In re Marriage of L.S.

1

In the Matter of the Marriage of L.S., Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and D.J., Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

No. 125,656

Court of Appeals of Kansas

May 31, 2024

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; DAN K. WILEY, judge. Oral argument held October 17, 2023.

Joseph W. Booth, of Lenexa, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Ronald W. Nelson, of Ronald W. Nelson PA, of Overland Park, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before ISHERWOOD, P.J., GREEN and PICKERING, JJ.

ISHERWOOD, J.

This case comes before us with challenges advanced by both parties. The issue D.J. asks us to resolve is whether the district court had the authority to modify the parties' final divorce decree to include what amounted to an interlocutory order for D.J. to pay L.S. nearly two years of temporary child support that was not previously ordered. L.S cross-appealed and first contends that the district court erred when it set aside the relevant portion of the parties' separation agreement pursuant to K.S.A 60-260(b), where the proper vehicle was to simply reform the agreement under K.S.A. 23-3005. She further asserts that the district court failed to go far enough back in time when it backdated D.J.'s child support obligation. Following a careful review of the record and a thorough analysis of the issues alongside guiding legal principles, we conclude the district court employed the proper legal mechanism when it set aside D.J.'s original child support obligation under K.S.A. 60-260(b) following revelations of miscalculations in the child support worksheet. We further find the district court abused its discretion when it entered an order for temporary child support after the conclusion of the litigation. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court and vacate that portion of the child support order that requires D.J. to pay temporary child support from March 2020 through December 2021.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

L.S and D.J. were married in 2005 and shared a 12-year marriage which gifted them with two children. In late 2017, L.S. filed for divorce. Her petition included a domestic relations affidavit (DRA), minus any child support adjustments, and she did not attach a child support worksheet. It also included her affirmative statement that the parties could maintain the status quo during the pendency of the case and, therefore, an order for temporary child support was not warranted. But L.S maintained that financial support for the children would be necessary once the divorce was finalized.

In June 2018, the district court held a hearing on the parties' proposed Parenting Plan, Stipulation, and Property Settlement Agreement. L.S. informed the district court that the parties had reached a settlement agreement on all issues and were ready to proceed with the final hearing. She then provided the district court with a child support worksheet and a proposed divorce decree. When the district court asked D.J. whether this was also his understanding, D.J. responded that he had not seen the settlement agreement and was unsure what its terms entailed. The district court inquired a second time in an effort to clarify whether the parties had truly reached an agreement on all issues. D.J. simply stated, "I gave her whatever she wants." The district court repeated its question a third time and D.J. again replied, "Whatever-I agree with whatever she says." L.S.'s attorney then interjected to note that L.S. provided a copy of the agreement to D.J. on several occasions.

The district court asked D.J. whether he wanted to go forward with the hearing to which D.J. responded, "I'll sign whatever she would like me to sign." The district court explained that it was not attempting to pressure him into proceeding if he was not ready to do so but acknowledged from D.J.'s despondent behavior that he appeared determined to conclude the divorce litigation as quickly as possible.

The district court went forth and accepted testimony from both parties concerning the settlement agreement. L.S. testified that she submitted a child support worksheet requesting $4,077 per month in child support and a lifelong order for maintenance in the amount of $3,748 per month. For his part, D.J. reiterated that he had not read the agreement but understood its provisions primarily favored L.S., which was an outcome he could accept so long as it made her happy.

At the conclusion of the proceeding, the judge declined to approve the proposed agreement, finding that the lifelong maintenance provision bore notes of unconscionability. He clarified that he was not objectively opposed to long-term maintenance agreements but, in this instance, it appeared D.J. was not protecting himself and the court felt compelled to intercede. The judge explained the potential risks of obligating oneself to such prolonged payments and expressed concern about D.J.'s current state of mind and well-being. He set a date for a new hearing and directed the parties to reconsider the length of maintenance, as well as any other conditions or contingencies that would protect their respective interests.

The parties reconvened several weeks later, at which time L.S. was present with her attorney, but D.J. was neither personally present nor did he appear through counsel. L.S. informed the court that the parties modified their settlement agreement, and its current terms contemplated that D.J. would pay monthly maintenance in the amount of $3,748 for a term of 10 years. Additionally, pursuant to the child support worksheet L.S. submitted, D.J. would be responsible for $4,077 in monthly child support with May 1, 2018, set as the start date. The court approved the settlement agreement, adopted its terms as part of the final divorce decree, and filed the decree on July 16, 2018. At that point, L.S.'s counsel withdrew, citing resolution of all matters involved in the case.

Roughly five months later, D.J. retained counsel who requested records and transcripts of the case. Not long after, in February 2019, his attorney filed a motion for relief from judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b) and argued that the divorce decree should be set aside due to material misrepresentations L.S. made about the parties' income and employment to buttress her requested amounts for final maintenance and child support. In support of his contentions, D.J.'s counsel asserted that L.S. did not leave her job as she claimed and, despite the fact she only alleged a monthly income of $1,257 in her child support worksheet, she actually earned far more, with a year-end total of $115,461 for 2018. Counsel for D.J. further noted that L.S. also misrepresented D.J.'s income on that worksheet in asserting that he made an estimated $20,000 per month in 2018 when, in reality, D.J.'s 2018 tax returns reflected that he made only $40,750 for the entire year. Thus, D.J.'s counsel took the position that L.S. intentionally misled the district court in pursuit of the nearly $8,000 she requested in combined monthly maintenance and child support.

L.S. filed a response and denied D.J.'s fraud allegations. She admitted that she did not leave her job but claimed that her plan to resign fell through when D.J. became suicidal after the final hearing. L.S. also acknowledged that the worksheet contained errors regarding the parties' income but claimed her first attorney was solely responsible for those miscalculations. The district court held a two-day hearing on D.J.'s motion and upon its conclusion requested additional briefing from the parties.

Several months later the district court granted D.J.'s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6) and set aside the parties' settlement agreement. In support of its conclusion, the district court reasoned that it should never have approved the child support worksheet because the document mistakenly reversed who was responsible for paying child support and which party was entitled to receive maintenance. Next, the district court determined the maintenance provision was not equitable under the relevant statutory factors once the parties' true incomes were revealed. Finally, it expressed concern with what it perceived to be an inequitable division of property.

In February 2020, three months after the court granted D.J.'s motion to set aside the parties' agreement, L.S. filed a motion for temporary child support accompanied by a revised child support worksheet and domestic relations affidavit. The new worksheet set forth L.S.'s and D.J.'s annual earnings at $100,000 and $240,000, respectively, with a request for $3,097 in monthly child support. In June of that year, the district court held a hearing limited to parenting time issues and noted that it would not entertain any arguments regarding, nor would it decide, the issue of temporary child support that day.

Over a year later, the parties met for a final pretrial conference and the district court approved their pretrial order. That order clarified that neither party was seeking spousal maintenance, expressed their intent to exchange updated domestic relations affidavits, and advised that both parties would file their respective child support worksheets ahead of the final hearing. The parties' order also stated that there were no outstanding pretrial motions at that time and made no mention of temporary child support.

In November 2021, the district court held a final hearing on the issues of property division and child support as set forth in the pretrial order. L.S. informed the district court that she filed a motion for temporary child support which had not been heard yet but did not expressly request a decision. At the end of the hearing, the district court announced that it would take the case under advisement.

The...