In re Kylik C.

179 A.D.3d 1057

114 N.Y.S.3d 711 (Mem)

In the MATTER OF KYLIK C. (Anonymous), Appellant.

2019–04021

Index No. D–2168–18

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted - December 9, 2019

January 29, 2020

Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant.

James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing and Cynthia Kao of counsel), for respondent.

LEONARD B. AUSTIN, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Kylik C. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Richmond County (Helene D. Sacco, J.), dated March 12, 2019. The order of disposition, upon an order of fact-finding of the same court also dated March 12, 2019, made after a hearing, finding that Kylik C. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of menacing in the second degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent and, on consent, conditionally discharged him for a period of 12 months.

ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from the order of fact-finding is deemed to be a premature notice of appeal from the order of disposition (see CPLR 5520[c] ); and it is further;

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

"The evidence supporting a fact-finding in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is legally sufficient if, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, any rational trier of fact could have found the appellant's commission of all the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt" ( Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d 757, 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685 ; see Family Ct Act § 342.2[2] ; Matter of Brandon V., 133 A.D.3d 769, 20 N.Y.S.3d 385 ). The appellant contends that the presentment agency failed to adduce legally sufficient evidence establishing that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of menacing in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review, since he did not raise those claims at the hearing (see Matter of Brandon S., 169 A.D.3d 1047, 92 N.Y.S.3d 903 ; Matter of Jonathan F., 72 A.D.3d 963, 898 N.Y.S.2d 516 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of menacing in the second degree (see Matter of Rene S., 167 A.D.3d 630, 631, 86 N.Y.S.3d 904 ; Matter of Franklin D.U., 161 A.D.3d 878, 879, 73 N.Y.S.3d 448 ; see also Matter of Monay W., 33...