Case Law In re Moore

In re Moore

Document Cited Authorities (17) Cited in (1) Related

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: CARLOS E. MOORE (PRO SE) WILLIE T. ABSTON, Flowood

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: HARRIS FREDERICK POWERS III, TOMMIE G. WILLIAMS, TOMMIE GREGORY WILLIAMS JR., Greenwood

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., TINDELL AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On December 1, 2017, the Leflore County Circuit Court granted Greenwood Leflore Hospital's motion for sanctions against Carlos Moore after Moore failed to appear on his client's behalf at a bench trial held on September 5, 2017. Moore subsequently filed unsuccessful motions for reconsideration and for an evidentiary hearing on the motion for reconsideration. On January 26, 2018, Moore filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal, and the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that Moore's petition should be treated as a notice of appeal. On appeal, Moore challenges the circuit court's denial of his motion for reconsideration and its failure to rule on his motion for an evidentiary hearing. Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court's denial of Moore's motion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On January 30, 2014, Moore filed a medical-negligence complaint against Greenwood Leflore Hospital ("the Hospital") in the circuit court on behalf of the plaintiff, Lue R. Sanders.1 At some point over the next two years, Moore associated with the firm of "Brown, Bass & Jeter, PLLC" as additional counsel. But the firm's first appearance on the record came on June 14, 2016, when Katrina Brown and Lillie Evans Bass filed a second amended designation of experts on behalf of Sanders. Until that point, Moore had been the sole attorney of record for Sanders, having executed and filed all pleadings and discovery submissions. Moore also entered into the first agreed scheduling order on Sanders's behalf.

¶3. On December 5, 2016, the circuit court entered an agreed order, setting trial for September 5, 2017, which was signed by Brown and the Hospital's counsel. The record does not indicate that Moore ever objected to this agreed trial date, nor does it include any evidence that Moore sought to withdraw as Sanders's counsel in the nine months leading up to trial. On August 18, 2017, Brown and Bass filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on behalf of Brown, Bass & Jeter, PLLC, citing a conflict of interest. In the motion, Brown and Bass advised the circuit court that the firm had no attorney-client agreement or any contract with Sanders and that they were associated on the case through Moore. They also contended that their withdrawal as Sanders's counsel would not unreasonably delay the case or cause prejudice to the parties because Moore would remain Sanders's attorney of record. Moore did not object to the withdrawal or file a response to the firm's motion. The Hospital agreed to the firm's withdrawal in its response, and the circuit court granted the firm's motion on August 29, 2017, noting that Moore "shall remain attorney of record for [Sanders]."

¶4. On August 31, 2017, Moore filed a motion to continue the trial on behalf of Sanders on the grounds that (1) Brown and the firm of Brown, Bass & Jeter, PLLC withdrew on August 29, 2017, and (2) Moore had a scheduling conflict on September 5, 2017, and would be out of state. Moore also filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, arguing that (1) he and Sanders "reached an impasse on how to proceed with her case," (2) Brown and the firm of Brown, Bass & Jeter, PLLC withdrew on August 29, 2017, and (3) Moore would be out of state on September 5, 2017, and had "not had time to adequately prepare for trial." Moore noticed both motions for a hearing for September 5, 2017, which was the scheduled trial date.

¶5. On September 5, 2017, all parties and their counsel appeared for trial, except for Moore. Instead, Justin Smith appeared to argue Moore's motions on behalf of Sanders. Smith advised the circuit court that Moore could not be present for trial because he was preparing for another trial in Tennessee for the following week. Smith also advised the circuit court that if a continuance was not granted, Moore alternatively requested to withdraw as Sanders's counsel. At the hearing, the circuit court noted that the circumstances surrounding Moore's failure to appear were "highly irregular," as the September 5th trial date had been set for "quite a long time." The circuit court also noted that Moore's Tennessee trial was set for the following week, which did not present a conflict for the then currently set trial. But the circuit judge reluctantly granted a continuance, stating that he "hate[d] for the client [ (Sanders) ] to suffer loss because of the neglect of the lawyer [ (Moore) ]."

¶6. On September 7, 2017, the Hospital filed a motion for sanctions against Moore, asking the circuit court to dismiss Sanders's case with prejudice or, alternatively, for an award of monetary sanctions against Moore. The Hospital alleged in its motion that Moore had not been in Tennessee preparing for another trial on September 5, as Smith had advised the circuit court. Instead, the Hospital argued that Moore failed to appear for trial in order to attend a speaking engagement at Jarvis Christian College in Texas, and the Hospital attached excerpts to its motion from Moore and Jarvis Christian College's Facebook pages to support its assertions. The Hospital further argued that it had incurred costs and expenses in preparation for the September 5 trial, which were wasted due to Moore's absence.

¶7. On December 1, 2017, the circuit court denied the Hospital's request to dismiss Sanders's case but granted its request for sanctions against Moore. The circuit court ordered Moore to pay $27,467.83 to the Hospital for the costs and fees associated with the September 5th trial. Moore filed a motion for reconsideration on December 11, 2017, and he filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on December 20, 2017. On January 4, 2018, the circuit court denied Moore's motion for reconsideration but did not address Moore's motion for an evidentiary hearing.

¶8. On January 26, 2018, Moore filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal from the circuit court's order denying his motion for reconsideration. The Mississippi Supreme Court ultimately found that Moore's petition should be treated as a notice of appeal, stating that "the Sanctions Order is final and directly appealable ... [b]ecause the sanctions were levied against [Moore] alone, and not the plaintiff, and the issue of sanctions has no bearing on the merits of the underlying case." On appeal before this Court, Moore presents the following issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred by failing to rule on his motion for an evidentiary hearing; (2) whether the circuit court erred by imposing sanctions on Moore; (3) whether the amount of the sanctions was reasonable; and (4) whether the circuit court erred in denying Moore's motion for reconsideration.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9. We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the circuit court's grant or denial of sanctions. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. McLain , 174 So. 3d 1279, 1284 (¶12) (Miss. 2015). We also employ an abuse-of discretion standard when we review the circuit court's denial of a motion for reconsideration. Rowser v. Fisher , 281 So. 3d 317, 319 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the circuit court erred when it failed to rule on Moore's motion for an evidentiary hearing.

¶10. Moore first argues that the circuit court erred when it granted the Hospital's motion for sanctions but failed to address Moore's motion for an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Moore further argues that because the circuit court never ruled upon the motion, the issue of sanctions was ultimately left unresolved. As such, Moore seems to suggest that the Mississippi Supreme Court wrongfully determined that the circuit court's "Sanctions Order" on January 5, 2018, constituted a final, appealable judgment.

¶11. In support of his assertions, Moore cites to the case of Wilton Acquisitions Corp. v. First Methodist Church of Biloxi , 85 So. 3d 319 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). In Wilton , the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's case and a motion for sanctions after the plaintiff repeatedly failed to appear for depositions. Id . at 322 (¶6). The chancellor granted the defendant's motions, but he expressly held the issue of attorney's fees and costs under advisement until the defendant could submit further information on the matter to assist the chancellor in his assessment. Id . at (¶7). In denying the plaintiff's motion to reconsider, the chancellor stated "that [the] judgment shall be final pursuant to [Rule] 54(b) as to all claims in the matter with the exception of the amount of expenses and attorney's fees to be awarded." Id . We dismissed the appeal, finding "that the chancellor's order was not a final, appealable order because it left [the defendant's] claim for attorney's fees pending." Id . at 324 (¶12). We further found that the chancellor "abused his discretion by improperly certifying his order of dismissal as a Rule 54(b) judgment[,]" and therefore the case could not be brought before this Court for appellate review. Id .

¶12. Moore argues that this Court's holding in Wilton applies to his case because the circuit court denied his motion to reconsider without ruling on his motion for an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. In Wilton , the chancellor ruled upon all of the parties’ claims except for the defendant's claim for attorney's fees. Id . (emphasis added). Therefore, this Court found that the chancellor had not properly disposed of all claims, and his order was not a final, appealable judgment. Id . Here, the circuit court assessed sanctions against Moore, not Sanders, the plaintiff. As the Mississippi Supreme Court noted in its May 17, 2018 order, "the sanctions were levied against the plaintiff's counsel [Moore] alone, and not the plaintiff ,...

1 cases
Document | Mississippi Court of Appeals – 2022
Hardin v. Hardin
"... ... As for Lisa's alternative request for relief under Rule 59(e), our caselaw requires that she show "(i) an intervening change in controlling law, (ii) availability of new evidence not previously available, or (iii) need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice." In re Moore , 297 So. 3d 316, 323 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Brooks v. Roberts , 882 So. 2d 229, 233 (¶15) (Miss. 2004) ). We find, however, that Lisa has failed to sufficiently establish any of these factors in her appellate brief and simply reasserts her prior assignments of error. Because we ... "

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1 cases
Document | Mississippi Court of Appeals – 2022
Hardin v. Hardin
"... ... As for Lisa's alternative request for relief under Rule 59(e), our caselaw requires that she show "(i) an intervening change in controlling law, (ii) availability of new evidence not previously available, or (iii) need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice." In re Moore , 297 So. 3d 316, 323 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Brooks v. Roberts , 882 So. 2d 229, 233 (¶15) (Miss. 2004) ). We find, however, that Lisa has failed to sufficiently establish any of these factors in her appellate brief and simply reasserts her prior assignments of error. Because we ... "

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