In re Jalen C.

139 A.D.3d 940

31 N.Y.S.3d 204

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 03875

In the Matter of JALEN C. (Anonymous), appellant.

2015-05301, 2015-05302, Docket No. D-18212-14.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 18, 2016.

Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Richard Dearing and Antonella Karlin of counsel), for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

Appeals from (1) an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Terrence J. McElrath, J.), dated June 2, 2015, and (2) an order of protection of that court, also dated June 2, 2015. The order of disposition adjudicated Jalen C. a juvenile delinquent, placed him on probation for a period of 24 months, and directed him to comply with the order of protection. The order of protection directed Jalen C., inter alia, to stay away from the complainant until and including June 2, 2017. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review an order of fact-finding of that court dated January 5, 2015, which, after a hearing, found that Jalen C. had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree.

ORDERED that the order of disposition and order of protection are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621 ; Matter of Damien S., 124 A.D.3d 667, 2 N.Y.S.3d 160 ; Matter of Anthony R., 43 A.D.3d 939, 841 N.Y.S.2d 642 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt (see Family Ct. Act § 342.2[2] ), that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree against the complainant (see Penal Law §§ 130.00[3], [8][a] ; 130.65[1]; Matter of Jonathan F., 72 A.D.3d 963, 898 N.Y.S.2d 516 ; Matter of Daniel R. [Lucille R.], 70 A.D.3d 839, 841, 894 N.Y.S.2d 165 ; Matter of Anthony R., 43 A.D.3d 939, 841 N.Y.S.2d 642 ; Matter of Najee A., 26 A.D.3d 258, 809 N.Y.S.2d 80 ; cf. Matter of Shourik D., 65 A.D.3d 1042, 1044, 884 N.Y.S.2d 875 ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Shannel P., 137 A.D.3d 1039, 27 N.Y.S.3d 195 ; cf. CPL 470.15[5] ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Daniel J., 136 A.D.3d 915, 26 N.Y.S.3d 138 ; cf. People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct. Act § 342.2[2] ; Matter of Jonathan F., 72 A.D.3d at 964, 898 N.Y.S.2d 516 ; Matter of Anthony R., 43 A.D.3d at 940, 841 N.Y.S.2d 642 ; cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ; Matter of Christian E., 68 A.D.3d 1109, 891 N.Y.S.2d 461 ).

The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant's application to recall the complainant for the purpose of cross-examining her on her prior allegations of sexual abuse (see Family Ct. Act § 344.4 ; Matter of Jerry J.-B., 116 A.D.3d 1042, 984 N.Y.S.2d 599 ; Matter of Dakota EE.,

209 A.D.2d 782, 618 N.Y.S.2d 133 ).

Accordingly, the Family Court properly issued the...