In re Mason

493 Mass. 148

222 N.E.3d 1082

In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF Frances R. MASON.

SJC-13439

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable.

Argued September 13, 2023

Decided December 13, 2023

Christine Fimognari, Assistant Attorney General, for Executive Office of Health and Human Services.

Matthew J. Dupuy, West Yarmouth, for the petitioner.

Patricia Keane Martin, Wellesley, Clarence D. Richardson, Jr., & C. Alex Hahn, for the Massachusetts Chapter of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Brian E. Barreira, Plymouth, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

WENDLANDT, J.

Through a cooperative Federal and State regulatory scheme, eligible Massachusetts residents (members) may have their medical costs covered by the State-administered health insurance program for low-income residents (MassHealth), which is overseen by the Executive Office of Health and Human Services (EOHHS).¹ Under this regulatory scheme, MassHealth is prohibited from recovering Medicaid benefits it has paid except in the case of certain categories of members. And even with regard to these members, MassHealth generally is prohibited from commencing recoupment efforts before a member's death and must seek recovery only from the member's probate estate.

In limited circumstances, however, Federal and State statutes permit MassHealth to act during the member's lifetime. Relevant here, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p and G. L. c. 118E, § 34, permit MassHealth to impose a lien prior to a member's death (TEFRA lien² ) against the member's property if the member is permanently institutionalized, having been admitted to a medical facility from which she is not reasonably expected to return home. If, while living in the facility, the member sells the property against which MassHealth has imposed a TEFRA lien, MassHealth may seek to recover Medicaid benefits paid, so long as protections for certain of the member's relatives are not applicable. See G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (d ). In other words, in this limited circumstance, MassHealth need not wait until the member's death to recoup Medicaid benefits paid.

This case presents the question whether, in Massachusetts, the Legislature has limited the State's implementation of the TEFRA lien program to allow enforcement of a TEFRA lien only if the encumbered property is sold during the member's lifetime. We conclude that it has.

Separate from MassHealth's authority to enforce a TEFRA lien during a member's lifetime, MassHealth may assert a timely claim against a member's probate estate to seek to recover Medicaid expenses after the member's death. The timing of such a claim presents the second question we must address in this case: whether the three-year statute of repose of the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (MUPC), G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108, applies retroactively to bar MassHealth's claim to recoup Medicaid benefits paid for the medical care of a member who died prior to the effective date of the MUPC. We conclude that it does not.

Applying these conclusions in the present matter, we affirm the order of the Probate and Family Court judge insofar as it struck MassHealth's lien against the home of the decedent, Frances R. Mason, who was permanently institutionalized in a medical facility in the last months of her life, and we reverse the order insofar as it dismissed MassHealth's claim against her estate.³

1. Factual background. The relevant facts are undisputed. From January to August 2008, MassHealth provided Medicaid funds to cover Mason's care in a residential nursing facility. On May 2, 2008, MassHealth, having determined that Mason would be institutionalized permanently, recorded a TEFRA lien against Mason's home in South Yarmouth (property). As expected, Mason lived her remaining days in the facility, and on August 18, 2008, Mason died testate,⁴ at the age of eighty-eight. The property was not sold during Mason's lifetime while it was subject to the TEFRA lien.

2. Procedural history. In June 2017, nearly nine years after Mason's death, Maryann Fells (petitioner), the named executor of Mason's will, filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court to open formal probate proceedings to settle Mason's estate.⁵ A personal representative was appointed, and the personal representative's bond was approved on July 20, 2018.

The petition and Mason's death certificate were sent to MassHealth.⁶ On August 13, 2018, MassHealth filed a notice of claim to recover the Medicaid benefits paid for Mason's care.⁷ On September 27, 2021, the property was sold, and the proceeds of the sale were held in escrow.

The personal representative did not object to MassHealth's claim;⁸ however, the petitioner filed a motion to strike both MassHealth's lien against the property and MassHealth's claim against Mason's estate.⁹ On March 4, 2022, the judge allowed the motion. She concluded that the TEFRA lien against the property became invalid upon Mason's death because the property had not been sold "during her lifetime," which the judge determined was required to trigger MassHealth's right to enforce the lien. In addition, the judge ruled that, although Mason died before the effective date of the MUPC, MassHealth's claim against Mason's estate was barred by the MUPC's three-year statute of repose, G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108 (4). MassHealth timely appealed. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

3. Discussion. This case presents two questions of statutory construction, which we review de novo. Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 331, 173 N.E.3d 333 (2021).¹⁰ First, we address whether a TEFRA lien that has been imposed against a permanently institutionalized member's home is enforceable after the member's death. Second, we consider whether the MUPC's three-year statute of repose applies to MassHealth's claim for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of a member who died prior to the MUPC's effective date.

In construing a statute, we begin with its plain language. Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc., 492 Mass. 676, 681, 214 N.E.3d 1043 (2023).

"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated" (citation omitted).

Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749, 840 N.E.2d 518 (2006). "Ordinarily, where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent." Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586, 594, 106 N.E.3d 661 (2018), quoting Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008). "Where the statutory language is not conclusive, we may ‘turn to extrinsic sources, including the legislative history and other statutes, for assistance in our interpretation.’ " HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 332-333, 190 N.E.3d 485 (2022), quoting Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket County, 437 Mass. 430, 435, 772 N.E.2d 578 (2002). We "look to the statutory scheme as a whole ... so as to produce an internal consistency within the statute" (quotations and citations omitted). Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 605, 135 N.E.3d 702 (2019).

We construe "[a] properly promulgated regulation ... in the same manner as a statute." Harvard Crimson, Inc., 445 Mass. at 749, 840 N.E.2d 518. Where an agency construes a statute, "[w]e give deference to agency interpretations in areas where the Legislature has delegated decision-making authority to the agency when the ‘interpretation is not contrary to the plain language of the statutes or their underlying purposes.’ " Metcalf, 492 Mass. at 681, 214 N.E.3d 1043, quoting Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 533, 895 N.E.2d 1277 (2008). However, deference is "not abdication, and this court will not hesitate to overrule agency interpretations of statutes or rules when those interpretations are arbitrary or unreasonable." Armstrong v. Secretary of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, 490 Mass. 243, 247, 189 N.E.3d 1212 (2022), quoting Moot v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 448 Mass. 340, 346, 861 N.E.2d 410 (2007), S.C., 456 Mass. 309, 923 N.E.2d 81 (2010).

a. Enforcement of a TEFRA lien after the member's death. With these principles in mind, we turn to the first question on appeal: whether, having placed a TEFRA lien against the property of a member who is permanently institutionalized, MassHealth may enforce the TEFRA lien after the member's death. Because TEFRA liens are creatures of Federal and State statutes, our analysis begins with a review of these statutes. See, e.g., City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 784, 119 N.E.3d 735 (2019) (analyzing statute governing mechanic's liens to resolve dispute involving mechanic's lien); Drummer Boy Homes Ass'n v. Britton, 474 Mass. 17, 47 N.E.3d 400 (2016) (analyzing statute governing condominium liens to resolve dispute involving condominium lien); Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 910 N.E.2d 330 (2009) (analyzing statute governing attorney's liens to resolve dispute involving attorney's lien); Luchini v. Commissioner of Revenue, 436 Mass. 403, 764 N.E.2d 870 (2002) (analyzing statute governing tax lien to resolve dispute involving tax lien). i. Statutory framework. The Federal Medicaid Act¹¹ "created a cooperative State and Federal program to provide medical assistance to individuals who cannot afford to pay for their own medical costs." Daley v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 477 Mass. 188, 189, 74 N.E.3d 1269 (2017). The act, and regulations promogulated under it by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS...