Best-Interest Finding

In her first issue, Cathy argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish both the underlying predicate grounds for termination and that termination is in the best interest of the children. We disagree.

In the instant case, the jury concluded the Department established that Cathy knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the children's physical or emotional well-being, among other things. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). To endanger means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987) ; see In re M.C. , 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); see also In re I.R.K. - N. , No. 10–13–00455–CV, 2014 WL 2069281, at *4, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 5310 at *11 (Tex. App.—Waco May 15, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). "The specific danger to a child's physical or emotional well-being need not be established as an independent proposition, but it may be inferred from parental misconduct." In re I.R.K.-N. , 2014 WL 2069281, at *4, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 5310, at *11 (citing Boyd , 727 S.W.2d at 533 ).

When termination of parental rights is based on section D, the endangerment analysis focuses on the evidence of the child's physical environment, although the environment produced by the conduct of the parents bears on the determination of whether the child's surroundings threaten his well-being. In re S.M.L. , 171 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Section D permits termination if the petitioner proves parental conduct caused a child to be placed or remain in an endangering environment. In re R.D. , 955 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).

It is not necessary that the parent's conduct be directed towards the child or that the child actually be

...