In re Jaylen

231 N.E.3d 302

CAKE AND PROTECTION OF JAYLEN.¹

SJC-13494

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued January 5, 2024

Decided April 17, 2024

Parent and Child, Care and protection of minor, Custody. Jurisdiction, Care and protection of minor, Custody of child, Juvenile Court, Probate Court. Juvenile Court, Jurisdiction. Probate Court, Jurisdiction, Child born out of wedlock. Practice, Civil, Care and protection proceeding. Statute, Construction. Due Process of Law, Care and protection of minor, Child custody proceeding, Substantive rights. Constitutional Law, Parent and child.

Petition filed in the Essex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on March 10, 2021.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Kerry A. Ahern, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

Dawn M. Messer, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the child.

Jennifer L. Kernan for Department of Children and Families.

Roberta Driscoll-Weiss, for the father, was present but did not argue.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

WENDLANDT, J.

This case lies at the intersection of two statutory schemes involving the Commonwealth’s interest in the welfare of children and two departments of the Trial Court -- the Probate and Family Court and the Juvenile Court -- with overlapping jurisdiction. The first statutory scheme provides safeguards for the care and protection of children. See G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26. If a Juvenile Court judge adjudicates a child in need of care and protection, the judge may award "permanent" custody to the child’s parent "qualified to give care to the child." G. L. c. 119, § 26. Such an order of custody is subject to "review and redetermination" at the request of a party during the pendency of the care and protection proceeding at six-month intervals. Id. In the present case, after custody was removed from the mother of the nonmarital child,² a Juvenile Court judge awarded "permanent" custody to the father. The child filed a motion to dismiss and to close the care and protection case, contending that the Juvenile Court’s custody order, without an order from a judge of the Probate and Family Court, was sufficient to award permanent custody to the father. The Juvenile Court judge denied the child’s motion in light of the second relevant statutory scheme, which comprehensively addresses the rights and responsibilities of the parents of nonmarital children and provides that the mother of a nonmarital child "shall" have custody "[i]n the absence of an order or judgment of a [P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt [judge] relative to custody." G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b).

The current practice in the Juvenile Court to resolve these seemingly imbricating schemes is to require the parent, who has been awarded permanent custody of the child in connection with a care and protection action, to seek an order of custody from the Probate and Family Court under the nonmarital child statutory scheme, G. L. c. 209C; the Juvenile Court judge will dismiss the care and protection proceeding only after a Probate and Family Court judge has issued an order regarding custody of the nonmarital child. We agree that this practice best reflects the Legislature’s intent and harmonizes the two statutory schemes. Further concluding that, in the circumstances presented here, the practice complies with due process, we affirm the Juvenile Court judge’s order denying the child’s motion to dismiss the care and protection case in the present matter.

1. Background. The relevant facts are undisputed. In March 2021, following removal of the child from the mother, the Department of Children and Families (de- partment) filed a care and protection petition in the Juvenile Court on behalf of the child pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24 (§ 24), alleging neglect by the mother. At that time, the mother, who never was married to the father, was the custodial parent of the child. The father established paternity when the child was born and was listed as the father on the child’s birth certificate.³ The father did not, however, seek custody of the child prior to the filing of the care and protection petition.⁴

Also in March 2021, the mother waived her right to a temporary custody hearing; a Juvenile Court judge approved the parents’ written stipulation and granted temporary custody to the father, with conditions. The father has maintained custody of the child since then.

[1] A different Juvenile Court judge (second judge) subsequently issued an order requesting that the Probate and Family Court resolve the issue of the child’s custody and further ordered the father to file a complaint in the Probate and Family Court, which he did in August 2022. The father later filed a motion for temporary orders regarding the child’s custody in the Probate and Family Court matter.⁵

In January 2023, the mother waived her right to a healing on the merits of the care and protection proceedings; instead, she stipulated that she was unfit, that the child be adjudicated in need of care and protection, and that the father maintain permanent physical and legal custody of the child. The department, the father, and the child agreed. Following a colloquy with the mother, the second judge found the mother currently unfit and awarded permanent physical and legal custody to the father under G. L. c. 119, § 26 (§ 26), with the condition that, inter alia, the father abide by the parenting plan agreement executed by the parties.⁶ Per § 26 (c), the order of the second judge was subject to review and redetermination at six-month intervals.⁷

In March 2023, the child filed a motion for permanent custody to be awarded to the father and for dismissal of the care and protection case. By then, the father had maintained custody of the child for over two years.

The second judge agreed with the undisputed position of the parties that the father presented no protective concerns, and that the father should be granted permanent legal and physical custody of the child. Nevertheless, the judge denied the child’s motion, reasoning that an order from a Probate and Family Court judge was required in order for the father to retain permanent legal and physical custody of the child, despite the order she had issued pursuant to § 26, awarding "permanent" custody to the father as part of the care and protection proceedings.⁸ The child timely appealed, and we allowed his application for direct appellate review.⁹

2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. This case presents a legal question as to the authority of a Juvenile Court judge under G. L. c. 119, § 26, regarding child custody matters, in light of the jurisdictional provisions of G. L. c. 209C, regarding custody of nonmarital children. Accordingly, our review is de novo. See Robinhood Fin. LLC v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 492 Mass. 696, 707, 214 N.E.3d 1058 (2023) (questions of pure law reviewed de novo). See also Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. King, 485 Mass. 37, 41, 147 N.E.3d 450 (2020) (where "[t]he interpretive question[s] … [are] purely legal," we review them "de novo because [t]he duty of statutory interpretation rests ultimately with the courts" [citation omitted]).

[2–4] The starting point of our analysis is the language of the relevant statutes, which constitutes "the principal source of insight into Legislative purpose." City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 784, 788, 119 N.E.3d 735 (2019), quoting Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 242, 479 N.E.2d 649 (1985). "Clear and unambiguous statutory language is ‘conclusive as to legislative intent.' " HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 332, 190 N.E.3d 485 (2022) (Morris), quoting Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 356, 362, 183 N.E.3d 398 (2022). However, "[w]here the statutory language is not conclusive, we may turn to extrinsic sources, including the legislative history and other statutes, for assistance in our interpretation" (quotation and citation omitted). Morris, supra at 332-333, 190 N.E.3d 485.

[5, 6] We strive to construe a statute "in harmony with prior enactments to give rise to a consistent body of law" wherever possible, assuming as we must that the "Legislature was aware of the existing statutes" (citation omitted). Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 583, 631 N.E.2d 555 (1994). See School Comm. of Newton v Newton Sch. Custodians Ass’n, Local 454, SEIU, 438 Mass. 739, 751, 784 N.E.2d 598 (2003) ("In the absence of explicit legislative commands to the contrary, we construe statutes to harmonize and not to undercut each other"). Thus, "where two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative pur- pose." FMR Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 441 Mass. 810, 819, 809 N.E.2d 498 (2004), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514, 333 N.E.2d 450 (1975).

b. Statutory framework. We begin with a review of the statutory framework for care and protection proceedings, G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26, as well as the Legislature’s comprehensive scheme regarding the rights of nonmarital children, G. L. c. 209C.

i. Care and protection proceedings. Where a child "is not receiving adequate care and protection, the department may file a petition … to summons the child’s parent ‘to show cause why the child should not be committed to the custody of the department or why any other appropriate order should not be made.’ "¹⁰ Care & Protection of Zeb, 489 Mass. 783, 785, 189 N.E.3d 235 (2022), quoting G. L. c. 119, § 24.¹¹ The Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over such petitions.¹² See G. L. c. 218, § 59 (setting forth Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction over cases arising under G. L. c. 119).

If the child is adjudicated in need of care and protection, the judge may order the child committed to the department’s custody.¹³ G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b). The judge also may "make any other appropriate order …...