In re M.

237 A.3d 190

IN RE Involuntary COMMITMENT OF M.

Docket: Kno-19-385

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted On Briefs: June 25, 2020

Decided: July 16, 2020

David Paris, Esq., Bath, for appellant M.

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Margaret E. Machaiek, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

HORTON, J.

[¶1] M. appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Knox County, Mallonee, J. ) affirming the order of the District Court (Rockland, Sparaco, D.C.J. ) committing M. to involuntary hospitalization for up to 120 days. See 34-B M.R.S. § 3864 (2020). M. argues that the absence of a complete transcript of the commitment hearing deprives her of due process and that the court's findings are not supported by evidence in the record.¹ We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] In March 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition for M.’s involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital. See 34-B M.R.S. §§ 3863(5-A)(B), 3864(1) (2020). The court appointed counsel for M. and, on April 8, 2019, held a hearing on the petition. At M.’s request, the court held the hearing at Penobscot Bay Medical Center, where she was receiving treatment. See id. § 3864(5)(B). The court arranged for the audio of the hearing to be transmitted simultaneously by telephone to the courthouse, where the audio of the proceeding was recorded using the court's electronic recording system. See id. § 3864(5)(G).

[¶3] During the hearing, M.’s treating physician and the court-appointed psychiatric examiner testified in support of the Department's petition. See id. § 3864(5)(F). The examiner also prepared a written report based on her interview with M. See id. § 3864(4). M. testified against an involuntary commitment.

[¶4] At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) M. is mentally ill and that her mental illness poses a "[l]ikelihood of serious harm," as that term is defined in 34-B M.R.S. § 3801(4-A) (2020) ; (2) there are no adequate community resources for M.’s care and treatment; (3) inpatient hospitalization is the best available means for M.’s treatment; and (4) the Department had presented a satisfactory individual treatment plan. See id. § 3864(6)(A). Based on these findings, the court authorized M.’s hospitalization for up to 120 days. See id. § 3864(7).

[¶5] M. filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court. See id. § 3864(11); 4 M.R.S. § 105(3)(B)(4) (2020) ; M.R. Civ. P. 76D. When the transcript of the hearing was filed, it contained many instances of the word "indiscernible" in parentheses, indicating that the transcriber could not determine from the recording what words were spoken.² M. did not move to rectify the indiscernible portions of the transcript, despite the existence of procedural rules for doing so. See M.R. Civ. P. 76F(b), 76H(e)(4).

[¶6] The Superior Court (Mallonee, J. ) affirmed the District Court's (Sparaco, D.C.J. ) judgment, and M. timely appealed to us, see M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

[¶7] Given the numerous indiscernible words and phrases in the audio recording and the transcript, we sua sponte ordered the parties to prepare a statement of the evidence pursuant to M.R. App. P. 5(d). Our order had the stated purpose of "improv[ing] the completeness and accuracy of the District Court record to the maximum extent possible." We expressly permitted the parties, as necessary, to "use the existing transcript as a source of information," "obtain information from witnesses or others present at the hearing," and "consult with the District Court itself."

[¶8] The parties submitted a Rule 5(d) statement to the District Court. See M.R. App. P. 5(d)(3). This statement was slightly more than one page in length and summarized the testimony at the hearing in three short paragraphs, without attempting to address or clarify any of the indiscernible portions of the audio recording and transcript. The court approved the statement, and it became part of the record on appeal. See id. M. did not object to the statement of the evidence approved by the court, and M. does not argue on appeal that the statement is deficient or inaccurate.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶9] M. argues that the State's inability to provide a complete transcript of her commitment hearing deprives her of due process and that the record contains insufficient evidence to support the court's findings. Before reaching these contentions, we consider whether M.’s appeal is moot given that she is no longer subject to involuntary commitment pursuant to the order she challenges on appeal.

A. Mootness

[¶10] The court authorized M.’s involuntary commitment for up to 120 days, beginning on April 8, 2019. Therefore, the order expired no later than August 6, 2019, and we must dismiss M.’s appeal as moot unless an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Cf. In re Steven L. , 2014 ME 1, ¶¶ 5-9, 86 A.3d 5 (dismissing an appeal from an order of admission to a progressive treatment program because the order had expired and no mootness exception applied).

[¶11] Our mootness doctrine is well established in the context of involuntary commitment proceedings:

Because the term of [M.’s] involuntary commitment has expired, [her] appeal should be dismissed as moot unless one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine is present. The collateral consequences exception allows the review of a controversy where sufficient collateral consequences result from the appealed matter so as to justify relief. The public interest exception permits questions of great public interest to be addressed to guide the bar and public. A third exception allows the review of matters that are repeatedly presented to trial courts, but they are of such short duration that they escape appellate review.

In re Walter R. , 2004 ME 77, ¶ 9, 850 A.2d 346 (citations omitted).

[¶12] When the court determines that an order of involuntary commitment is warranted, it "may order commitment to a psychiatric hospital for a period not to exceed 4 months in the first instance and not to exceed one year after the first and all subsequent hearings."

34-B M.R.S. § 3864(7). Accordingly, there is a significant collateral consequence that results from an individual's first involuntary commitment pursuant to section 3864, and we will reach the merits of M.’s appeal, even though the court's order has expired, if this is M.’s first time being subjected to involuntary hospitalization. See In re Walter R. , 2004 ME 77, ¶¶ 9-11, 850 A.2d 346.

[¶13] There is some evidence in the record suggesting that M. was hospitalized about thirty-three years ago. However, the Department did not seek to have M. committed for more than four months, and the court stated at the end of the hearing that it "will authorize the 120 days. That's the maximum without coming back to court. " (Emphasis added.) Implicit in the court's statement is a finding that M. has not previously been subject to involuntary commitment. Based on the record before it—which contained only cursory references to any previous instances of M.’s hospitalization—the court's finding is not clearly erroneous. We defer to that finding, see Gould v. A-1 Auto, Inc. , 2008 ME 65, ¶ 6, 945 A.2d 1225, and we will reach the merits of M.’s appeal pursuant to the collateral consequences exception, see In re Walter R. , 2004 ME 77, ¶¶ 9-11, 850 A.2d 346.

B. Due Process

[¶14] M. argues that she has been denied due process and a fair appeal because there is no verbatim transcript of her commitment hearing.

[¶15] The absence of a complete and accurate transcript of trial court proceedings creates the risk of an erroneous deprivation of life, liberty, or property because an appellate court may be unable to recognize prejudicial error in the trial court's procedure or decision without the benefit of a complete record. Accordingly, the absence of a complete transcript implicates due process. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 332-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (reviewing procedural due process considerations); State v. Milliken , 2010 ME 1, ¶¶ 12-17, 985 A.2d 1152 (discussing due process in the context of a challenge to the State's failure to provide a complete transcript for appeal).

[¶16] In this instance, the gaps in the transcript result from the muffled audio recording of the commitment hearing.³ For example, the transcript contains the following exchange between the Department's attorney and the court-appointed psychiatric examiner:

Q: [M.’s treating physician] recommended (indiscernible) does approve the application?

A: I think [M.’s treating physician] may be sensible for the patient in terms of the way that I understand it. I'm involved in getting to people. I haven't—I did not see any implication of (indiscernible) to engage in treatment.

Q: (Indiscernible). I'm suggesting also, if there was a referral to (indiscernible). What is your recommendation for today as far as the recommended plan (indiscernible).

A: (Indiscernible).

Q: Are there any other aspects (indiscernible) your recommendation today?

A: (Indiscernible).

[¶17] These and other shortcomings in the transcript do not, in and of themselves, however, establish a violation of M.’s right to due process. A litigant is not denied due process if she fails to take advantage of available procedural mechanisms that are designed to protect against an erroneous deprivation of life, liberty, or property. See In re A.M. , 2012 ME 118, ¶¶ 23-27, 55 A.3d 463 (concluding that a parent was not denied due process by her inability to attend a termination of parental rights hearing given that "[s]he made no effort to seek relief through [other] means" despite "the availability of procedural mechanisms designed to safeguard [her] right[s]"); see also Putnam v. Albee , 1999 ME 44, ¶ 8, 726 A.2d 217 ("[T]he inability of a party to obtain a transcript may be a proper basis...