In re Marriage of Mrla

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF GEORGE G. MRLA, JR.

AND ANGELA M. MRLA

Upon the Petition of GEORGE G. MRLA, JR., Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning ANGELA M. MRLA, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 19-1222

COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

September 2, 2020

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey A. Neary, Judge.

Angela Mrla appeals from the property division decree entered after trial on remand. Finding no merit in her arguments, we affirm. AFFIRMED.

R. Scott Rhinehart (until withdrawal), Sioux City, and Michelle Lewon of Michelle Lewon, PLC, Sioux City, for appellant.

Rosalynd J. Koob and Joel D. Vos, Sioux City, for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., Mullins, J., and Vogel, S.J.^*

^*Senior judge assigned by order under Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2020).

DOYLE, Presiding Judge.

Angela Mrla and George Mrla were married for about four years before George filed to dissolve the marriage. Angela appealed the first dissolution decree, asserting the property division was inequitable. In re Marriage of Mrla, No. 17-1029, 2018 WL 3057482, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 20, 2018). This court remanded the case for a more detailed evaluation of the couple's assets. Id. at *2. A second trial was held. The district court then entered a thirty-four page property division decree. Faulting the second decree in many respects, Angela again appeals. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the district court's property division decree.

I. Facts and Proceedings.

Our previous opinion sets the stage:

Angela and George married in 2011. Prior to that time, they cohabited along with Angela's two children. During the marriage, George farmed his own land and worked as a self-employed truck driver, a business he started shortly after the parties married. Angela and George separated in 2015.

Id. at *1. George petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in September 2015. The district court entered a decree after a March 2017 trial. Angela appealed the district court's allocation of the couple's property, claiming the district court failed to equitably divide the property. Id.

This court determined the decree was "fatally flawed and incapable of meaningful appellate review." Id. We found that the decree failed to make a determination regarding disputed factual issues and did not identify all the parties' assets and liabilities. Id. The decree valued none of the parties' property. Id. It did not appear to this court that the district court divided all the property at issue. Id. Without an ability to exercise appellate review over the property division, we vacated "the property division in the decree and remand[ed] this matter to the district court to identify the parties' property subject to division, to determine a value for all of the property based on the evidence admitted at trial, and to equitably divide the property." Id. at *2.

On remand, before a different judge, the district court held a new trial and allowed the parties to present new evidence. In June 2019, the district court entered a detailed thirty-four page decree valuing and dividing the parties' properties. The decree included a distribution of assets and liabilities spreadsheet to memorialize the division of property between the parties. It shows Angela's award of marital assets to be $25,278.26 and George's to be $107,743.72. Angela was awarded $19,153.32 in marital debt and George awarded $192,469.26—leaving Angela a net of $6124.94 in marital assets and George with a negative $84,725.54.

Angela now appeals.

II. Standard of review.

We review dissolution actions de novo. See In re Marriage of Larsen, 912 N.W.2d 444, 448 (Iowa 2018); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. We give weight to the decree's factual findings. Id. When it comes to the credibility of witnesses, "[t]here is good reason for us to pay very close attention to the trial court's assessment." In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984). This is because the district court, in making its credibility assessment, has the distinct advantage of listening and observing each witness's demeanor firsthand, while we must rely on a cold transcript. See Albert v. Conger, 886 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016); In re Marriage of Udelhofen, 444 N.W.2d 473, 474 (Iowa 1989). "[W]e accord the trial court considerable latitude in resolving disputed claims and will disturb a ruling 'only when there has been a failure to do equity.'" In re Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

Iowa Code section 598.21(5) requires marital property be divided equitably in dissolution-of-marriage cases. See In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 702 (Iowa 2007). "The partners in a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts," In re Marriage of Hazen, 778 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009), but it "is important to remember marriage does not come with a ledger." In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 2007). In determining how to equitably divide the property, an "equitable division is not necessarily an equal division." Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 702. Though "it is generally recognized that equality is often most equitable," Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 102, "[e]quitable distribution depends upon the circumstances of each case." Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 702.

A. Background.

After George and Angela separated, Angela and her daughter filed two civil suits against George. These suits arose out of certain allegations made by and on behalf of Angela's daughter as well as allegations made by Angela against George. The civil cases did not succeed and were either dismissed voluntarily or by the court. In another matter, Angela reported to a grain company that George was misusing his corn license. She did so because she was mad at George. George hired legal representation to defend himself in these matters and incurred legal fees. To keep Angela's daughter out of the trial, the parties agreed during the second trial that there would be no mention of the other civil cases.

After entry of the property division decree, Angela timely moved to amend and enlarge. Among other things, she complained it was "unfair to force her to pay for one-half (1/2) of George's legal fees for his various misdeeds but then she be responsible for all of hers; when she and her daughter are the victims here." In pointing out that the court noted in its decree that "The civil matters noted above were each unsuccessful and were either dismissed prior to judgment voluntarily or by the Court and the Monsanto matter was initiated by Angela because she was mad at George," Angela claimed the district court improperly "considered fault to justify its ruling." Angela filed a supplemental motion to amend and enlarge, which was found to be untimely.¹

B. Fault

Angela's arguments on appeal are a bit difficult to follow.² On the one hand, she contends the "trial court clearly considered fault in its ruling and should not have considered fault."³ On the other hand, in an apparent tit-for-tat, Angelaargues if fault is a factor, the district court should have considered fault on some other issues where she claims George engaged in misdeeds. Angela then contends that if fault is not a factor, she should not have to pay half of George's promissory notes and that George should compensate her for items he allegedly burned.

The parties agreed they would not get into fault at trial. In fact, Angela's attorney specifically asked the court to omit such testimony as shown in this colloquy:

MR. RHINEHART: Yes, Your Honor. I didn't want to interrupt earlier. We had a conversation yesterday about fault in a divorce case.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RHINEHART: And I think we have assurances from counsel that we are not going to get into fault in this case, and so I had my client's daughter, . . . , here. She is not intended to be called as a witness unless the assurances of opposing counsel fail and people start blurting out things that are not to be admitted in the case. So my point is I would prefer to have her sit in here because I don't expect to call her as a witness at all . . . .

The district court did not hear any evidence about the matters from the civil suit involving the daughter. Angela raised the issue post-decree when she asked the court to consider another judge's ruling on the civil case. Asking the court to consider new evidence in an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion is improper. Homan v. Branstad 887 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Iowa 2016). In any event, Angela does not challenge the district court's denial of her motion to amend and enlarge.

We find no merit in Angela's claims that the district court should have made George compensate her for items he allegedly burned. She claimed the items were worth $5000. But just saying a cow has three legs does not make it so. The district court found that because there was no evidence of age or condition of these items to value them, "Angela's claim for the loss of these items fails for lack of proof." We agree.

Of the debt awarded to George, $85,000 was in promissory notes for money George borrowed to pay legal fees in matters unrelated to the dissolution of marriage. Angela claims this promissory note debt should not have been considered a marital debt to be shared by the parties. Angela is mistaken when she alleges that the district court ordered her to pay half of George's attorney fees related to the civil cases and the Monsanto matter. The court determined

that the obligations incurred by George as noted above, except for those obligations related to attorney fees in this dissolution matter, should be considered as marital debt for purposes of division of assets and liabilities and because they are each supported by a promissory note, executed by George alone, they should be paid by George.

There is nothing in the decree—by equalization payment, property division, or otherwise—that obligates Angela to pay, directly or indirectly, half of...