In re Murack

957 N.W.2d 124

In the MATTER OF: Diana MURACK.

A20-1178

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed March 8, 2021

Thomas A. Krause, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., Winona, Minnesota; and Charles H. Thomas, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator Diana Murack)

Katherine Conlin, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.

SEGAL, Chief Judge

This unemployment-benefits appeal raises the issue of whether an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) violated a provision of an executive order issued by the governor in conjunction with the COVID-19 peacetime emergency. The first operative paragraph of that order suspended "strict compliance" with the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law (unemployment statute), Minn. Stat. §§ 268.001 -.23 (2020). Without considering the impact of the executive order, the ULJ dismissed as untimely relator Diana Murack's appeal of an initial determination of ineligibility for unemployment benefits.

Murack asserts that strict compliance with the administrative appeal deadline was suspended by the executive order and that, consequently, the dismissal must be reversed. Respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED), the agency that administers the unemployment statute, claims that the executive order is more limited in its scope.

We agree with Murack that the plain language of the first paragraph of the executive order suspended strict compliance with the administrative appeal deadline and reverse the dismissal. The suspension of strict compliance did not, however, eliminate the deadline. We therefore remand this case for consideration of the impact of the executive order and, specifically, whether relator was in substantial compliance with the deadline.

FACTS

On March 13, 2020, Governor Tim Walz declared a peacetime emergency in Minnesota because of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-01, Declaring a Peacetime Emergency & Coordinating Minnesota's Strategy to Protect Minnesotans from COVID-19 (Mar. 13, 2020). The COVID-19 peacetime emergency has been extended multiple times and is currently in effect through March 15, 2021, subject to further order of the governor or termination by a majority vote of each house of the legislature. See Minn. Stat. § 12.31, subd. 2 ; Emerg. Exec. Order No. 21-08, Extending the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency Declared in Exec. Order No. 20-01 (Feb. 12, 2021). Since March 13, 2020, the governor has issued numerous additional emergency executive orders, requiring such things as the temporary closure of certain businesses and a suspension of most evictions and writs of recovery. See, e.g. , Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-04, Providing for Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants & Other Places of Public Accommodation (Mar. 16, 2020); Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-14, Suspending Evictions & Writs of Recovery During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (Mar. 23, 2020). The legislature also enacted provisions in response to the pandemic, including a suspension of the statutes of limitation during the pendency of the peacetime emergency. See 2020 Minn. Laws ch. 74, art. 1, § 16; 2021 Minn. Laws ch. 3, § 1.

On March 16, 2020, the governor issued Emergency Executive Order No. 20-05, Providing Immediate Relief to Employers & Unemployed Workers During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (Mar. 16, 2020) (EEO 20-05 or the executive order). EEO 20-05 modified provisions of the unemployment statute to help mitigate the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on workers and employers.

During the COVID-19 peacetime emergency, DEED issued an initial determination that Murack was not eligible for unemployment benefits for reasons unrelated to this appeal. The determination stated that it would be final unless an administrative appeal was filed within 20 calendar days from the date of mailing, or by April 13, 2020.

According to Murack, she attempted to appeal online and believed that a telephonic hearing on her appeal was scheduled for June 19, 2020. Unbeknownst to Murack, she did not complete all online steps necessary to submit her appeal. After no telephonic hearing was held on June 19, Murack filed an appeal online on June 22, 2020, this time successfully completing all necessary steps. The appeal, however, was dismissed by a ULJ as untimely because it was filed ten weeks after the April 13 deadline. Murack sought reconsideration, but the dismissal was affirmed.

Murack filed this certiorari appeal in which she contends that the ULJ erred by dismissing her administrative appeal because strict compliance with the 20-day statutory time period for filing an administrative appeal was suspended by EEO 20-05. On the parties’ joint motion, we expedited scheduling of this appeal to address the time-sensitive issue of whether EEO 20-05 suspends strict compliance with the 20-day administrative appeal period during the COVID-19 peacetime emergency.¹

ISSUE

Did the ULJ err by requiring strict compliance with the administrative appeal deadline?

ANALYSIS

The only issue for our determination on this appeal is whether the ULJ erred by dismissing Murack's administrative appeal as untimely without considering the impact of the executive order. See Christgau v. Fine , 223 Minn. 452, 27 N.W.2d 193, 199 (1947). A ULJ's decision to dismiss an appeal as untimely raises a jurisdictional question of law, which we review de novo. Kennedy v. Am. Paper Recycling Corp. , 714 N.W.2d 738, 739 (Minn. App. 2006).

In analyzing this issue, we first provide an overview of the administrative appeal process and law related to the appeal deadline. We then address the threshold question of whether principles of statutory construction apply to interpreting emergency executive orders. Deciding that question in the affirmative, we apply those principles to conclude that the plain language of the executive order suspended strict compliance with the administrative appeal deadline and that the ULJ erred by failing to consider whether Murack was in "substantial compliance" with the appeal deadline.

Administrative Appeal Deadline

Under the unemployment statute, an applicant's eligibility for unemployment benefits is determined through a multi-stage administrative process. An applicant first applies for benefits and establishes a benefit account. See Minn. Stat. § 268.07. Once a benefit account is established, DEED issues initial determinations of eligibility or ineligibility. See Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2. An applicant may appeal an initial determination of ineligibility, but only if the applicant files the administrative appeal within 20 days of the date that the initial determination is mailed. See Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f). If the administrative appeal is timely, a ULJ will hold a hearing and issue a final administrative decision on the eligibility issue. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105. If the applicant fails to timely appeal, the initial determination becomes final. See Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f).²

We have held that "[t]he statutory time for an appeal from a department determination is absolute." Cole v. Holiday Inns, Inc. , 347 N.W.2d 72, 73 (Minn. App. 1984) (construing predecessor statute with similar language to Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f) ); see also Semanko v. Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 309 Minn. 425, 244 N.W.2d 663, 666 (1976) (characterizing as "absolute and unambiguous" time period to challenge initial determination under predecessor statute). And we have repeatedly stated that when an appeal is not timely filed, it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC , 814 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. App. 2012) ; Kennedy , 714 N.W.2d at 740.

Murack acknowledges these well-established principles regarding appeals from initial determinations, but she argues that the principles do not apply here because of EEO 20-05. More specifically, Murack relies on language in the executive order providing that "strict compliance" with the unemployment statute is "suspended" during the peacetime emergency.

Applicability of Principles of Statutory Interpretation to Executive Orders

The governor declared the COVID-19 peacetime emergency pursuant to his authority under the Minnesota Emergency Management Act of 1996, Minn. Stat. §§ 12.01 -.61. Executive orders issued pursuant to this authority have "the full force and effect of law." Minn. Stat. § 12.32.

Although it appears to raise an issue of first impression for Minnesota courts, courts of other jurisdictions have applied principles of statutory interpretation in interpreting executive orders. See, e.g. , Bassidji v. Goe , 413 F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir. 2005) ("As is true of interpretation of statutes, the interpretation of an Executive Order begins with its text."); United States v. Abu Marzook , 412 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ("The Court interprets Executive Orders in the same manner that it interprets statutes."); City of Morgan Hill v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. , 118 Cal.App.4th 861, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420, 431 (2004) ("The construction of an executive order presents an issue akin to an issue of statutory interpretation ...."). Relying on these cases, the parties have framed their arguments with reference to principles of statutory interpretation. Because the governor's emergency-executive orders have "the full force and effect of law," Minn. Stat. § 12.32, we agree that it is appropriate to apply statutory-interpretation principles in interpreting them. Cf. Minn. Stat. §§ 14.38, subd. 1 (providing that administrative rules filed with secretary of state have "force and effect of law"), 645.001 (providing that provisions of chapter 645 governing statutory interpretation apply to administrative rules) (2020).

Interpretation of EEO 20-05

The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of ...