In re Mohammad

12 Cal.5th 518

501 P.3d 635

288 Cal.Rptr.3d 271

IN RE Mohammad MOHAMMAD on Habeas Corpus.

S259999

Supreme Court of California.

January 3, 2022

Michael Satris, Bolinas, and Heather MacKay, Oakland, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Mohammad Mohammad.

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael Mongan, State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, Helen H. Hong, Deputy State Solicitor General, Amanda J. Murray and Charles Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent the People.

Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent the People.

Richard J. Sachs, Deputy District Attorney (San Diego) and Mark Zhaner for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent the People.

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

This case asks whether Proposition 57, The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, requires California's Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) to provide early parole consideration to individuals currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony.

Petitioner Mohammad Mohammad was incarcerated after having been convicted of nine violent felony counts and six nonviolent felony counts. The trial court ordered all terms to be served consecutively. After petitioner's conviction, the electorate approved Proposition 57 in November 2016, which added section 32 to article I of the California Constitution to provide, in relevant part, that "[a]ny person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her primary offense." ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(1).)¹ The ballot initiative also directed the Department to "adopt regulations in furtherance of these provisions" and instructed the Secretary of the Department to "certify that these regulations protect and enhance public safety." ( Art. I, § 32, subd. (b).)

The Department subsequently adopted regulations implementing early parole consideration under article I, section 32.² Those regulations exclude from nonviolent offender early parole consideration any inmate who "is currently serving a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony[.]’ " ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3490, subd. (a)(5).)³ The regulations state that a " ‘[v]iolent felony’ is a crime or enhancement as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code." (Id. , § 3490, subd. (c).)

Consistent with those regulations, the Department determined petitioner was ineligible for nonviolent offender early parole consideration because he was serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony. Petitioner challenged that determination, and the Court of Appeal granted relief, holding that the language of article I, section 32(a) requires early parole consideration for any inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony even when that inmate was also convicted of a violent felony. ( In re Mohammad (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 719, 727, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706 ( Mohammad ).)

We granted review to decide the validity of the Department's regulation prohibiting early parole consideration under the Proposition 57 scheme for inmates "currently serving a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony.’ " (Cal. Code Regs., § 3490, subd. (a)(5).) While the matter was pending in this court, four other appellate courts disagreed with Mohammad and concluded the Department's regulations properly excluded from early parole consideration inmates currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony offense.⁴

We conclude that the Department acted within the authority provided by article I, section 32(b) when it adopted the regulation at issue here. In reaching this conclusion, we find the constitutional text is ambiguous concerning the application of article I, section 32(a) to an inmate like petitioner who is currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony offense.

Considering the text together with the materials presented to the voters, we hold that the Department's approach is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of Proposition 57. We therefore agree with the majority of the appellate courts, and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal below.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Underlying Conviction

In 2012, petitioner pleaded no contest to nine counts of second degree robbery ( Pen. Code, § 211 ) and six counts of receiving stolen property (id. , § 496, subd. (a)). The trial court designated one count of receiving stolen property to be the principal term and ordered the remaining counts to run consecutively. Petitioner was sentenced to 29 years in prison — three years for the principal term of receiving stolen property, eight months for each of the other counts of receiving stolen property, one year for each of the nine counts of robbery, and a total of 13 years eight months for gang enhancements attached to six counts (id. , § 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C)).⁵ Petitioner did not appeal.

B. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Court of Appeal Opinion

The electorate approved Proposition 57 in 2016. Petitioner subsequently filed a request with the Department asking for early parole consideration. He asserted that Proposition 57 requires early parole consideration for inmates who have completed the full term for a primary offense when that offense is nonviolent. He noted that the trial court in his case designated as the principal term one count of receiving stolen property, and that receiving stolen property is not defined as a violent felony under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). The Department denied petitioner's request. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The superior court denied the petition in November 2018, agreeing with the Department.

In January 2019, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in the Court of Appeal. That court ultimately held in a published opinion that the Department's regulations improperly excluded petitioner from early parole consideration. ( Mohammad, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 729, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706.) The court focused on the language of the constitutional provision establishing parole consideration for " ‘[a]ny person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense’ upon completion of ‘the full term of his or her primary offense.’ " ( Id. at p. 726, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706, quoting art. I, § 32(a)(1).) This language, the court held, contains the sole requirement for early parole consideration under Proposition 57 — conviction of a nonviolent felony. ( Mohammad, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 726, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706.) Early parole consideration is therefore required, according to the Court of Appeal, "so long as [the inmate] commits ‘a’ single nonviolent felony offense — even if that offense is not his or her only offense." ( Ibid. )

In support of its conclusion, the court pointed to the constitutional language defining the " ‘full term for the primary offense’ as ‘the longest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense, excluding the imposition of an enhancement, [a ] consecutive sentence , or [an] alternative sentence.’ " ( Mohammad, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 726, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706, quoting art. I, § 32(a)(1)(A).) Under this provision, the court asserted, "an inmate who is ‘convicted of a nonviolent felony offense’ not only remains eligible if he or she is sentenced to a consecutive sentence, but in fact, becomes eligible for an early parole hearing prior to serving that consecutive sentence." ( Mohammad, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 727, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706, quoting art. I, § 32(a)(1).)

The court rejected the Department's regulations as incompatible with the language of article I, section 32(a)(1). ( Mohammad, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 726–727, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706.) The court noted that those regulations "dictate a different result, but only by impermissibly defining and limiting the universe of eligible inmates to ‘nonviolent offenders ’ — a term that does not appear anywhere in [article I,] section 32 (a)(1)." ( Id. at p. 726, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706, quoting Cal. Code Regs., § 3491.) The court declined to consider the ballot materials presented to the voters, determining that review of extrinsic sources was unnecessary because the language of the constitutional provision itself was unambiguous. ( Mohammad, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 727, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706, citing Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 444–445, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 312, 187 P.3d 37.)

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Department's argument "has some intuitive appeal. It cannot be, the argument goes, that voters intended a defendant who is convicted of more crimes, i.e., both violent and nonviolent felonies, to be eligible for early parole consideration while a defendant convicted of fewer crimes, i.e., the same violent felony but no nonviolent felonies, is not." ( Mohammad, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 727, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706.) But this "intuitive appeal" is overcome and that interpretation foreclosed, the court determined, by the language of the provision. ( Id. at pp. 727–728, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706.)

The court also noted that petitioner's case "is an unusual one" in that the trial court designated a nonviolent felony as petitioner's principal term, while "[o]ften" an individual's most serious violent felony is deemed the principal term. ( Mohammad, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 728, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 706.) The court suggested that these facts — "when an inmate becomes eligible for early parole consideration before serving time for any of his or her violent felony offenses" — ...