In re J.S.

174 N.H. 375

262 A.3d 1178

IN RE J.S.

No. 2020-0502

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: June 17, 2021

Opinion Issued: July 30, 2021

Office of the Attorney General (Weston R. Sager, attorney, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the juvenile.

HICKS, J.

The juvenile, J.S., appeals a finding of delinquency made by the Circuit Court (Boyle, J.) based upon petitions alleging criminal mischief, simple assault, and attempted simple assault. We affirm.

The trial court could have found the following facts. On September 29, 2020, Chief Foss of the Campton Police Department filed seven delinquency petitions against the juvenile arising out of incidents alleged to have occurred at Mount Prospect Academy (Mount Prospect) on September 11, 17, and 29. Mount Prospect is part of the Becket Family of Services, where the juvenile was placed at the time of the alleged incidents.¹

At the close of the State's case at the adjudicatory hearing, the court granted the juvenile's motion to dismiss one of the petitions for insufficiency of evidence, and denied his motions to dismiss the remaining petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The latter motions argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State failed to comply with RSA 169-B:6, III and IV, which provide:

III. Absent serious threats to school safety, when a delinquency petition is filed by a school official, including a school resource officer assigned to a school district pursuant to a contract agreement with the local police department, or when a petition is filed by a local police department as a result of a report made by a school official or school resource officer, based upon acts committed on school grounds during the school day, information shall be included in the petition which shows that the legally liable school district has sought to resolve the expressed problem through available educational approaches, including the school discipline process, if appropriate, that the school has sought to engage the parents or guardian in solving the problem but they have been unwilling or unable to do so, that the minor has not responded to such approaches and continues to engage in delinquent behavior, and that court intervention is needed.

IV. When a school official, including a school resource officer assigned to a school district pursuant to a contract agreement with the local police department, or a local police department as a result of a report made by a school official or school resource officer, files a petition involving a minor with a disability pursuant to RSA 186-C, upon submission of a juvenile petition, but prior to the child's initial appearance, the legally liable school district shall provide assurance that prior to its filing:

(a) It was determined whether or not the child is a child with a disability according to RSA 186-C:2, I.

(b) If the school district has determined that the child is a child with a disability, a manifestation review pursuant to 20 U.S.C. section 1415(k)(1)(E) occurred.

(c) If the child's conduct was determined to be a manifestation of the child's disability, the school district followed the process set forth in 20 U.S.C. section 1415(k)(1)(F).

(d) It has reviewed for appropriateness the minor's current individualized education program (IEP), behavior intervention plan, and placement, and has made modifications where appropriate.

RSA 169-B:6, III, IV (2014). The juvenile argued that, according to Chief Foss's testimony, "these petitions were filed as a result of information provided by school officials." Specifically, Chief Foss testified that he had spoken to certain "members of the Becket staff ... and other faculty."

The State countered that "Becket is not a ‘school,’ by definition," but, rather, constitutes a non-secure detention facility under RSA 169-B:2. See RSA 169-B:2, VII (2014) (defining "[n]on-secure detention" to mean "the care of a minor in a facility where physical restriction of movement or activity is provided solely through facility staff"). The court denied the motion, concluding that "Becket and Mount Prospect Academy are ... not a school." The court explained: "It's nonsecure placement, and ... the reason children are placed there and not going to a conventional school is because of behavioral issues."

The juvenile presented his case, eliciting further testimony from a Mount Prospect employee on the nature of its operations. The witness, Ian Detamore, stated that he was "employed with Mount Prospect Academy, Campton facility, which is the enhanced residential treatment ... and shelter care facilities," as "executive director of the Campton campus." Detamore testified that Mount Prospect has a contract with the New Hampshire Department of Education and that the services Mount Prospect provides are subject to approval by the State Board of Education.

The court specifically inquired: "Is Mount Prospect Academy a school?" to which Detamore responded: "Mount Prospect Academy has an educational component with ... in-home services, academic services, therapeutic residential milieu services. We do have a component that is absolutely a school, yes." The State then inquired:

Q Would you say Mount Prospect Academy is solely a school?

A No. Absolutely not.

Q And would you compare it to -- would it be more comparable to a school or a nonsecure detention facility?

A I would define it as a residential treatment setting for at-risk youth.

Detamore described the "enhanced residential treatment program" as a "contracted program[ ]" providing "a high level of services to youth as an alternative to community services or detention settings. So it is contracted to provide services to youth at risk of being detained or committed."

Following Detamore's testimony, the juvenile renewed his motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, which the court again denied. The court dismissed four of the petitions on other grounds and entered findings of true on three petitions alleging criminal mischief, simple assault, and attempted simple assault, respectively. The court then made a finding of delinquency and ordered the juvenile committed to the John H. Sununu Youth Services Center for the remainder of his minority.

On appeal, the juvenile argues that the trial court "erred as a matter of law in determining that, on the undisputed facts in the record here, Mount Prospect Academy is not a school." Accordingly, he contends that the court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petitions.

Determining whether Mount Prospect is a "school" within the meaning of RSA 169-B:6, III and IV requires that we engage in statutory interpretation, "which presents a question of law subject to de novo review." Petition of N.H. Div. for Children, Youth & Families, 173 N.H. 781, 785, 249 A.3d 177 (2020).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or unjust result. Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature's intent in enacting them and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Absent an ambiguity, we need not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent.

N. New England Tel. Operations v. Town of Acworth, 173 N.H. 660, 667, 247 A.3d 809 (2020) (citations omitted).

Noting that RSA chapter 169-B does not define "school," the juvenile argues that Mount Prospect falls within various dictionary definitions of that term, as it is "an organized source of education and training of children, and ... an institution or place for instruction or education." See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2031 (unabridged ed. 2002). The State, on the other hand, argues that RSA 169-B:6, III must be read in the context of the "overall statutory scheme[,] ... [which] confirms that [Mount Prospect] is a ‘facility’ and not a ‘school.’ " The State specifically looks to RSA chapter 126-U, which defines the terms "facility" and "school":

In this chapter:

....

III. "Facility" includes any of the following when used for the placement, custody, or treatment of children:

(a) The youth services center maintained by the department of health and human services, or any other setting established for the commitment or detention of children pursuant to RSA 169-B, RSA 169-C, or RSA 169-D.

....

(c) Any foster home, group home, crisis home, or shelter care setting used for the placement of children at any stage of proceedings under RSA 169-B, RSA 169-C, or RSA 169-D or following disposition under those chapters.

....

V. "School" means:

(a) A school operated by a school district.

(b) A chartered public school governed by RSA 194-B.

(c) A public academy as defined in RSA 194:23, II.

(d) A nonpublic school subject to the approval authority of the state board of education under RSA 186:11, XXIX.

(e) A private or public provider of any component of a child's individualized education program under RSA 186-C.

RSA 126-U:1, III, V (2021).

Our settled rules of statutory interpretation instruct that "[a]ll statutes dealing with the same subject matter are to be considered in interpreting any one of them" and, "[w]here reasonably possible, statutes should be construed as consistent with each other." In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 88-89, 89 A.3d 165 (2014) (quotation...