In re Lillyanne D.

215 Conn.App. 61

281 A.3d 521

IN RE LILLYANNE D. et al.^*

AC 45124, (AC 45156)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 18, 2022

Officially released September 1, 2022^**

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 45124 (respondent mother).

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 45156 (respondent father).

Michael J. Besso, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, Claire Kindall, solicitor general, and Evan O'Roark, Jennifer C. Leavitt and Nisa Kahn, assistant attorneys general, for the appellee (petitioner in both appeals).

Kelly L. Babbitt, for the minor child in both appeals.

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Clark, Js.

CLARK, J.

In these two appeals, the respondent mother, Chrystal P., and the respondent father, William D., appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating their parental rights as to their minor child, Richard D.¹ In Docket No. AC 45124, the respondent mother claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence two documents under the residual exception to the rule against hearsay. In Docket No. AC 45156, the respondent father claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) the Department of Children and Families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Richard or, alternatively, that he was unwilling and unable to benefit from those reunification efforts, (2) he had failed to achieve the requisite degree of rehabilitation required by General Statutes § 17a-112 (j), and (3) it would be in Richard's best interest to terminate his parental rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.²

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to both appeals. The department became involved with the respondents in June, 2017, when the respondent mother threatened to harm the respondents’ daughter, Lillyanne D., who, at that time, was less than one year old.³ In July, 2017, the department received another referral after the respondent father called 911 to report that the respondent mother had threatened to harm Lillyanne⁴ and had held Lillyanne tightly across her chest, causing her to cry, during an argument between the respondents. In both instances, the respondent mother had threatened harm to Lillyanne as retribution against the respondent father. As a result of the July, 2017 incident, criminal charges were filed against the respondent mother, and the criminal court issued a full protective order, which prohibited her from having any contact with the respondent father and Lillyanne.⁵ Lillyanne remained in the care of the respondent father, who signed a safety plan with the department in which he agreed to abide by the protective order and to prohibit the respondent mother from having any unsupervised visits with Lillyanne in the event that the protective order was modified.

During its investigation, the department learned that the respondent mother had a history with the department dating to 1997, when her eldest child, Margaret T., was removed from her care following a domestic dispute with Margaret's father, James T. During that incident, the respondent mother reportedly had attacked James with a pen and picked up Margaret, who was five weeks old, by one arm and dangled her in the air twice, stating: "Look what I can do."⁶ The department's files also indicated that the respondent mother had subsequently been involved with Michael T., with whom she had two children. In 2015, the department had received a referral alleging that the respondent mother and Michael had been arrested after getting into a domestic dispute that was witnessed by their children.⁷ When interviewed during the department's investigation into the allegations concerning Lillyanne, Michael indicated that the respondent mother had a history of attempting or threatening to harm one of their children when they were in a relationship.⁸

On October 2, 2017, the criminal protective order was vacated, and the respondent mother moved back into the respondents’ home shortly thereafter. On October 5, 2017, the department learned that the respondent mother was residing in the home and attempted to create a safety plan with the respondents. The respondents declined to implement a safety plan and were informed by the department that the respondent mother's presence in the home placed Lillyanne at risk of removal from their care. The next day, the petitioner filed a motion for an order of temporary custody and a neglect petition on behalf of Lillyanne. The court granted the ex parte order of temporary custody and ordered specific steps for the respondents to take to facilitate their reunification with Lillyanne. The order of temporary custody was sustained by agreement of the parties on October 10, 2017. Lillyanne was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the petitioner on July 9, 2018.

In June, 2019, the respondents’ second child together, Richard, was born. On June 7, 2019, the petitioner filed a motion for an order of temporary custody and a neglect petition as to Richard on the basis of predictive neglect.

That same day, the court granted the order of temporary custody, ordered specific steps with which the respondents were required to comply, and scheduled a contested hearing. Richard was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the petitioner on June 21, 2019. On October 8, 2019, the petitioner filed termination of parental rights petitions as to both Lillyanne and Richard, which alleged that the respondents had failed to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j).⁹ The termination of parental rights trial was held on July 12, 13, 15 and 16, 2021.

In a memorandum of decision dated September 17, 2021, the court granted the termination petitions. In the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings, it initially found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children had been adjudicated neglected in prior proceedings, that the department had made reasonable efforts to locate and reunify the children with the respondents, and that the respondents remained unwilling or unable to benefit from the services the department offered. The court further found that the respondents had failed to achieve an appropriate degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the children, they could assume responsible positions in the children's lives. The court's conclusion that the respondents had failed to rehabilitate was predicated on its finding that the respondent mother had resisted efforts to address the key issues underlying her history of threats or acts of violence against her children and had minimized the nature of the events that led to Lillyanne's removal from her care. With respect to the respondent father, the court found that the respondents were unified in their intentions to parent as a couple and that the respondent father had demonstrated an inability to accurately evaluate the risk the respondent mother poses to the children.

In the dispositional phase of the proceedings, the court made findings as to each of the criteria set forth in § 17a-112 (k) and concluded that the termination of the respondents’ parental rights would be in the best interests of Lillyanne and Richard. Accordingly, the court appointed the petitioner as the statutory parent of the children. These appeals followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

IAC 45124

The respondent mother claims that the court improperly admitted into evidence two documents under the residual exception to the rule against hearsay and that the admission of those documents constituted harmful error because the court could not have reached the decision to terminate her parental rights as to Richard in the absence of the information contained within those documents. Without deciding whether the challenged documents fall within any of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay, we conclude that the admission of the documents, even if improper, was harmless.¹⁰

The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to the disposition of the respondent mother's claim.¹¹ At the termination trial, the petitioner offered testimony from two witnesses and presented ten exhibits, all of which the court admitted into evidence in full. Relevant to this appeal, the court admitted a social study and an addendum to the social study (addendum), which were authored by Jennifer L. Andrews, a department social worker assigned to the respondents’ case, who testified at trial. Both the social study, dated September 10, 2019, and the addendum, dated June 24, 2021, were admitted into evidence without objection.

The social study outlines, among other things, the observations and assessments of United Services, Inc. (USI), staff members, who worked with the respondents in 2018 when they participated in two reunification programs, Therapeutic Family Time and Reunification and Therapeutic Family Time (reunification program(s)).¹² Following each reunification program that the respondents participated in, USI staff members authored a summary report (summaries), both of which are the subjects of the respondent mother's claim on appeal.

In the social study, Andrews noted that the USI staff members had reported the following concerns with respect to the respondent mother: her inappropriate tone in regard to her interactions with Lillyanne; her poor reception of feedback and suggestions made by staff members; a continued lack of insight into the circumstances that led to Lillyanne's removal from her care; and her statements indicating that, after the department was no longer involved with the family, she would parent her children in the manner she saw fit. It was also noted that the USI staff members had concluded that the respondent mother was unwilling...