In re M.G.

86 Cal.App.5th 1004

302 Cal.Rptr.3d 766

IN RE M.G. on Habeas Corpus.

H050341

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

Filed December 22, 2022

Attorney for Petitioner M.G., Brandon L. Li, Office of the Public Defender, Santa Clara County

Attorneys for Real Party in Interest Crestwood Center San Jose, Alan L. Martini, Sheuerman, Martini, Tabari & Garvin, San Jose

Attorneys for Public Guardian of Santa Clara County, Allen Brandt, Office of the County Counsel, Santa Clara County

Grover, J. Petitioner M.G. was detained in a locked behavioral health facility under the authority of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5250. That law allows for temporary detention of up to 14 days when a person poses a danger to self or others because of a mental disorder and is unwilling to accept treatment. A companion statute, Welfare and Institutions Code section 5276, provides for prompt judicial review: within two judicial days of a detainee's request, the superior court must hold an evidentiary hearing to decide whether the detention is warranted. M.G. requested a hearing but the superior court did not hold it within two judicial days. M.G. then petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus ordering her release.

We conclude Welfare and Institutions Code section 5276 imposes a mandatory duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing within two judicial days of a detained person's request; failure to do so requires that the detainee be immediately released. Although we therefore find petitioner's contention has merit, we will deny the petition as moot because petitioner has already been released.

I. BACKGROUND

Welfare and Institutions Code section 5000, et seq., (the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act) provides a procedure for temporarily detaining a person who poses a danger because of a mental health disorder. The Act is intended to protect public safety while preventing indefinite involuntary commitment of people afflicted with a mental disorder, safeguarding the rights of the mentally ill through judicial review. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5001, subds. (a) – (d) ; unspecified statutory references are to this code.)

To achieve its aims, the law provides for gradually increasing periods of temporary confinement with an opportunity at each step to determine whether further confinement is necessary. If a mentally ill person presents a danger to self or others, a law enforcement officer can take the person into custody for placement at a state approved facility for evaluation and treatment up to 72 hours. (§ 5150, subd. (a).) If the evaluation conducted during that time determines the detainee remains a danger but is not willing to accept treatment, the person may be involuntarily confined for an additional 14 days of intensive treatment and the detainee has a right to seek judicial review by petition to the superior court for release through a writ of habeas corpus. ( § 5250, subd. (a) ; § 5275.) Given that the maximum confinement period at that point is limited to 14 calendar days, the superior court must "order an evidentiary hearing to be held within two judicial days after the petition is filed." ( § 5276.)

If the court finds the detainee does not meet the statutory criteria for involuntary detention, he or she must be ordered released. ( § 5276.) Otherwise, the detention can continue and an additional 30-day detention may commence at the end of the 14-day period. (§ 5270.15.) On recommendation of a treating professional, a person certified for intensive treatment can then be subject to temporary or permanent conservatorship proceedings. (§§ 5352.1, 5361.)

In this case, M.G. was detained in August 2022 for the 14-day confinement allowed by section 5250. The 14-day period was set to expire September 4. On August 26, a Friday, M.G. petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus ordering her release on the ground that she was not mentally disordered, gravely disabled, or a danger to anyone. An evidentiary hearing on the petition was set for the following Tuesday, August 30. Because M.G. is hearing impaired, she requested two sign language interpreters for that hearing: an American Sign Language interpreter and a certified deaf interpreter. Relay interpreting using both interpreters was necessary for M.G. to understand the proceedings and communicate with her counsel.

When the hearing was convened on M.G.'s habeas corpus petition, the court informed the parties that neither interpreter was available that day. The hearing was continued for two days, to Thursday, September 1. The superior court reasoned that due process requires M.G. be assisted by an interpreter, and the unavailability of an interpreter constituted good cause to continue the hearing beyond the two-day statutory timeframe.

On August 31, M.G. petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus granting her release. We ordered the facility where she was detained to show cause why the relief should not be granted. After we issued the order to show cause, counsel notified us M.G. had been released. Since we cannot grant the relief requested in M.G.'s habeas corpus petition—release from confinement—we must deny her petition as moot. We nonetheless elect to decide the question here despite its technical mootness. The statutory interpretation issue presented is one of first impression. And because the associated temporary confinement can last at most 14 days, a challenge to its propriety will routinely evade appellate review. (See In re Webb (2019) 7 Cal.5th 270, 273, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 107, 440 P.3d 1129 [appropriate to decide moot question where important to provide guidance in future cases and where the question will consistently evade review].)

II. DISCUSSION

M.G. asserts her continued confinement was unlawful because the superior court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing within two judicial days of her August 26 request. She argues that under section 5276, the court was required to either conduct an evidentiary hearing within the specified timeframe or release her from custody. She argues postponing the hearing, even for good cause, is not an option authorized by the Legislature.

To determine whether M.G. is correct, we look to the language of the statute, which in this case is clear and unambiguous. ( MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1083, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 650 [words of the statute are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent; if they are clear and unambiguous their plain, commonsense meaning controls and no further interpretation is required].) Because involuntary detention, even for a relatively short period, directly infringes personal freedom, we strictly construe statutory provisions intended to protect a detained person's liberty interests. ( Edward W. v. Lamkins (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 516, 530-531, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.)

Section 5276 provides, in relevant part, that when a detainee pursues judicial review of a 14-day intensive treatment detention, "[t]he court shall either release the person or order an evidentiary hearing to be held within two judicial days after the petition is filed." The language is clear: upon the filing of a petition, the court shall either (1) conduct an evidentiary hearing within two judicial days; or (2) release the petitioner. No other action is allowed, including a good cause continuance beyond the statutory deadline.

The treatment facility reads the statute to mean that as long as a hearing date has been set to occur within two judicial days of a petition's filing, the court has complied with the statute, even if the hearing ultimately occurs outside the two-day timeframe. As practical as that interpretation may be, the statutory...