In re McMahan

405 P.3d 1012

In the MATTER OF the DETENTION OF James MCMAHAN

In the Matter of the Detention of Shawn Botner

No. 34192-5-III

consolidated with No. 34198-4-III

No. 35236-6-III

No. 35237-4-III

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

NOVEMBER 21, 2017

Mary Elizabeth Robnett, Brooke Elizabeth Burbank, Assistant Attorney General, Joshua George Studor, Attorney at Law, Office of the Attorney General, 800 5th Ave., Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, for Petitioner.

Jodi R. Backlund, Manek R. Mistry, Backlund & Mistry, P.O. Box 6490, Olympia, WA, 98507-6490, Marla Leza Polin, Polin Law Office PS, 1314 S. Grand Blvd., Ste. 2, # 139, Spokane, WA, 99202-1174, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Pennell, J.

¶1 Under RCW 71.09.070(1), the Department of Social and Health Services is required to obtain a mental condition examination of each person committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) at least once every year. We are asked to clarify what the legislature meant by this requirement and what remedies are available for noncompliance.

¶2 Based on the plain language of the statute, we hold the Department is required to finalize a mental condition examination report at least once every calendar year. Should it fail to do so, a detained person's recourse is to demand a show cause hearing. At the show cause hearing, the State may proffer any evidence that would otherwise be admissible, including an untimely examination report. The trial court's rulings to the contrary are reversed.

BACKGROUND

James McMahan's first motion

¶3 James McMahan was civilly committed as an SVP on November 7, 2012. On November 25, 2015, Mr. McMahan filed a motion in superior court, alleging the Department had failed to conduct its annual examination of his mental condition as required by RCW 71.09.070. Mr. McMahan's motion requested a show cause hearing regarding his continued detention under RCW 71.09.090(2)(a).

¶4 In brief, RCW 71.09.090(2)(a) permits a committed person to ask for a preliminary, "show cause" hearing to assess the possibility of a full evidentiary hearing regarding the person's continued eligibility for detention as an SVP. At the preliminary hearing, the State is burdened with presenting prima facie evidence supporting continued detention. RCW 71.09.090(2)(b). This burden may be satisfied by reliance on an annual report prepared pursuant to RCW 71.09.070. Id. If the State fails to meet its burden, or if there is probable cause to believe the committed person's mental condition has changed such that the criteria for detention are no longer met, the matter must be set for a full hearing.

RCW 71.09.090(2)(c). If the State satisfies its burden, no further proceedings are warranted.

¶5 As part of his arguments to the trial court, Mr. McMahan demanded the State be prohibited from satisfying its burden of proof at the show cause hearing through use of an untimely annual examination report. Although the State had obtained a report that recommended continued SVP detention shortly after Mr. McMahan filed his initial motion, Mr. McMahan argued the court should exclude the report from evidence as a penalty for missing its deadline.

¶6 The trial court agreed with Mr. McMahan. Because the Department had not completed Mr. McMahan's examination within one year of his commitment anniversary date, the trial court found the most recent report untimely. As a sanction for this deficiency, the court excluded evidence of the report from Mr. McMahan's show cause hearing. Without the information from the report, the trial court determined the State had failed its show cause obligation. Thus, the court ordered a trial on the merits regarding whether Mr. McMahan should be released from commitment.

Shawn Botner's first motion

¶7 Shawn Botner was committed as a sexually violent predator on November 17, 2014. On December 23, 2015, the Department completed an initial examination report that concluded Mr. Botner continued to meet the criteria for SVP detention. Despite the report's adverse recommendation, Mr. Botner filed a motion for a show cause hearing under RCW 71.09.090(2)(a). Mr. Botner argued that because the Department's examination report was not issued within one year of his commitment date, it was untimely and should be excluded from evidence at his show cause hearing. The trial court agreed with Mr. Botner and issued the same ruling in his case as was issued for Mr. McMahan. Specifically, the trial court granted Mr. Botner's show cause motion, excluded the examination report from evidence at the show cause hearing, and ordered a release trial.

Subsequent proceedings and motions

¶8 Prior to the release trials, the State obtained discretionary review from our court and stays of execution. During the pendency of the stays, the Department completed additional examination reports pertaining to McMahan and Botner. Mr. McMahan's report was completed on December 8, 2016. Mr. Botner's report was completed on November 28, 2016, Both reports found a continued basis for SVP detention.

¶9 In December 2016, McMahan and Botner each filed a second motion to show cause. They again argued the Department failed to meet the statutory one-year deadline for their examinations. Utilizing the anniversary date of the two men's original orders of commitment as a reference point, the trial court agreed and found the examination reports untimely. The court then excluded the reports from consideration at each show cause hearing and scheduled full evidentiary hearings for both men.

¶10 After the trial court's second set of rulings, the State again sought discretionary review and requested stays of all scheduled evidentiary hearings. These requests were granted and all four cases pertaining to McMahan and Botner have been consolidated for review in this appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶11 "Each person committed [as an SVP] shall have a current examination of his or her mental condition made by the department at least once every year." RCW 71.09.070(1). This appeal presents questions over what constitutes a "year;" what must be done within the yearly period; and when compliance with the yearly deadline should be measured. We are also asked what remedies are available if these obligations are not met. The questions posed turn on statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Dep't of Ecology v . Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).

The statutory requirement of an examination at least once every year

¶12 The fundamental goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the legislature's intent. In re Marriage of Schneider , 173 Wash.2d 353, 363, 268 P.3d 215 (2011). The best evidence of this intent is a statute's language. Id. If a statute is plain on its face, we look no further and do not engage in statutory construction. However, as part of assessing whether or not a statute's meaning is plain on its face, we may look to the statute's context and related provisions. Campbell & Gwinn , 146 Wash.2d at 11, 43 P.3d 4. We may also consult dictionaries to assess the meaning of terms left undefined by the legislature. Cornu-Labat v . Hosp. Dist. No. 2 , 177 Wash.2d 221, 231, 298 P.3d 741 (2013). If, after this close scrutiny, a statute's terms are only amenable to one reasonable interpretation, the statute must be declared unambiguous and we will give it that effect. Gorre v . City of Tacoma , 184 Wash.2d 30, 42, 357 P.3d 625 (2015).

¶13 The parties raise three questions regarding what the legislature meant by RCW 71.09.070(l)'s requirement that the Department make an examination of a committed person's mental condition at least once every year:

1. What is meant by the word year?

2. What must be done to satisfy the requirement that an examination be made at least once every year?

3. What action date should be utilized to determine the Department's compliance with its yearly examination obligation?

All three questions can be answered by careful review of the statute's plain language.

What constitutes a year?

¶14 Neither the SVP statute nor the Revised Code of Washington define what is meant by the term "year." This lack of explicit definition has prompted debate over whether the term means anniversary year or calendar year. If the term refers to anniversary year, this leads to dispute over which anniversary is intended. Is it the anniversary of the committed person's SVP determination or the anniversary of the person's last mental condition examination?

¶15 The inquiry need not be so complicated. In common parlance the term "year" refers to a cycle in the Gregorian calendar of 365 or 366 days, divided into 12 months, beginning with January and ending with December. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2648 (1993); 74 AM. JUR. 2 D Time § 7 (2012). In contrast, "[t]he term 'preceding year' or 'year preceding' ... signifies a 12-month anniversary-to-anniversary period." 74 AM. JUR. 2 D Time § 7, at 626. By using the generic term "year," instead of "anniversary year" or some form of "preceding year," the legislature indicated its intent that the Department only complete an examination at least once every calendar year.

¶16 Had the legislature intended "year" to mean anniversary year, it would have used clarifying language similar to that set forth in RCW 71.09.070(7), which sets an anniversary year deadline in special circumstances.¹ Because the language used in subsection (1) is substantially different than what is contained in subsection (7), it is apparent the legislature intended different meanings. Densley v. Dep't of Ret. Sys ., 162 Wash.2d 210, 219, 173 P.3d 885 (2007).

¶17 Reviewing the term "every year" in both isolation and context, it is reasonably apparent the legislature intended the State have some leeway² in choosing the precise timing of a committed person's annual examination, so long as an examination takes place at least once every calendar year. Such leeway does not lead to untenable results. Requiring the Department to conduct examinations once every calendar year enables it to...