In re Kranz

1

In re the Estate of: Lavonne Eleanor Kranz, Deceased.

No. A23-0231

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

January 16, 2024

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Anoka County District Court File No. 02-PR-21-478

Alisa A. Gutierrez, Fridley, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Ivory S. Umanah, Thomas E. Marshall, Engelmeier & Umanah, P.A. Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Loren M. Irwin)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman Judge; and Kirk, Judge. ^[*]

BJORKMAN, JUDGE

Appellant challenges the summary judgment dismissing her petition for a formal adjudication of intestacy based on her claims of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity in the creation of her mother's will. Appellant also filed three motions to supplement the record. We deny the motions. And because nothing in the record presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of decedent's self-proved will, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Alisa Ann Gutierrez is the daughter of decedent LaVonne Eleanor Kranz. Following decedent's death in April 2021, Gutierrez petitioned the district court for a formal adjudication of intestacy, alleging that decedent's July 2019 will is invalid because decedent lacked testamentary capacity following an early-2019 head injury and decedent's brother, respondent Loren Irwin, unduly influenced her. Irwin objected and petitioned for formal probate of the July 2019 will, which names Irwin as personal representative, leaves the estate to him, and declares that it intentionally makes no provision for Gutierrez or her brother.

In April 2022, the district court set trial for October and ordered the parties to complete discovery by July 1. In early June, Gutierrez sought to amend the scheduling order, stating that her attorney only recently received and began reviewing decedent's medical records. Based on the parties' agreement, the district court did so, retaining the July 1 discovery deadline but moving the trial to December and setting a new initial-disclosure deadline of September 30.

On September 14, Gutierrez filed "initial and expert disclosures," which stated that Gutierrez possessed decedent's "medical records" from several providers but did not disclose any. And it stated that Gutierrez's attorney had requested a medical report "in August, 2022 and expected to receive [it] last week," but had not. Gutierrez's disclosures indicated that the healthcare providers informed her that they "were expediting the process," and that she would "immediately supplement" her disclosures upon receipt.

On September 23, Irwin moved for summary judgment. In support of the motion, Irwin submitted affidavits from the two subscribing witnesses to decedent's will. Both averred that decedent was of sound mind and not unduly influenced at the time she executed her will. Irwin also submitted a transcript of Gutierrez's deposition testimony, and the deposition exhibits: affidavits of decedent's friends and family attesting to decedent's sound mind and her poor relationship with Gutierrez, Gutierrez's "initial and expert disclosures," and a June 2019 medical assessment that decedent appeared safe to resume driving following her head injury earlier that year. And he included decedent's will, a July 2019 power of attorney authorizing Irwin to act on decedent's behalf, a July 2019 health-care directive naming Irwin as decedent's health-care agent, a July 2019 quitclaim deed transferring decedent's home to Irwin and retaining a life estate for decedent, and a February 2019 beneficiary designation naming Irwin as the sole beneficiary of decedent's investment and retirement accounts. A motion hearing was set for October 26.

Gutierrez did not file a written response to the summary-judgment motion or submit any evidence. Rather, on October 25, she moved for a continuance to secure medical opinion letters that her attorney had been working to obtain "since August, 2022," stating that they would help her "learn and know the truth" whether decedent had capacity when executing her will. She agreed to "drop her objection" if she had not obtained the letters by November 11 or if the letters opined that decedent had capacity.

When November 11 passed without any sign of the opinion letters Gutierrez referenced, the district court denied her motion for a continuance and granted Irwin summary judgment, dismissing Gutierrez's claims.

Gutierrez appeals.

DECISION

Summary judgment is proper if the moving party shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ P. 56.01. When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, they must present admissible evidence "to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions." Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Minn. 2002); see Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03(d) (requiring that affidavits opposing summary judgment set forth facts that would be admissible at trial). They may not "rely upon speculation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine fact issue." Limberg v. Mitchell, 834 N.W.2d 211, 219 (Minn.App. 2013) (quotation omitted). We review de novo whether there are genuine fact issues and whether the district court erred in applying the law. In re Est. of Kinney, 733 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn. 2007). In doing so, we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted." Id.

In granting summary judgment, the district court (1) denied Gutierrez's motion for a continuance, and (2) determined that the record presents no genuine issues of material fact and Irwin is entitled to summary judgment. Gutierrez appears to challenge both aspects of the district court's decision; we address each in turn.^[1]

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance.

A party opposing summary judgment may ask the district court to deny or continue the motion if the party "shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Under this rule, continuances should be liberally granted if the nonmoving party "has been diligent in obtaining or seeking discovery prior to its [continuance] motion, and seeks more discovery in good faith, rather than a mere fishing expedition." Bremer Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Matejcek, 916 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn.App. 2018). We review a district court's decision whether to continue a summary-judgment motion for an abuse of discretion. Id.

The district court denied Gutierrez's continuance motion for two independently sufficient reasons. First, the motion was untimely. Gutierrez was required to file any response to Irwin's motion 14 days before the hearing. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.03(b).

But she waited until the day before the hearing to seek a continuance. Second, the district court found, and Gutierrez does not dispute, that she was not diligent in pursuing discovery, waiting until after the discovery deadline to request what she deemed to be a necessary medical report. The court also noted that Gutierrez did not produce the report by November 11, as she proposed, which the district court reasoned "display[ed] a lack of good faith" and revealed the continuance request to be "a fishing expedition." On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Gutierrez's continuance motion.

II. Irwin is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law.

Irwin moved for summary judgment on the ground that the undisputed evidence shows decedent's will is valid. A will's validity is "self-proved" if it contains the testator's sworn and witnessed statement that they are an adult "of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence," and like statements from the witnesses. Minn. Stat. § 524.2-504 (2022); see In re Est. of Zeno, 672 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn.App. 2003). A person contesting a will bears the burden of...