In re Kuyk

40 N.E.3d 822

In re MARRIAGE OF Charles F.G. KUYK III, Petitioner–Appellee and Kimberly L. Kuyk, n/k/a Kimberly L. Larson, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 2–14–0733.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Sept. 30, 2015.

Randy K. Johnson, Law Office of Randy K. Johnson, West Dundee, for appellant.

Anthony J. Giudice, Shaw, Jacobs, Goostree & Associates, P.C., St. Charles, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This post-decree matter comes before us a second time, although it presents a different issue: whether the parties' dissolution decree, which incorporated their marital settlement agreement (MSA), prevented either party from filing a petition for the review of maintenance. The trial court determined that, under the terms of the MSA, maintenance had terminated before the former wife's review petition was filed and the petition was, therefore, barred. The trial court further found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. We reverse and remand.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Petitioner, Charles F.G. Kuyk III, and respondent, Kimberly L. Kuyk, n/k/a Kimberly L. Larson, were married in 1980. Their marriage resulted in one child, now emancipated.

¶ 4 The trial court dissolved the parties' marriage on April 22, 2009, and the court's dissolution judgment incorporated the parties' MSA. Article 2.2 of the MSA provided:

“Charles shall pay Kimberly maintenance in the sum of $6,200.00 per month for a period of 60 months at which time the maintenance shall be reviewable upon the filing of a petition prior to the termination of the maintenance. In addition, Charles shall pay Kimberly 25% of his annual balance of profits received from Crowe Horwath [ (an accounting firm, where Charles was a partner) ] as and for additional maintenance. These amounts, coupled with the income[-]producing assets/pension described [elsewhere], will provide income to Kimberly in the approximate amount of $152,700 per year.”

The dissolution decree was entered and Charles made his first maintenance payment to Kimberly in April 2009.

¶ 5 In a prior appeal, we held that the trial court correctly interpreted article 2.2 of the MSA as stating that Charles would pay to Kimberly approximately $152,700 per year in maintenance, or approximately $12,725 per month. In re Marriage of Kuyk, 2013 IL App (2d) 120989–U, ¶ 26, 2013 WL 5450768. We also noted the trial court's comment that, to the extent there was any ambiguity in the MSA, it would be construed against Charles since he drafted the agreement. Id. ¶ 14.

¶ 6 Charles made his 60th maintenance payment in April 2014; thereafter, he stopped paying maintenance. In June 2014 Kimberly filed a “Petition for Declaratory Judgment” and a petition to review maintenance. The petitions were largely duplicative, and the trial court considered them together as a single petition for review. We will do the same. Kimberly's review petition asserted that Charles's maintenance obligation remained extant and had not terminated. In response, Charles filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment” and a supporting memorandum, which asserted that his maintenance obligation had “automatically terminated” at the end of the 60–month period. Charles also argued that Kimberly's petition was barred (1) under the MSA, because it was not filed “prior to the expiration of the period of review,” and (2) under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Marriage Act), because Kimberly had not alleged a substantial change in circumstances, a necessary condition to “modify” or restart maintenance (750 ILCS 5/510(a–5) (West 2012)). Further, because maintenance had terminated, according to Charles, under the holding in Rice v. Rice, 173 Ill.App.3d 1098, 123 Ill.Dec. 630, 528 N.E.2d 14 (1988), the trial court lacked “jurisdiction” to entertain Kimberly's review petition.

¶ 7 Following a hearing, the trial court found that maintenance terminated at the end of the 60–month period and that Kimberly's failure to file her review petition within the 60–month period “denied the Court jurisdiction to continue hearing the matter.” The court also entered a written order granting Charles's “Motion for Summary Judgment,” effectively denying the petition. Kimberly appealed.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 As an initial matter, we note that the labels of the parties' pleadings in the trial court, e.g., “summary judgment,” do not control our review. See Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill.2d 95, 102, 267 Ill.Dec. 58, 776 N.E.2d 195 (2002) (the substance of a petition, and not its label, controls its identity). As noted, we construe Kimberly's pleadings as a single petition for review and Charles's motion and memorandum as a response thereto.

¶ 10 This case requires us to consider the parties' MSA and the trial court's jurisdiction. We address jurisdiction first, which we review de novo. Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 2011 IL 111611, ¶ 26, 355 Ill.Dec. 400, 959 N.E.2d 1133. Kimberly contends that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider her review petition even though it was filed after the expiration of the 60–month period. Charles disagrees. He asserts that any order granting Kimberly's petition would be “void” for lack of jurisdiction because it would contravene the MSA and the Marriage Act. Although the parties were not specific in their pleadings (or their appellate briefs), the parties invoke the concept of subject matter jurisdiction, which is the circuit court's inherent power to hear and decide a given case. As noted, Charles relies on Rice v. Rice, 173 Ill.App.3d 1098, 123 Ill.Dec. 630, 528 N.E.2d 14 (1988), for support.

¶ 11 In Rice, as part of the parties' dissolution decree, the trial court ordered the petitioner (former husband) to pay $1,000 monthly maintenance to the respondent (former wife) for a period of 42 months. Twenty-four days after the final maintenance payment, the respondent filed a petition to modify the maintenance award. The trial court denied the petition and the appellate court affirmed, stating, “The respondent's petition to modify the maintenance award * * * was untimely, was filed after payment in full of the maintenance award and after the trial court's jurisdiction to modify the maintenance award had terminated.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1103, 123 Ill.Dec. 630, 528 N.E.2d 14. The Rice court noted that the trial court in the dissolution judgment “did not reserve jurisdiction to review the award of rehabilitative maintenance at the end of the 42 months.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1099, 123 Ill.Dec. 630, 528 N.E.2d 14.

¶ 12 We find Charles's reliance on the jurisdictional language in Rice misplaced. Jurisdiction is a loaded word and, in Rice, it was incorrectly used to suggest that Illinois circuit courts derive their subject matter jurisdiction from statutes, such as the Marriage Act. Under that view, if a party failed to comply with a statutory prerequisite—say, a pleading requirement—that failure seemingly divested the court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case altogether. Rice was by no means alone in making this mistake (see, e.g., City of Marseilles v. Radke, 287 Ill.App.3d 757, 223 Ill.Dec. 181, 679 N.E.2d 125 (1997) ; In re Shaw, 153 Ill.App.3d 939, 106 Ill.Dec. 749, 506 N.E.2d 456 (1987) ), but it is a mistake nonetheless.

¶ 13 Under the state constitution of 1970, excepting administrative review and suits against the State in the Court of Claims (irrelevant here), the circuit court is a court of original jurisdiction over general legal subject matter. See Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill.2d 325, 336, 264 Ill.Dec. 283, 770 N.E.2d 177 (2002) (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9 ). Accordingly, because the circuit court's jurisdiction is of constitutional dimension, it cannot be constrained by a statute, or by a party's compliance with a statute, such as the Marriage Act. See Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill.2d 514, 530, 259 Ill.Dec. 729, 759 N.E.2d 509 (2001) (stating that “a circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction, which need not look to the statute for its jurisdictional authority”). Both the supreme court and this court have expressed this principle in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., McCormick v. Robertson, 2015 IL 118230, 390 Ill.Dec. 142, 28 N.E.3d 795 (child custody); LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, 392 Ill.Dec. 245, 32 N.E.3d 553 (debt collection); In re Luis R., 239 Ill.2d 295, 346 Ill.Dec. 578, 941 N.E.2d 136 (2010) (juvenile delinquency); People v. Glowacki, 404 Ill.App.3d 169, 344 Ill.Dec. 576, 937 N.E.2d 282 (2010) (bond forfeiture); In re Estate of Pellico, 394 Ill.App.3d 1052, 334 Ill.Dec. 12, 916 N.E.2d 45 (2009) (guardianship); In re Andrew B., 386 Ill.App.3d 337, 324 Ill.Dec. 848, 896 N.E.2d 1067 (2008), aff'd, 237 Ill.2d 340, 341 Ill.Dec. 420, 930 N.E.2d 934 (2010) (involuntary commitment).

¶ 14 The only prerequisite to the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction “is whether the asserted claim, legally sufficient or not, was filed in the proper tribunal” (In re Luis R., 239 Ill.2d at 303, 346 Ill.Dec. 578, 941 N.E.2d 136 ), that is, whether it belongs to the class of cases generally heard in the circuit court (In re M.W., 232 Ill.2d 408, 415, 328 Ill.Dec. 868, 905 N.E.2d 757 (2009) (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill.2d at 334, 264 Ill.Dec. 283, 770 N.E.2d 177 )). Here, undoubtedly, issues related to the parties' dissolution and post-decree maintenance were ordinary, justiciable matters for a circuit court to consider. Once Kimberly filed her petition, the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction was triggered and it possessed the authority to adjudicate her claims. See In re Luis R., 239 Ill.2d at 304, 346 Ill.Dec. 578, 941 N.E.2d 136. Put differently, parties may, by agreement, revest the court with jurisdiction (People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 25, 378 Ill.Dec. 591, 4 N.E.3d 474 ), but they may not divest the court of...