In re M.M.V.

469 P.3d 556

IN RE the Petition of M.M.V., Appellee,

for the Adoption of D.D.R., a Child, and Concerning B.P.R., Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 19CA0759

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division IV.

Announced June 11, 2020

Melinda B. Orendorff, Pueblo, Colorado, for Appellee

Beltz & West, P.C., Daniel A. West, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR

¶ 1 In this stepparent adoption proceeding, B.P.R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court judgment terminating his parental rights and decreeing the adoption of his child, D.D.R., by M.M.V. (stepfather). We must decide an issue that has not yet been addressed in Colorado — does the Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), sections 14-13-101 to - 403, C.R.S. 2019, govern the termination of parental rights that is initiated in a stepparent adoption case? We conclude that the answer is yes.

¶ 2 We further conclude that the record does not establish that the magistrate properly acquired subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA before terminating father's parental rights. As a result, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. The Juvenile Court Proceeding

¶ 3 The child was born to K.E.V. (mother) and father in 2007. About six years later, a court in Arizona issued an order that dissolved the parents' marriage and allocated decision-making authority and parenting time for the child. As part of the same case, the Arizona court later issued orders (1) placing restrictions on father's parenting time; (2) awarding visitation to the paternal grandparents; and (3) authorizing mother to move with the child to Colorado.

¶ 4 Meanwhile, mother married stepfather. And, in February 2018, stepfather filed two petitions, one to adopt the child and one to terminate the child's legal relationship with father. Father moved to dismiss the petitions under the UCCJEA and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1738A (2018), arguing that because the Arizona court that had made the prior child-custody determinations had not declined jurisdiction, the Colorado court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.

¶ 5 Soon thereafter, mother asked the Arizona court to decline to exercise its continuing jurisdiction over decision-making authority and parenting time for the child. Although mother's motion informed the Arizona court that a Colorado court had a pending proceeding to sever father's rights and allow stepfather to adopt the child, it does not appear that she filed a copy of the petitions from this case. After reviewing pleadings from mother and father, the Arizona court determined that the child no longer had a significant connection with the state and that substantial evidence regarding the child's care was no longer available in the state. As a result, it granted mother's request and declined its continuing jurisdiction. And, based on that order, the magistrate in stepfather's case determined that the Colorado court had jurisdiction to hear the petitions for termination and stepparent adoption.

¶ 6 However, in early September 2018, the Arizona court partially reconsidered its determination. By the agreement of the parties to that case — father, mother, and the paternal grandparents — the Arizona court determined that it would retain jurisdiction over the grandparents' visitation rights and severed that issue into a separate case.

¶ 7 Not long after, the magistrate held a hearing on stepfather's petitions to terminate father's rights and adopt the child. At the start of the hearing, father raised the issue of the reconsideration order and objected to the magistrate exercising jurisdiction because it meant two states would be determining child-custody issues. The magistrate determined that the Colorado court had jurisdiction, but also said that it was a significant issue that the parties needed to address as part of their proposed orders.

¶ 8 Following the two-day hearing, the magistrate issued a thorough order addressing the Colorado court's jurisdiction to hear the proceeding under the UCCJEA and the PKPA. The magistrate reasoned that termination and stepparent adoption were a single proceeding and the UCCJEA did not apply to adoption proceedings. The magistrate further observed that even if the UCCJEA was applicable, the Arizona court's reconsideration order was entered without jurisdiction because the magistrate had already begun exercising the Colorado court's jurisdiction by that time. Thereafter, the magistrate terminated father's parental rights and granted the decree of adoption.

II. Jurisdiction Over Proceeding

¶ 9 Father contends that the magistrate lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and the PKPA to terminate his parental rights because the Arizona court had previously entered a child-custody determination and had, at the time of the termination proceeding, retained jurisdiction over grandparent visitation. To resolve this issue, we must first decide a preliminary question that the magistrate also addressed — whether the UCCJEA governs a proceeding to terminate parental rights that arises in the context of a stepparent adoption. Contrary to the magistrate's determination, we conclude that the UCCJEA is applicable under those circumstances and that the record does not demonstrate that the magistrate had properly acquired jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to consider the termination of parental rights.

A. Standard of Review and Interpretation Principles

¶ 10 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People in Interest of L.M. , 2018 CO 34, ¶ 13, 416 P.3d 875. In construing a statute, we look at the entire statutory scheme "in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts, and we apply words and phrases in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings." Id. (quoting UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark Towers Ass'n , 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 836 ).

¶ 11 And, when construing statutes related to the same subject matter, we aim to avoid a statutory interpretation that would render certain words or provisions superfluous or ineffective. Id. We also avoid a statutory construction that would lead to an absurd result. Id. Instead, we aim to adopt an interpretation that achieves consistency across a comprehensive statutory scheme. Id.

B. Statutory Frameworks

1. Stepparent Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights

¶ 12 Under the Colorado Children's Code, a child may be available for stepparent adoption when the parent has abandoned the child or failed without cause to provide reasonable support for a period of one year or more. § 19-5-203(1)(d)(II), C.R.S. 2019; D.P.H. v. J.L.B. , 260 P.3d 320, 324 (Colo. 2011). Alternatively, a parent having only residual parental responsibilities may consent to the child's adoption by the spouse of the parent who has primary custody or parental responsibilities. § 19-5-203(1)(e).

¶ 13 Still, there are two distinct components that arise during a stepparent adoption case. In addition to issuing a final decree of adoption, the juvenile court must also issue an order terminating the noncustodial parent's rights. § 19-5-210(6), C.R.S. 2019; see also D.P.H. , 260 P.3d at 323 (recognizing that a stepparent adoption necessarily includes the termination of the parental rights of the noncustodial parent). Although both the decree and termination judgment are issued in the same case, they are separate orders. See In re E.R.S. , 2019 COA 40, ¶ 21, 452 P.3d 174 (concluding that the juvenile court's order terminating mother's parental rights in a stepparent adoption proceeding was final for appellate purposes even though the court had not issued the adoption decree).

¶ 14 In addition to being a distinct component of the stepparent adoption process, termination of parental rights is particularly significant because it permanently severs a constitutionally protected fundamental liberty interest. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of a parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child. Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) ; see also In Interest of Baby A , 2015 CO 72, ¶ 20, 363 P.3d 193. It is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court. Troxel , 530 U.S. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054. And it is an interest far more precious than any property right. Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

¶ 15 Termination of parental rights is defined as the permanent elimination of all parental rights and duties, including residual rights and responsibilities. § 19-1-103(107), C.R.S. 2019. It is complete, final, and irrevocable. In Interest of K.D. , 471 S.W.3d 147, 167 (Tex. App. 2015). As a result, termination permanently severs the parent's fundamental liberty interest in parenting his or her child.

2. The UCCJEA

¶ 16 The UCCJEA was promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission for the key purpose of creating consistency in interstate child-custody jurisdiction and enforcement proceedings. Angel B. v. Vanessa J. , 234 Ariz. 69, 316 P.3d 1257, 1259-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). It has now been adopted in forty-nine states as well as the District of Columbia. Linda Elrod, Unif. Law Comm'n Joint Editorial Bd. of Unif. Family Law, Commentary on Adoption Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA 7, 9 (2019), https://perma.cc/6TYE4SJZ.

¶ 17 The primary aim of the UCCJEA is to prevent competing and conflicting custody orders by courts in different jurisdictions that would put all parties at risk of uncertainty and unilateral removals of children from or to various jurisdictions. Angel B. , 316 P.3d at 1260. Put another way, the UCCJEA is designed to avoid jurisdictional competition over child-custody matters in an increasingly mobile society. Brandt v. Brandt , 2012 CO 3, ¶ 19, 268 P.3d 406. To effectuate this purpose, it establishes a comprehensive framework...