In re Karter F.

207 Conn.App. 1

262 A.3d 195

IN RE KARTER F.^*

AC 44496

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 13, 2021

Officially released August 24, 2021^**

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent father).

Elizabeth Bannon, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Evan O'Roark, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).

Alvord, Clark and Sullivan, Js.

CLARK, J.

The respondent father, Charles W. (respondent), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner), terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor child, Karter F., pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j).¹ On appeal, the respondent claims that in terminating his parental rights, the trial court improperly found that (1) the department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with his child and that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services, (2) he had failed to rehabilitate, and (3) it was in the best interests of the child to terminate his parental rights. We disagree with the respondent and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant. The child was born in March, 2017. In June, 2017, the respondent was arrested on charges of breach of the peace in the second degree and assault in the third degree after he allegedly punched the mother in the face and spat on her, an incident for which the mother obtained a protective order against him. In July, 2017, the respondent again was arrested and charged with, inter alia, assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and carrying a pistol without a permit, in connection with an incident in which he allegedly shot a thirteen year old boy. His bond was set at $1 million and he was incarcerated at the Northern Correctional Institution.

On September 21, 2017, the Department of Children and Families (department) filed neglect petitions on behalf of the minor child and his maternal half brother. On October 10, 2017, the department invoked a ninety-six hour administrative hold on behalf of the child, due to the mother's unaddressed mental health and intimate partner violence issues, lack of stable housing, and the respondent's incarceration.² The respondent was given specific steps to facilitate reunification, which were approved and ordered by the court on October 13, 2017. On that same date, an order of temporary custody was filed and granted. The court held a hearing on October 20, 2017, to address the order of temporary custody. On October 26, 2017, the respondent appeared and, through appointed counsel, agreed to the order of temporary custody. The respondent requested a paternity test, which was ordered by the court. During the termination hearing, the court found that "[a]t a January 18, 2018 court hearing, the court and the parties reviewed the results of the paternity test: there existed a 99.99 percent likelihood that [the respondent] was [the child's] father." The respondent initially contested the results of the court-ordered paternity test and requested a contested paternity hearing, which the court scheduled. The respondent, however, elected not to proceed with the hearing and acknowledged paternity, which the court adjudicated on February 7, 2018.

Also in January, 2018, the child was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the commissioner. Final specific steps were ordered for the respondent at the January 18, 2018 hearing, which required the respondent, inter alia, to engage in counseling; cooperate with service providers of mental health treatment, intimate partner violence treatment and education, and parenting services as determined appropriate by the department; attend and complete a domestic violence program; avoid the criminal justice system; and visit the child as often as permitted by the department. A department social worker first contacted the respondent in May, 2018. While he was incarcerated, from September, 2018, to March, 2020, the respondent engaged in monthly one hour supervised visits with the child.³ Because the respondent was incarcerated, limiting what services the department could provide to him directly, the department encouraged the respondent to utilize services and programs available through the Department of Correction. Those services and programs were paused in 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic rendered their provision no longer feasible.

On January 15, 2019, following a guilty plea and conviction of the criminal charges stemming from the incident in which the respondent shot a minor, the respondent was sentenced to seven years in prison. He was transferred from Northern Correctional Institution to Cheshire Correctional Institution, where he became eligible for a number of services and programs offered by that facility.

Approximately seven months prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, on August 28, 2019, the commissioner filed a petition to terminate the respondent's parental rights as to the child pursuant to § 17a-112 (j), on the grounds that the child had been adjudicated neglected and the respondent had (1) failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation and (2) lacked an ongoing parent-child relationship. The commissioner alleged that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent, but the respondent was unwilling or unable to benefit from the department's efforts because he had not engaged in recommended mental health services or otherwise addressed his issues, was incarcerated, and struggled to engage appropriately with the child during supervised visits, despite having received support and education. The commissioner further alleged that termination of the respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the respondent had not engaged in court-ordered treatment or recommended services, displayed little interest in the child during supervised visits, and was serving a seven year prison sentence. The commissioner alleged that the child was attached to his foster parents, with whom he had lived, along with his half brother, since October, 2017.

The commissioner appended a social study to the termination petition pursuant to Practice Book § 35a-9, which was admitted into evidence. The study stated that the department encouraged the respondent to "partake in individual counseling services in May, 2018," and referred the respondent "to Integrated Wellness for individual therapy [and] employment assistance" and "mental health counseling with the Interface Center." Despite these referrals, the study stated that, although the respondent began participating in anger management services on January 25, 2019, he "ha[d] not started individual therapy at Cheshire Correctional [Institution] ...." The respondent "ha[d] not participated in any therapeutic services to date per his counselor's report." The respondent also "ha[d] not made efforts to utilize the correctional [facility's] books to educate himself on the roles of a father and the importance of engagement with [the child]." The court found that, although the respondent engaged in anger management sessions, prayer groups, and prison employment once he was transferred to Cheshire Correctional Institution, he "has yet to [engage] in meaningful and necessary mental health treatment or [intimate partner violence] treatment."

The study also stated that the respondent declined to request visitation with the child until August, 2018.⁴

When visits between the respondent and the child commenced in September, 2018, the respondent "struggle[d] to engage with [the child] ... [did] not speak to [the child] during his visits and during times [the child was] sad or crie[d], he [did] not attempt to nurture or console him. [The respondent] display[ed] little to no interest in [the child's] well-being during supervised visits and ha[d] limited physical contact with him. For example, [he] ... [vented] about his life while incarcerated and [did] not ask for updates on [the child's] developmental, medical or social well-being."

The court conducted a termination trial remotely⁵ on November 23 and 30, 2020. At trial, Inés Schroeder, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified that she had performed a court-ordered psychological evaluation of the respondent in January, 2020. Schroeder's evaluation report was admitted into evidence, and revealed that the respondent struggles with anger, as evidenced by his June, 2017 domestic violence arrest, and has difficulty appreciating the needs of the child. When asked if the respondent demonstrated an understanding as to why the child was in foster care, Schroeder testified that the respondent "felt that he had not done anything wrong" and that the child was in the petitioner's care "because [the mother] was unable to take care of him ...." Schroeder also testified that she had observed the child and the respondent together. Consistent with the statements in the study, the child was silent for most of the observed visit and "did not engage playfully and actively until about the last ten minutes of the interaction and he did so at a distance." By contrast, the child was "very animated ... [and] ... sought physical affection voluntarily and spontaneously" when he was with his foster parents. The department's social worker also testified that the respondent had not participated in any mental health services while he was incarcerated and that he failed to engage with the child during visits or display an emotional bond with him.

Following the trial, on December 3, 2020, the court issued a memorandum of decision granting the petition on the grounds that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate⁶ and that termination was in the child's best interests. The court first found that the department had made reasonable efforts to locate the...