In re Mays

1

IN THE MATTER OF FORREST MAYS, ET AL.

No. 2165-2022

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

September 10, 2024

UNREPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND ^[*]

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No C-02-CV-22-000730

Graeff, Nazarian, Woodward, Patrick, L., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION

Woodward, J. Laura Townsend, appellant, appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County approving the decision of the City of Annapolis Planning Commission ("the Commission") to allow the construction of The Village at Providence Point ("the Village"), a mixed-use retirement community in the City of Annapolis. Specifically, appellant asserts that the Commission erred in deciding that the Village is not subject to the City of Annapolis Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit ("MPDU") ordinance, which requires that a certain number of units in new subdivisions be affordable.^[1] As we shall explain, we hold that appellant does not have standing to bring this appeal. Accordingly, we will dismiss the instant appeal.

BACKGROUND

On July 25, 2017, Katherine Properties, Inc., Katherine Properties, LLC, AIC Forest, LLC, AIC Forest II, LLC, Campus Drive, LLC, EAJ Forest Drive, LLC, 1623 Forest, LLC, and The Village at Providence Point, Inc. (collectively, the "Developers"), filed a Subdivision Application, Adequate Public Facilities Certificate Application, and Forest Conservation Approval Application with the Commission. The applications were for the development of the Village, a mixed-use retirement community to be located on approximately thirty-four acres of a 175-acre parcel to the west/southwest of the intersection of Forest Drive and Spa Road in the vicinity of Crystal Spring Farm Road, in the City of Annapolis. On January 22, 2019, the Developers filed a Planned Development Application with the Commission. In addition, on June 21, 2021, the Developers filed a request for a significant tree removal variance, seeking a variance to remove sixty-four significant trees to further the development of the Village.

After several revisions of the Village's design, the Commission held a series of six hearings on the Developers' applications beginning on December 16, 2021, and ending on March 31, 2022. At the hearing on January 6, 2022, appellant argued that the development of the Village would irreparably harm the environment, negatively impact the neighboring communities, and that the City of Annapolis MPDU ordinance, which requires that at least fifteen percent of the houses for sale or rent in a new subdivision of ten or more units be sold or rented below the market rate for other units in the same development, applied to the Village.

On March 31, 2022, the Commission issued an opinion and order approving all of the Developers' pending development applications. The Commission found, inter alia, that the MPDU ordinance did not apply to the Village. On April 28, 2022, appellant, along with six other individuals and one corporation, filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Commission's opinion and order in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ("the Petition"). On May 2, 2022, appellant filed a separate Petition for Judicial Review, which was later consolidated with the Petition. At the time of filing the Petition, appellant lived at 1228 Crummell Avenue, Annapolis, MD 21403.

In the petitioners' memorandum in support of the Petition, they argued that (1) the Commission erred when it determined that the Village was exempt from the MPDU regulations; (2) the Commission failed to satisfy "the minimum requirements for articulating the facts found, the law applied, and the relationship between the two regarding the requested variances to remove priority forest and significant trees[;]" (3) the Commission erred by granting the Developers' requested variance to remove sixty-four significant trees because it misinterpreted the criteria to grant a variance; and (4) the record lacked substantial evidence to support the grant of a variance to the Developers. In a "Complaint" supporting her separate petition for judicial review, appellant asserts that (1) the Commission^[2] erred in its decision to approve the zoning application for the Village by failing to require the application of the MPDU ordinance; (2) the Commission erred in approving the zoning variance by not complying with the zoning regulation requiring an analysis of the financial impact on adjacent and surrounding private property; and (3) the Commission "violated the Federal Fair Housing Act by failing to enforce the MPDU."

By order dated December 12, 2022, the circuit court upheld the Commission's determination that the Village was exempt from the MPDU ordinance, but stated that it would hold sub curia all questions related to variances from the Forest Conservation Act and tree removal. On January 11, 2022, the court issued an order vacating and remanding the Commission's Opinion and Order pertaining to certain forest conservation elements of the Commission's decision. On February 10, 2023, appellant, proceeding pro se, filed the instant appeal. Appellant was the only party to note an appeal. The appellees are the Developers and the City of Annapolis (the "City").

In this Court, the Developers filed a Motion to Dismiss and Amended Motion to Dismiss asserting, inter alia, that appellant lacked standing to maintain the instant appeal. We denied the motions "without prejudice to the appellees to seek that relief in the appellees' brief pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-603(c)." In their briefs before this Court, both the Developers and the City seek dismissal of the instant appeal on the grounds that appellant lacks standing to maintain an appeal.

We shall provide additional facts as necessary to the resolution of the questions presented in this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court recently described the appellate standard of review for agency decisions in Matter of Cricket Wireless, LLC, 259 Md.App. 44, 66-67 (2023):

" 'In an appeal of the circuit court's review of an agency action, an appellate court reviews the agency's action itself rather than the decision of the circuit court.'" Maryland Small MS4 Coal. v. Maryland Dep't of the Env't, 250 Md.App. 388, 411, 250 A.3d 346 (2021) (quoting Maryland Dep't of the Env't v. Cnty. Comm'rs of Carroll Cnty., 465 Md. 169, 201, 214 A.3d 61 (2019) ("Carroll Cnty.")), aff'd, 479 Md. 1, 276 A.3d 573 (2022).

In reviewing the agency's action, we apply three standards of review. First, we review the agency's pure factual findings and conclusions under the "substantial evidence" standard. Montgomery Park, LLC v. MarylandDep't of Gen. Servs., 254 Md.App. 73, 98, 270 A.3d 993 (2022), aff'd, 482 Md. 706, 290 A.3d 586 (2023). We apply that same standard to mixed questions of law and fact, which many agency decisions represent. A mixed question of law and fact arises "when an agency has correctly stated the law, its factfinding is supported by the record, and the remaining question is whether the agency has correctly applied the law to the facts." Crawford v. Cnty. Council of Prince George's Cnty., 482 Md. 680, 695, 290 A.3d 571 (2023). In that instance, our task is to determine if the evidence before the agency was "fairly debatable." Id.

"Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" B&S Mktg. Enters., LLC., v. Consumer Prot. Div., 153 Md.App. 130, 151, 835 A.2d 215 (2003) (quoting Md. State Police v. Warwick Supply &Equip. Co., 330 Md. 474, 494, 624 A.2d 1238 (1993)) (further quotation marks and citation omitted). We review the record in a light most favorable to the agency, and, if the record supports the agency's findings, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the agency's, even if we might have reached a different result. Montgomery Park, 254 Md.App. at 98-99, 270 A.3d 993. In other words, we give deference to the agency's findings of fact, the inferences it draws from those facts, and its application of the relevant law to those factual findings. Id.

Second, we generally review the agency's pure legal conclusions de novo without deference to the agency. Id. But in doing so, we give careful consideration to the agency's interpretation of a law it has been charged by the legislature to administer. Maryland Small MS4 Coal., 250 Md.App. at 412, 250 A.3d 346.

Third, we review the agency's discretionary decisions under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Cnty. Council of Prince George s Cnty. v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 574, 120 A.3d 677 (2015). "This standard is highly contextual, but generally the question is whether the agency exercised its discretion 'unreasonably or without a rational basis.'" Carroll County, 465 Md. at 202, 214 A.3d 61 (quoting Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 297, 884 A.2d 1171 (2005)).

DISCUSSION

I. Standing Generally

Before a case may be heard on the merits, a plaintiff or petitioner must have standing to bring the lawsuit. See Greater Towson Council of Cmty. Associations v. DMS Dev., LLC 234 Md.App. 388, 408-09 (2017). Standing is a doctrine that falls under the broad category of justiciability, a concept that is "'aimed at isolating those circumstances in which courts should withhold decision, either from deference to the particular authority and competence of another branch of government, or from recognition of the functional limitations of the adversary system.'" State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P'ship, 438 Md. 451, 498 (2014) (quoting Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyanne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1992)). "Although the issue of standing may not be jurisdictional in nature, it does go to the very heart of whether the controversy before the court is justiciable[.]"...